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Long abstract 
Perceptual decision-making describes the processes by which sensory information is recognised, 
evaluated and combined before making a commitment to a course of action.  The goal of this thesis 
is to understand the neural and computational mechanisms underlying human perceptual decisions.  
Good decisions are made when all the available evidence is taken into account, and allowed to 
influence choice in proportion to its reliability. The first experimental chapter describes a 
categorisation task employed to investigate how information is integrated and employed according 
to its reliability during sequential sampling.  It is observed that humans weight information 
approximately optimally. A subsequent experiment involving electroencephalographic (EEG) 
recordings elucidates a neurobiologically plausible mechanism that could give rise to this effect.  
 
However, reliability-based evidence integration may only be possible in relatively simple decisions, 
when task demands are lower. Previous work investigating more challenging decisions has shown that 
when two alternatives are viewed in series, locally preferred alternatives are processed with higher 
gain (“selective integration”). Experiment 2 asks (at both the behavioural and neural level) whether 
this selective integration happens at the level of attributes - i.e. category A versus B - or features - i.e. 
sub-dimensions of each of the attributes. Finding that it occurs at the level of features, we discuss the 
optimality of this strategy. We show, interestingly, that whilst selective integration at the feature level 
is not harmful to performance, only attribute-level selectivity is actively beneficial in this context.  
 
In everyday settings, the choice to stop integrating evidence and commit is often determined by the 
agent, rather than an external deadline. Experiment 3 uses a self-paced categorisation task to 
investigate what factors predict when decisions are made. The results show that decisions and their 
latencies are described by a quasi-optimal model, that times commitment in a way that depends on 
the evidence consistency.  We show that an approximation based on normalisation can account for 
these findings at the computational level. This model predicts neural signals observed in humans. 
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Impact statement 
Decisions are made collectively, individually, with wide- or narrow-reaching scope, successfully or 
unsuccessfully, in every walk of life at every moment of every day. The work presented in this thesis 
asks a fundamental question: when making decisions on the basis of the available information, which 
pieces of evidence do people attend to, and why do they have that focus? In the research presented, 
I show that individuals attend to only some of the evidence available in many situations, and 
specifically often focus on evidence that is in line with their current beliefs. Importantly, I outline the 
mechanisms that give rise to this behaviour: it is only through understanding the processes 
underpinning evidence integration that we can help people make the best choices. For example, when 
a nation goes to vote on some historically important issue about which it is generally ill-informed, 
knowing about these tendencies towards incomplete and biased evidence perusal may allow us to 
present evidence in a way that best mitigates against these effects, allowing individuals to make the 
best-informed decision possible.  
 
In the world of mental health, disorders such as obsessive-compulsive disorder, depression and 
schizophrenia are characterised by atypical decision-making. Through understanding how decision-
making occurs in healthy individuals, as I do here, we can begin to understand what causes choices to 
be different in those who suffer from these illnesses. Gaining this understanding may open up 
potential cognitive-behaviour treatment options, that guide the individual back towards a healthy 
pattern of decision making without the need for psychoactive medication, which often has far 
reaching negative side effects.   
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1. General introduction 
 
1.1. Perceptual decision making 
 
Mentioning to a newly-met acquaintance that your research focuses on decision making is a risky 
business: there generally follows an exclamation of great excitement about the clear utility of your 
work, followed by an inevitable anti-climax when you hasten to add that the decisions in question are 
perceptual in nature. To many, perceptual decision making – the detection, discrimination and 
categorisation of sensory information, which underpins processes from determining a person’s 
identity, to deducing whether you have been pocket dialled or the person on the other end of the 
phone just has bad signal, to recognising the bus in the distance as the one you are waiting for – is 
just not something that they would classify as ‘decision making’: is it really fair, they ask, to call a 
process that generally occurs with such obvious ease, with little to no conscious deliberation, a 
“decision”? 
 
A decision occurs every time we are compelled to choose one option from a number of alternatives. 
Thus objectively, yes, such perceptual processes certainly are decisions, and furthermore they are far 
from trivial. When I correctly recognise movement I catch in the corner of my eye as being caused by 
the cat walking past the doorway, the process seems simple, and yet within a few milliseconds my 
brain has detected motion in my peripheral vision and, based on the nature of this fleeting and 
ambiguous sensory signal, has ruled out other plausible explanations for its cause (e.g. reflections 
caused by my wristwatch catching the sunlight, another person walking by, an illusion caused by the 
onset of a migraine). What’s more, I would argue that a process that occurs in such a streamlined 
manner that it doesn’t even appear to penetrate our consciousness in fact makes it all the more 
remarkable. The apparent structure of the external world seems so obvious to us that we may forget 
that every waking moment, we are being bombarded with sensory information and that somehow – 
somehow – from this jumbled mess we are able to segment objects, notice coherence, differences, 
coincidences, patterns and much more in order to infer causes to these sensations. This is, I would 
argue, a breath-taking ability - especially when we consider that the subjective perception that we 
take into account everything that is ‘out there’ cannot possibly be true. Thus without even fully 
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processing the information, we pick out the relevant evidence, combine it with other pieces of 
information and use this to guide our decisions, often under intense time pressure.  
 
In this thesis I will be trying to understand some of the processes that give rise to this ability. I will 
begin with an analogy that covers the key themes that will follow: imagine playing a game of poker at 
a casino. The player to your right, who has been betting with dreadful hands all evening, throws some 
money into the pot. You are aware that there are better hands than your own that could be out there, 
but given this player’s tendency to bluff you match his bet. However, after the next card is revealed, 
a different player on your left – who is evidently a skilled poker player – makes another, similarly sized 
bet, and this now gives you pause. You note the cards on the table that are higher than your own, and 
reflect on the probability of your own hand winning. Concluding after a few moments of deliberation 
that she likely has a better hand than you, you fold your cards before the other players start to 
complain that your thinking time is holding up the game. This process, lasting only a few seconds, is 
an apt example of several of the phenomena that will be examined in detail in this thesis.  
 
Firstly, to make good decisions, information must be considered in proportion to its reliability. Giving 
much greater credence to the raise from the skilled player than the bet from the bluffer illustrates 
behaviour in accordance with this principle: although the ‘evidence’ (the size of the bet) was equally 
strong in both cases, they lead to very different behaviour on your part (calling versus folding). The 
question of whether and how people make decisions that take into account the reliability of the 
information is of central interest here.  
 
Secondly, we noted already that it is impossible to take into account all of the information that reaches 
our senses, but even information which is processed in conscious awareness may be ignored. When 
the second player made her bet, although there were several cards on the table, those that had the 
strongest influence on your decision to fold were the higher cards. This is despite the fact that it’s 
entirely plausible that lower cards formed part of her winning hand. Thus a second central question I 
will ask is what makes us integrate some information preferentially over other pieces of information, 
and what impact this has on choices.  
 
Thirdly, I will consider what drives the timing of choices. In the poker example, your decision to fold 
was made in a timely manner, despite there being no strict deadline imposed on choices (other than 
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etiquette). If a decision is made too quickly, it is likely to be bad, as there will not have been time to 
consider a sufficient amount of evidence. However if a decision is made too slowly, it could also be 
bad: the opportunity for the outcome to be beneficial may already have passed. How we strike a 
balance to time decisions appropriately will be a third focus here.  
 
Finally, an overarching theme of this work is: do these processes lead to good choices? Humans are 
after all often criticised for making poor choices (Brexit, for example), and selective integration of only 
some of the information in particular seems like a potentially myopic strategy. However, we will see 
that defining “optimality” in the first place is a far from simple process.  
 
In the remainder of this introduction, thus, I will start by outlining traditional definitions of 
“optimality”, and providing evidence that people do or do not make optimal perceptual decisions. 
Finding conflicting evidence, I will question these traditional definitions, and suggest an alternative 
definition of ‘optimality’ that provides a unifying account of otherwise contradictory findings. 
According to this updated definition, an optimal decision is one that leads to the greatest chance of 
making an accurate choice when cognitive demand is high. Finally, I will discuss theories that account 
for when choices are made.  
 
1.2. Do humans make good decisions?  
 
Agents make good decisions by giving greater credence to more reliable 
information 
 
Good decisions use all available evidence to inform the choice. However, the best decisions not only 
take into account all the available information but they also – crucially – scale the impact of evidence 
on choice according to its reliability, over and above its strength. The oft used example to illustrate 
what it means to separate these two factors, analogous to the poker example above, is witness 
testimony in a court of law: two witnesses may both give internally consistent accounts of the 
suspect’s movements on the evening the crime was committed, thus providing equally strong 
evidence to the case. However, said witnesses may differ substantially in their reliability: if one is an 
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unconnected bystander, and the other a suspected co-conspirator of the accused, the testimony of 
the former should be more impactful than that of the latter. ‘Reliability-weighting’ or ‘reliability-based 
integration’ refers to the process by which evidence is considered in proportion to its reliability, with 
more reliable evidence holding greater credence.  
 
Early work detailed the phenomenon of ‘visual capture’: participants judged the size of an object by 
viewing it through a distorting lens at the same time as feeling it (Rock & Victor, 1964). The authors 
showed that participants were generally unaware of the discrepancy between the two sources of 
information, and that judgements were overwhelmingly made on the basis of visual rather than haptic 
information. In terms of reliability-weighting, this reliance on vision is appropriate: our highly refined 
visual systems often make it the most reliable source of sensory evidence (Welch & Warren, 1986).  
 
However, later work based on maximum likelihood estimation revealed that visual evidence only 
dominates when it conveys the most reliable evidence: when visual sources are corrupted and 
therefore unreliable, their impact is attenuated by that of other senses. Maximum likelihood 
estimation is a process that specifies how information from different sources (for example, sensory 
modalities) should be combined according to the reliability of each source. Thus it can be used to 
derive the ‘optimal’ weight a reliability-weighting observer should give each source of information in 
a given scenario. There is a wealth of evidence, particularly from sensorimotor tasks, to support the 
idea that humans behave in accordance with this process. In one pivotal study, Ernst and Banks asked 
participants to judge the height of a bar based on either haptic evidence, or on visual evidence in the 
form of a random dot stereogram, the reliability of which was varied by increasing the random 
displacement of dots (Ernst & Banks, 2002). Asking participants to perform these unimodal 
judgements allowed the authors to measure the sensory uncertainty in each modality, and therefore 
to determine via maximum likelihood estimation how participants should behave in subsequent 
multimodal trials, in which the height of the block was again judged, but this time using both sources 
of information simultaneously. In line with the maximum likelihood rule, participants reliability-
weighted the visual and haptic information in the multimodal task. Similar behaviour has also been 
observed in tasks that combined vision and audition (Alais & Burr, 2004; Alais, Morrone, & Burr, 2006) 
and vision and proprioceptive cues (van Beers, Sittig, & Gon, 1999), suggesting that reliability-
weighting of sensory information is a robust, modality independent phenomenon.   
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‘Reliable’ evidence need not just be defined according to the extent of external (sensory) uncertainty 
(noise) at its source. A second characterisation of reliability pertains to the number of pieces of 
information that give rise to a certain piece of evidence: a 4.5 star TripAdvisor restaurant review 
should be more impactful if it is based on an average of 2000 rather than 20 reviewers. This is because 
statistically, information from a larger sample provides more reliable information than that from a 
smaller sample, as the standard error of the mean information conveyed is inversely related to the 
size of the sample. In a realistic task that asked individuals to rate products from the online retail site 
Amazon, participants first gave their initial impression (rating out of 5) of products that are actually 
available from the site (e.g. a pair of headphones) based only on the picture and brief description of 
the product. They were then shown the same products alongside their Amazon ratings (i.e. the 
number of people who gave the product 1, 2, 3, 4 or 5 stars) and provided a second rating. The 
researchers found that participants’ update of their initial impression was largest when the number 
of reviews that formed the Amazon rating was higher and therefore more reliable, which is what 
would be expected if observers were indeed reliability-weighting the information (De Martino, 
Bobadilla-Suarez, Nouguchi, Sharot, & Love, 2017).  
 
The example of a court of law above highlights a third type of reliability: social trustworthiness. In 
macaques, a monkey’s position in the social hierarchy determines their relative priority in accessing 
food (amongst other things). As such, information about higher (rather than lower) status animals 
should be integrated preferentially as it is a more reliable source of pertinent information, which is 
exactly what research has shown: macaques forego rewards to view faces of higher status monkeys 
but require payment to view faces of lower status monkeys (Deaner, Khera, & Platt, 2005; Rudebeck, 
Buckley, Walton, & Rushworth, 2006). In human research, individuals acquire and employ information 
about the social reliability of a confederate who advises them during a perceptual classification task 
via an associative learning mechanism similar to that believed to underlie reward based learning 
(Behrens, Hunt, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2008). This latter experiment is particularly important as it 
gives an insight into the processes used to derive the weight given to information in the first place, 
mirroring findings from the developmental literature that indicate that this information is learned 
over time (Petrini, Remark, Smith, & Nardini, 2014).  
 
Whilst differing slightly in the specifics of their definitions, a key unifying feature of the research 
described is the dissociable impact of evidence reliability and strength on choice: for example in Ernst 
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and Bank’s task, both the visual and haptic cues may have suggested that one bar was (e.g.) 2cm taller 
than the other, but the signal reliability is what caused information from one modality to carry greater 
weight. In the Amazon task, two reviews that both averaged 4 stars would have been indistinguishable 
except for their reliability. If reliability-weighting describes human behaviour well, we may therefore 
reasonably expect dissociable neural correlates of evidence strength and reliability during similar 
tasks. This phenomenon has indeed been observed in several studies. When participants were asked 
to make judgements about the average colour of an array of shapes, decreasing evidence strength 
(the average colour of the shapes) and increasing evidence variability (the width of the distribution 
from which the colour for each shape in the array was drawn, see Figure 1.1) not only independently 
negatively influenced accuracy and response latencies, but also predicted opposite response profiles 
in the  medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) such that activity scaled positively with the mean and 
negatively with the variance of the information (Michael, de Gardelle, Nevado-Holgado, & 
Summerfield, 2015). The neural dissociability of these two factors was similarly evident using the same 
task with concurrent electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings (Michael, 2015).  
 
 
Figure 1.1: Illustration of typical stimuli used in perceptual averaging tasks, and the underlying 
stimulus distributions. In the task illustrated (left panel), participants were required to report the 
average colour of the eight shapes. As the right panel shows, when the mean of the distribution was 
closer to the boundary (white line), the choice was harder because the average colour information 
(depicted in the background of the figure) was ambiguous. When the distribution variance was wider, 
difficulty was increased by the range of colours that could feature in a given sample. Thus the level of 
mean and the level of variance had orthogonal influences on task difficulty. Figure taken from de 
Gardelle and Summerfield (2011).  
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Two important themes have emerged over the course of the discussion so far: people and monkeys 
reliability-weight information in order to make the best choices, and the impact of evidence reliability 
is dissociable from the impact of evidence strength both behaviourally and neurally. As a whole, this 
body of evidence supports the idea that humans (and non-human primates) do indeed make ‘good’ 
decisions. However, this account of what constitutes a ‘good’ decision arguably holds for the simplest 
decisions only, as it overlooks a key factor in the general decision making process: the influence of 
pre-existing knowledge. To see whether individuals optimally incorporate this information into 
choices, we turn next to work based on the theory of Bayesian optimality.  
 
Agents make good decisions by behaving in line with the Bayesian solution 
 
Bayesian decision theory holds that all beliefs about the world are assigned a probability (Green & 
Swets, 1966; Kording & Wolpert, 2006). Proponents of the theory note that uncertainty – which can 
be caused by a myriad of factors – is an inherent aspect of all decisions, and therefore the best 
decisions can be made by leveraging this uncertainty such that beliefs with higher probabilities carry 
more weight on the eventual choice. This concept is formalised by Bayes’ rule:  
 𝑝(ℎ|𝑥) = 𝑝(ℎ) ∙ 𝑝(𝑥|ℎ)𝑝(𝑥)  
 
Where ℎ	is a hypothesis, and 𝑥 is the noisy sensory observation, see figure 1.2. Bayes’ theory is an 
extension of the work on reliability-weighting, and the example Kording and Wolpert (2006) use helps 
to illustrate how: in a game of tennis, you have a pre-existing idea of the locations on the court at 
which a serve is likely to land. These possible locations have a given mean (the average place that balls 
land) and variance (the range of places it could land), and as such can be represented as a probability 
distribution, which constitutes the prior 𝑝(ℎ). As your opponent takes the shot, you can then estimate 
where the ball will land based on the current sensory information 𝑥; given inherent uncertainty (from, 
for example, the visibility on the day, the speed of the movement) this estimate too is uncertain, and 
can therefore also be represented as a distribution with given mean and variance. The variance 
reflects your level of uncertainty, which itself is determined by the reliability of the sensory signal, and 
is expressed as a likelihood function, i.e. the probability of observing that sensory data under each 
hypothesis, 𝑝(𝑥|ℎ). Crucially, if either distribution has a higher variance (i.e. lower reliability), it will 
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have a smaller influence on this combined likelihood estimate. The posterior (i.e. your final belief 
about where the ball will land) is then computed using Bayes’ theorem above, and is driven more 
strongly by the more reliable source. It is this posterior that constitutes the Bayesian estimate of 
where the ball will land (Kording & Wolpert, 2006). Importantly, the probabilistic nature of decisions 
means that the Bayesian course of action will generally, but not always, lead to the desired outcome: 
whilst a single choice may lead to failure, in the long term accuracy (and thus, in many cases, reward) 
will be maximised if decisions are made in line with Bayes’ theorem.  
 
 
Figure 1.2: Illustration of Bayesian integration. The yellow curve at the bottom reflects the posterior, 
generated by combining the green curve (the prior) and the red curve (the likelihood) according to 
Bayes’ rule. Figure taken from Kording and Wolpert (2006).  
 
Does Bayes’ theorem provide a good account of human decisions? For many researchers, the answer 
is ‘yes’. A canonical study from Kording and Wolpert was amongst the first to demonstrate that 
humans optimally combine prior and current information in line with Bayes’ theorem. Participants 
performed a task in which they were simply required to point to a target in a virtual reality 
environment which distorted the visual information about their arm location by an average of 1cm 
rightwards. On some trials, participants were given information about the true arm location mid-way 
through the point trajectory, with varying degrees of reliability (caused by the presence and degree 
of visual blurriness). Aware of this average 1cm false feedback, a Bayesian participant should 
compensate for the distorted visual input by altering their aim 1cm to the left (i.e. making use of the 
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prior information) when no mid-way feedback was provided or when the mid-way feedback was 
unreliable, but base their decision more on the mid-way feedback when it was less corrupted by noise. 
This is indeed exactly what participants did (Kording & Wolpert, 2004). Such instances of Bayesian 
behaviour are not limited to the sensorimotor sphere. Bayes’ theorem can be applied to explain a 
host of behaviours: our succumbing to an illusion that causes an identical stimulus to be perceived as 
convex when at 0°, but concave when rotated 180°, can be explained by our Bayesian reliance on the 
‘light comes from above’ prior, which in the vast majority of decisions leads to an optimal choice (Sun 
& Perona, 1998). The fact that the strength of this prior is altered by experience lends further support 
to Bayesian explanations, as the posterior (which incorporates previous experiences) then forms the 
prior (Adams, Graf, & Ernst, 2004). Similarly, our altering perception of line length as a function of its 
orientation or context is explained by a strong prior over the regularities of structure in the world 
(Howe & Purves, 2002, 2005a, 2005b). Beyond the sensory sphere, decisions made in line with Bayes’ 
theorem have also been shown in higher-order cognition: highly abstract problems that involved 
inferring the prior probability distribution of questions as broad as the length of a Pharaoh’s reign 
given the amount of time he or she had reigned already, or how long a cake will take to bake given 
the time it has already been in the oven, lead to answers in line with a Bayesian calculation (Griffiths 
& Tenenbaum, 2006).  Taken together, these results provide clear evidence that patterns of behaviour 
in a range of tasks are in line with those that would be observed if individuals were implementing 
Bayes’ theorem, and are a small selection of the pieces of evidence that explain why the notion that 
humans are “Bayes optimal” has become so dominant in the field.  
 
Marr’s levels of analysis assert that information processing systems must be understood at three 
levels: the computational level, which asks what the system aims to do, the algorithmic level, which 
asks via what processes the system does this, and the implementational level, which questions via 
what ‘hardware’ (such as neurons and neural structures) this process is implemented (Marr, 1981). 
Bayes’ theory accounts for the computational problem to be solved: decisions must be made despite 
inherent uncertainty. It clearly accounts for the algorithmic process via which this may occur: it occurs 
according to Bayes’ rule. However, we are left questioning how, at the implementational level, Bayes’ 
theorem is manifested? Indeed, it is worth considering what type of evidence could theoretically 
support Bayes’ theorem at the implementational level. Arguably this evidence must be neural, given 
that disparate mechanisms can all lead to highly similar patterns of behaviour. Evidence for the neural 
implementation of Bayes’ theorem may involve (but not be limited to): i) evidence for explicit 
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representation of uncertainty or probabilities, ii) evidence for dissociable influences of prior and 
current sensory information, alongside iii) a mechanistic account of how they merge. If we are unable 
to reveal conclusive evidence then arguably, the theory falls short, despite its overwhelming 
popularity. (See (Jones & Love, 2011)). 
 
There are several pieces of evidence that suggest there is an explicit neural representation of 
uncertainty. Platt and Glimcher trained monkeys to saccade to one of two possible locations, each of 
which was associated with a given prior probability. Concurrent single unit recording revealed that 
the responses of neurons in the lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP) were proportional to the prior 
probability of making a saccade to the location of that particular cell’s receptive field. Additionally, 
the probability of reward associated with each saccade was manipulated, and neuronal responses 
were found to be proportional to this probability (Platt & Glimcher, 1999). A second study addressed 
the representation of uncertainty on the level of neurotransmitters, drawing a distinction between 
expected uncertainty – the known unreliability of predictive cues (it may rain today so I may need an 
umbrella), which the authors showed was signalled by acetylcholine, and unexpected uncertainty – 
unsignalled context switches that lead to unexpected observations (e.g. a substantial drop in the 
forecast reliability) and is signalled by norepinephrine (Yu & Dayan, 2004). However, these findings 
clearly still leave questions unanswered. Firing at a rate proportional to the probability is one thing, 
but we have 100 billion neurons (Herculano-Houzel, 2009), and decisions aren’t made on the basis of 
the activity of just one of them. A key outstanding question is: how are populations of neurons able 
to represent the reliability of a stimulus simultaneously with its strength, as required by Bayesian 
solutions? Some sophisticated attempts have been made to outline plausible possibilities: Ma et al 
note that neuron spike timings occur at a Poisson rate (i.e. a fixed probability of a spike occurring at 
any given time), and as a result the mean of the firing rate is equivalent to its variance (reliability). 
Thus a population of neurons in theory could signal the probability associated with a stimulus via the 
range of responses in the population (Ma, Beck, Latham, & Pouget, 2006; Pouget, Beck, Ma, & Latham, 
2013).   
 
More direct support for the implementation of Bayesian processes in the brain is derived when 
looking for support for the second and third criteria, evidence for the representation and combination 
of both prior and current sensory information. One well-known example of a process that accounts 
for this is the theory of predictive coding (Huang & Rao, 2011; Rao & Ballard, 1999), the central tenet 
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of which is that rather than simply signalling the information from the sensory world, neurons signal 
the extent to which the incoming sensory information deviates from a prediction (the prior), either 
by signalling the pure prediction error (Friston, 2005; Rao & Ballard, 1999) or the posterior probability 
(see (Aitchison & Lengyel, 2017)). As well as providing a mechanism by which Bayesian computations 
could occur, the theory offers a Bayesian reinterpretation of a number of phenomena such as 
repetition suppression, a consistent finding in which lower neural activation is seen on the second 
presentation of a stimulus. In the predictive coding framework, this activity attenuation is consistent 
with the idea that, having been viewed already, it is now ‘predicted’ (i.e. forms the prior), and as such 
gives rise to lower feedforward activity (Grill-Spector, Henson, & Martin, 2006; Summerfield, 
Trittschuh, Monti, Mesulam, & Egner, 2008). Another neural response that follows naturally from the 
predictive coding theory is the ‘oddball’ response, whereby unexpected stimuli elicit a very high 
neural response: again this would be explained by the theory because unexpected stimuli cause a high 
prediction error (Lieder, Stephan, Daunizeau, Garrido, & Friston, 2013; Naatanen, Tervaniemi, 
Sussman, Paavilainen, & Winkler, 2001). Nonetheless, although predictive coding is an intuitive 
mechanism for implementing Bayesian processes, the ‘prior’ in these studies is generally derived from 
horizontal connections, and feedback between layers for a concurrently perceived stimulus. This is 
quite far removed from the priors described in the empirical behaviour work above, which are reliant 
on explicit memory, or implicit knowledge of the statistical structure of the natural world. Thus it begs 
the question of where this more temporally-extended prior comes from, and how it is activated. We 
could argue that Hebbian learning – the long term strengthening of synaptic connections which may 
lead to easier communication between the neurons involved –  is a natural answer to explain longer 
term priors, but it is unclear why one specific prior would be activated at a given moment. A full theory 
should account for the effects of different timescales of prior (c.f. (Hasson, Yang, Vallines, Heeger, & 
Rubin, 2008; Summerfield, Behrens, & Koechlin, 2011)). Finally, even if predictive coding could 
account for these questions (which it cannot in its current format), it is not the case that evidence for 
predictive coding is synonymous with evidence for a Bayesian mechanism, though it could be a useful 
starting point in outlining a mechanism by which Bayesian computations could be implemented 
(Aitchison & Lengyel, 2017).  
 
Thus far in our quest to determine whether or not humans make ‘good’ decisions, we have seen a 
wealth of excellent empirical evidence that suggests that human behaviour in a host of decision 
making tasks generates the solution that would be derived from Bayes’ theorem. Although our 
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examination of evidence that shows how Bayesian solutions may be realised in the brain suggested 
that the theory falls short the implementational level – there are no consistent accounts of how these 
complex and computationally demanding procedures are realised neurally – we nonetheless have 
consistent evidence for the ‘optimality’ of human choices, when ‘optimality’ is defined as making 
choices in line with the Bayesian solution.  
 
Agents make irrational decisions in a host of situations 
 
In this next section, however, I will outline a number of empirical findings that run counter to this 
notion. There are two central tenets implied by Bayes’ theorem that will be a key focus here. The first 
is that all decision-relevant available evidence should be considered, with its reliability (variance) 
being the only factor that affects its impact on choice. The second is choice consistency: those who 
assert that humans behave in line with a Bayes optimal observer assume that it is only external noise 
that influences choices, but the internal decision process itself is consistently optimal. This means that 
were the same evidence to be presented again, the only thing that should lead to a different decision 
ought to be external noise in the process. However, a body of evidence – particularly from behavioural 
economics, but also as we shall see below from the field of perceptual decision making – has shown 
repeatedly that humans themselves are remarkably inconsistent, and display behaviours that 
challenge the notion that they are Bayes optimal.  
 
The everyday work of a behaviour scientist is characterised by seeking evidence to support a given 
hypothesis. It is slightly ironic, then, that this ‘confirmation bias’ – the tendency to seek evidence to 
support, rather than disconfirm, a hypothesis – is considered irrational: only via falsification of all 
alternatives can a theory definitely be said to hold (Popper, 1959). Nonetheless it is a pattern of 
behaviour consistently shown by humans when making choices: rather than treating all evidence 
equally, evidence that confirms their pre-existing idea (whether this is derived from a bias, or from 
their initial impression when perusing the evidence) is given preference (Nickerson, 1998). Although 
this behaviour can in many situations be attributed to practicalities – as the example goes, to prove 
the theory that all swans are white, I must search the world for a black swan, which is generally 
impractically time consuming – impracticality has been shown not to be the only cause of this bias: 
even when definitive evidence can be acquired simply by falsification, people still by preference seek 
confirmatory evidence (Nickerson, 1998; Wason, 1968), and often overvalue it when it is found 
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(Bruner, Goodnow, & Austin, 1956; Doll, Hutchison, & Frank, 2011; Doll, Jacobs, Sanfey, & Frank, 
2009). This asymmetric treatment of the available evidence presents a challenge to Bayesian theories 
of behaviour.  
 
The decoy effect is linked to a more general category of preference reversal effect, whereby decisions 
change according to context. Again whilst often demonstrated in economic decisions (Tversky, Slovic, 
& Kahneman, 1990), this too has been shown in cognitive tasks: when choosing between two streams 
of rapidly presented numbers, participants’ choices were affected by the information conveyed in a 
third, irrelevant distractor (Tsetsos, Chater, & Usher, 2012; Tsetsos, Usher, & Chater, 2010). A more 
specific example is the phantom decoy effect, a phenomenon in which, when several options are 
initially available, the removal of one of the options affects the relative ranking of those that remain. 
For example, after choosing a lemon gelato and hearing that the gelateria has run out, you opt for 
cremino al pistachio over the final option, coconut. The next week, upon hearing the lemon has been 
replaced with a tiramisu flavour, you order it only to find that this too has run out. This time when 
choosing between the remaining options (again cremino al pistachio and coconut), your second choice 
is coconut. This illustrates the phantom decoy effect: preferences between two options (coconut and 
pistachio) are dependent on a third, unavailable option (Pettibone & Wedell, 2000), and is part of a 
class of more general decoy effects whereby the preference of an irrelevant option affects decisions 
about independent options. Although decoy effects have again most prominently been studied in 
economic decisions (e.g. (J. Doyle, O’Connor, Reynolds, & Bottomley, 1999; Parrish, Evans, & Beran, 
2015), they have also been demonstrated in perceptual decisions: when people had to choose the 
largest of three rectangles, the choice between the remaining two was influenced by the 
disappearance at choice time of the third option (Trueblood & Pettibone, 2015). As with confirmation 
bias, these contextual effects are not obviously in line with Bayesian processes (though see (Dayan & 
Solomon, 2010) for an explanation of how the response to irrelevant information could be interpreted 
in a Bayesian framework). 
 
Although there are many others, the final non-Bayesian phenomenon to be considered here is 
anchoring. This highly consistent yet irrational behaviour involves making numerical judgements on 
the basis of recently seen, but entirely irrelevant, information: in the earliest experiments, Tversky 
and Kahneman spun a ‘wheel of fortune’ containing the numbers from 1-100. After indicating whether 
or not they believed that the number of African nations in the United Nations was greater or less than 
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the number spun by the wheel, participants then gave an estimate of the actual number of African 
nations. Despite the clear knowledge that the number the wheel spun was random, having watched 
it be generated, the second estimate was still significantly related to the wheel’s number, as though 
it was acting as an “anchor” on estimates (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974a). The anchoring effect has 
been repeatedly demonstrated on a wide number of outcome measures (for example, how much an 
individual would pay for wine, the value they give to familiar products) with a wide range of arbitrary 
anchors (for example, digits in an individual’s birthdate, social security numbers) (Ariely, 2009; Ariely, 
Loewenstein, & Prelec, 2003).  
 
A new definition of ‘optimal’ 
 
Thus we are left at a rather puzzling juncture. We began by reviewing clear evidence that humans 
make optimal choices, in line with a Bayesian observer. But we were then presented with evidence 
for the existence of a number of behaviours that humans consistently exhibit that fly in the face of 
Bayesian rationality. So how do we reconcile these conflicting patterns of results? Which is right?  
 
The answer, I will argue, is neither: we are in fact using a limited definition of optimality. Bayes’ 
theorem provides an excellent account of how humans make the best possible decisions given 
unavoidable external noise. However, I argue that a practical definition of an optimal decision process 
would be one that assumes that the best mechanisms operate in a way that can actively combat the 
effects of noise. Furthermore, Bayesian theories are excellently equipped to deal with noise arising 
from the senses during decision making, but overlook the influence of noise at other stages of the 
decision process. This short-sightedness explains why it is only under some circumstances that 
humans behave in line with the Bayes optimal solution. To come up with a more all-encompassing 
definition of ‘optimality’, we should acknowledge that noise affects decisions at multiple stages of the 
choice process, not just the earliest stage, and ‘optimal’ choices should overcome this corrupting 
source at all stages.  
 
Furthermore, a theory of optimality should be biologically plausible. Not only (unlike the Bayesian 
account) should we have an idea about how it could occur at the implementational level, but this 
account should also explicitly acknowledge the fact that we are limited capacity beings. In the next 
sections I will put forward the idea that optimal decisions are those that maximise the chances of a 
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correct choice in the face of multiple sources of noise, via a plausible neural mechanism that explicitly 
takes into account our capacity limitation. I will show that this account, unlike the Bayesian theory, 
can provide a coherent explanation of the apparently contradictory findings just outlined.  
 
Before I can start to do this, we need to understand in more detail the multiple sources of noise that 
can affect cognitive decisions, and particularly to understand the impact that late noise has on choices.  
 
1.3. Multiple sources of noise 
 
Imagine you are a teacher on a school trip to the Natural History museum, trying to herd the kids back 
onto the coach at the end of the day. You’d hoped that by dressing your class in fluorescent jackets 
they’d be easier to spot, but unfortunately all schools had the same idea, so you’re working hard to 
pick out your class from the chattering mass in the entrance hall. In the terms I will be using here, this 
part of the task presents a challenge because of early, sensory noise (or uncertainty): children are all 
roughly the same size, they are all roaming round the entrance hall and they are all wearing the same 
clothes, so identifying the ones that go to your school is challenging. Once you spot them, you beckon 
them onto the coach, tracking how many of them you still need to find as you go. This second stage 
of the task presents a challenge because it is hard to keep count, particularly as the number of children 
steadily increases. I refer to uncertainty at this stage as “late noise”, as it occurs after the initial 
sensory uncertainty. There is more than one source of late noise, this particular example illustrates 
‘integration noise’. It is important to note that all late noise is driven by internal rather than external 
sources: in this example, uncertainty is due to problems keeping count. Finally, you’re aware that all 
but one child is safely on board, but in your exhaustion when the driver asks you whether it’s time to 
go, you respond ‘yes’ on autopilot. Response variability caused by such factors is a form of late, 
response noise. As before, this source of late noise is internal (in this case, caused by tiredness). More 
formally, the dissociation between late and early noise can be defined as follows: 
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Early noise: 𝑦 =+ 𝑓(𝑋. + 𝑁(0, 𝜎))4.56  
 
Late noise: 𝑦 = 7+ 𝑓(𝑋.)4.56 8 + 𝑁(0, 𝜎) 
  
in which 𝑦  refers to the internal estimate of the available information, 𝑋.  refers to the sensory 
information 𝑋  on sample 𝑖 , 𝑁  denotes noise drawn from a zero mean Gaussian distribution with 
variance 𝜎, and 𝑛 denotes the total number of samples viewed. A crucial distinction is that late noise, 
unlike early noise, is applied to the summed information.  
 
The unique influence of late noise on decisions 
 
What evidence is there then that this late noise has an important and unique impact (relative to early, 
sensory noise) on decisions? Research is limited, but investigations have shown that sensorimotor 
tasks are affected primarily by noise at a different stage of the information processing pipeline than 
that which influences cognitive tasks (Faisal & Wolpert, 2009; Hunt, 2014). More specifically, it has 
been pointed out that the types of cognitive tasks employed in the lab generally involve clearly 
perceptible stimuli  (and as such are relatively unaffected by noise at the sensory processing stage), 
but are adversely affected by demand at the integration level, for example the need to integrate often 
highly conflicting pieces of evidence in a short time with a limited capacity system (Botvinick, Braver, 
Barch, Carter, & Cohen, 2001; Rushworth, Kennerley, & Walton, 2005).  
 
Part of the reason this research may be limited is because determining the independent influence of 
late noise is nontrivial: in fact, in many tasks it is impossible. For example in Brunton and colleagues’ 
click count discrimination task (Brunton, Botvinick, & Brody, 2013), an identical pattern of behaviour 
could be caused by early noise in the absence of late noise (the noisy sensory perception of clicks, 
with lossless integration), or by late noise in the absence of early noise (noisy integration of perfectly 
detected clicks). In other words, in cases such as this, the impact of early and late noise is theoretically 
indistinguishable (Drugowitsch, Wyart, Devauchelle, & Koechlin, 2016).  
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Drugowitsch and colleagues thus conducted a series of experiments designed specifically to enable 
them to tease apart the effects of noise at different stages of the decision process. The task employed 
was simple: after viewing a series of oriented Gabor patches (see figure 1.4), participants were simply 
required to categorise the average orientation of the stream of stimuli. The length of the inference 
(number of stimuli to be integrated) and the dimensionality of the inference (number of orientation 
categories to choose from) varied independently between 2-16, and 2-3 respectively. If performance 
is mainly affected by early, sensory noise, choice variability should scale with the number of samples, 
because with each stimulus presented there will be sensory ambiguity about its precise orientation. 
Early noise also predicts that, when the log likelihood ratio of evidence in favour of each of the choices 
is calculated, this quantity will be correlated between the options, as sensory noise that favours one 
option disfavours the other(s). If performance is more affected by late, integration noise, choice 
variability should also scale with the number of samples because (as with counting children onto a 
school bus), cognitive demand increases as the number of stimuli to be integrated increases. 
However, this noise should have independent influences on the log likelihood of evidence favouring 
each sample, as it exerts its influence at the cumulative rather than momentary stage. Finally, if late 
selection noise is the key influence on decisions, choice variability should scale with the number of 
options, but not the number of stimuli (see figure 1.3). In all the tasks, the authors showed that choice 
variability was overwhelmingly better explained by a model that featured late, integration noise, and 
in a model comparison procedure in which all three sources of noise were included competitively, 
variance was again disproportionately explained by a late integration noise mechanism. This thus 
provides clear evidence of the unique influence of this source of variance on choice.  
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Figure 1.3: (Top panel) Illustration of the task used to tease apart the influences of early and late 
noise. The choice could involve two or three options, and was made on the basis of 2-16 samples. 
(Lower panels) Schematic of the effects different types of noise would be predicted to exert, as 
detailed on the figure. Figure taken from Drugowitsch, Wyart et al (2016).  
 
Building on this notion, Herce Castañon and colleagues illustrated the dissociability of the influences 
of early and late noise on participants’ confidence (Herce Castañon et al., 2018). Across a series of six 
experiments, observers were asked to judge on each trial the average orientation relative to a 
horizontal reference of eight simultaneously-presented Gabor patches. Sensory noise was 
manipulated by altering the contrast of the Gabors, making them more or less easy to perceive, whilst 
cognitive noise was manipulated by increasing the underlying variance of the angular distribution 
from which the eight samples were drawn, making the integration of disparate samples challenging. 
On 50% of trials participants were given a cue that was 75% valid, meaning that when they were more 
uncertain, participants should rely more heavily on the cue. The authors showed that participants did 
this when sensory, but not cognitive noise was higher. Furthermore, using two measures of 
confidence, the authors showed that participants appropriately calibrated their confidence as 
sensory, but not cognitive, noise increased. This study thus demonstrates the dissociability of the 
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influences of different sources of noise not just on performance, but on metacognitive processes such 
as confidence too.  
 
Selective prioritisation of decision information is optimal under late noise 
 
Having thus established that late noise has a unique influence on choices, we can now directly address 
the question of what strategy is optimal under circumstances of higher late noise, and whether or not 
people behave in line with this strategy. In what follows, we will show that the selective prioritisation 
of decision information – the down-weighting of certain pieces of information in favour of the 
prioritisation of others, via a number of different but related mechanisms – leads to the most accurate 
choices under conditions of late noise, and therefore provides a promising alternative definition for 
what it means to be ‘optimal’. 
 
Selective prioritisation via robust averaging 
The selective prioritisation process is captured in a series of experiments that report the phenomenon 
of “robust averaging”. In a low sensory noise task that involved reporting the average colour, shape, 
or orientation relative to a reference, of an array of eight clearly-visible stimuli, cognitive load was 
manipulated orthogonally by varying the strength of the evidence (mean colour or shape) as well as 
the variance of the distribution from which the stimuli were drawn. This latter manipulation in 
particular was linked to the level of late noise: the simultaneous integration of several highly disparate 
elements has been argued to lead to high integration noise, as noted above. The results from a 
regression analysis used to determine the impact of each stimulus on choice showed a striking effect 
of “robust averaging”: information from “extreme”, outlying stimuli carried less weight on the 
eventual choice (Li, Herce Castanon, Solomon, Vandormael, & Summerfield, 2017; Michael et al., 
2015).  
 
Robust averaging is counter to a Bayesian strategy: given that prior belief on each trial should have 
been equal for all alternatives (as each answer was equally likely to be correct), all stimuli ought to 
have been incorporated with respect to the information they conveyed. However the key question 
here is whether robust averaging nonetheless leads to good choices? The empirical answer is yes. In 
Li’s study, the authors fit a power-law model via which stimulus values were transformed by an 
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exponent such that either inliers (close to the reference orientation) or outliers (extreme values, i.e. 
those that were empirically shown to be down-weighted) would have the greater impact on choice. 
The authors also estimated from each participant’s data the slope of a logistic choice function that 
simulated late noise; higher values of slope indicated that the participant was relatively more affected 
by late noise. As expected from the qualitative results, human choices were best fit by an exponent 
value lower than 1, confirming that they over-weighted inliers in line with a robust averaging process, 
in particular when late noise was higher. However a second important insight from this model-fitting 
process was that robust averaging improved performance relative to no weighting, or the over-
weighting of outliers, at all levels of late noise greater than zero. In other words, whilst robust 
averaging down-weights relevant choice information, this process of selective prioritisation of some 
information actually improved accuracy in the face of noise that occurs beyond the sensory stage.  
 
What feature of this selective (robust averaging) mechanism may cause this to be the case? One 
potential answer is that, in these tasks, features (stimulus values, i.e. shape, colour, orientation) were 
drawn from a normal distribution in which the mode is always close to the category boundary (e.g. 
the red/blue boundary in the colour task, see figure 1.1) – i.e. the modal feature value is an ‘inlier’. 
This means that through the process of robust averaging, decisions are optimally tuned to process 
information that is most likely to occur. Simulations for feature values drawn from uniform (rather 
than normal) distributions supported this hypothesis: under a uniform distribution, all feature values 
are equally likely to occur so robust averaging would lead to no optimal tuning, and the simulated 
data confirmed that asymmetric gain (as in robust averaging) conferred no advantage over linear gains 
on accuracy maximisation in this circumstance. Thus the crucial contribution of this work is to show 
not only that humans do engage in robust averaging, but also to demonstrate firstly that it is beneficial 
for accuracy under late noise, and secondly how it leads to this advantage.  
 
Selective prioritisation of information via adaptive gain control 
In these robust averaging tasks, all information was presented simultaneously and late noise was 
manipulated by increasing the variance of the underlying distribution from which the evidence was 
drawn. However, the majority of everyday decisions are temporally extended, meaning that evidence 
must be sampled repeatedly and these samples integrated across time, a process which also leads to 
late integration noise but of a slightly different nature. We see a similar pattern of behaviour 
performance in such tasks. Participants performing the same orientation classification task as that of 
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Li et al, but with the eight samples arriving sequentially rather than simultaneously, integrated 
evidence in line with its consistency with the running mean of information via an ‘adaptive gain 
control’ mechanism: discordant samples were integrated with lower gain than consistent evidence 
(Cheadle et al., 2014). As with robust averaging, this is a computationally efficient mechanism – not 
all information need be integrated fully, thereby saving precious neural processing resources – but 
nonetheless leads to accurate choices in the face of late noise.  
 
Selective prioritisation of information in comparison tasks 
In another temporally extended task, participants were asked to indicate which of two streams of 
numbers was higher on average. Each sample was presented sequentially, but simultaneously for the 
two streams: on each frame participants saw one sample of evidence from each stream. Participants 
again showed a pattern of selective weighting, this time prioritising the ‘local winner’ on each frame, 
i.e. the higher number of the two presented, and integrating it with enhanced gain. This process was 
captured by a model that features a bottleneck that discounts the gain of the weakest sample via a 
selective weighting parameter (see figure 1.4). As before, this selectivity was shown to lead to 
superior performance in the face of late noise (Tsetsos et al., 2012; Tsetsos, Chater, & Usher, 2015). 
Notably, this latter work implies a different process of selectivity: in the robust averaging and adaptive 
gain tasks, the inlying evidence closest to the running mean was preferentially integrated, whilst in 
the selective integration model, it is ‘winning’ evidence that gets preferential treatment. One 
potential determinant of which information is prioritised is the task context: in simple categorisation 
tasks, in which all information (presented serially or simultaneously) requires judgement in favour of 
one category or another, selective gain control prioritises that information that is most informative of 
this choice. In comparison tasks on the other hand, in which two (or more) streams of evidence each 
favour a different option, the more informative information is which stream is superior to the other 
– and as such, the locally winning information is selectively integrated to lead to the best choices. (See 
chapter 5 for further discussion).  
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Figure 1.4: Illustration of the selective integration model. In an “A or B” categorisation task, IA and IB 
denote information in favour of category A and category B respectively. Information from the more 
prevalent category is integrated with full strength, whilst information from the less prevalent category 
is down-weighted before being corrupted by further late noise. Figure taken from Tsetsos et al (2015).  
 
Selective prioritisation is neurally plausible and efficient 
 
As alluded to above, all formats of the selective prioritisation process have the useful by-product of 
implying computationally efficient processing: some information need not be fully integrated, saving 
neural processing resources, and yet a good decision can still be reached. This is important given that 
we know humans (and other animals) have neural capacity limitations based on both cortical 
availability, which requires efficient coding in order to circumvent, as well as limited metabolic 
resources, which necessitates efficient computation (Franconeri, Alvarez, & Cavanagh, 2013; Lennie, 
2003). Evidence from neural recordings suggests that selective prioritisation may fulfil both these 
criteria: during the simple categorisation task used by Cheadle and colleagues (involving the 
orientation classification of sequentially presented Gabor patches), differences were evident in the 
EEG signal: samples that were more similar to the running tally were encoded neurally with higher 
strength than those that were less similar, consistent with an adaptive gain control account that 
preferentially allocated resources to more consistent information. In blood oxygen level dependent 
(BOLD) signals in the parietal cortex, the dorsal medial prefrontal cortex, and the anterior insular 
cortex – all of which have been implicated in perceptual category judgements – there was a choice-
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predictive encoding of the decision information provided by each sample that was significantly 
modulated by the difference in evidence between the current and previous samples (i.e. the 
discrepancy). This again supports the notion that there is a specialised processing mechanism that 
leads to enhanced processing of consistent evidence.  
 
Divisive normalisation, a canonical neural process, provides a potential plausible mechanism via which 
information may naturally be integrated with greater strength depending on its position with respect 
to the rest of the information available: according to this framework, the responses of neurons are 
scaled by a common factor, generally based on the summed activity of a pool of neurons – in other 
words, information signalled by one neuron is relative to the information that other neurons are 
signalling too (Louie, Glimcher, & Webb, 2015; Rangel & Clithero, 2012). If this mechanism were able 
to be extended temporally such that differences between current and recent stimulation were also 
signalled, it could provide a good account of the underlying process that leads to selective integration 
in simple categorisation tasks.  
 
In this section, we have seen that humans do not always behave in line with a Bayesian solution, but 
that they nonetheless often make accurate choices. Thus rather than defining “optimal” cognitive 
decisions as those that generate choices in line with the solution provided by Bayes’ theorem, we 
could instead define “good” cognitive decisions as those that lead to correct choices in the face of late 
noise. If we use this definition, it seems that humans largely behave optimally. They do this via a 
process of selective prioritisation of some pieces of decision information over others, which itself is 
an efficient process. However, a decision is only good – no matter what your definition – if it is made 
at the right time. For example, if you spend several hours watching the weather forecast and make 
the decision to don wellie boots before leaving the house, it was the right decision 2 hours ago when 
it was still pouring, but now the sun is out and the boots are simply a sweaty inconvenience. All the 
decisions that we have described so far have been ‘experimenter-paced’ – participants were required 
to view as many stimuli as the experimenter determined, and make a choice at the allocated time – 
as is the overwhelming norm in the field. In the next section, we will discuss the ubiquitous situation 
in which a decision is made at a time of the agent’s choosing. What factors predict when participants 
will commit to a decision, and is this timing appropriate? 
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1.4. Deciding when to decide 
 
Agents must strike a delicate balance when determining when to make a choice. On the one hand, 
accumulating evidence over time is highly beneficial, as it allows them to generate a more precise 
estimate of the current evidence in order to inform choice: taking several samples of evidence allows 
an individual to accumulate them into an overall ‘decision variable’ – a single quantity that reflects 
the running combination of the evidence that has been seen so far – that has precision proportional 
to the square root of the number of samples taken. On the other hand, accumulating evidence is 
costly: delaying decisions can lead to lower reward in the long run, as fewer choices can be taken. This 
is particularly true in situations in which the correct answer remains elusive even after time has been 
spent generating evidence, as it is unclear whether continuing to sample will confer any extra benefit 
in such a situation – indeed, the explicit cost (in terms of possible reward) of continuing to sample 
increases as the decision duration lengthens (Drugowitsch, Moreno-Bote, Churchland, Shadlen, & 
Pouget, 2012). Furthermore, the structure of the world can be volatile: as highlighted in our wellie 
boots example above, decisions must be executed at the appropriate time, otherwise the 
environment may change and that decision is no longer appropriate (Summerfield et al., 2011). Thus 
a crucial question in the decision sciences is: how do we decide when to decide?  
 
In this section I will review the prominent models of decision timing, with a particular focus on the 
drift diffusion model, and outline behaviour and neural evidence that supports the idea that decisions 
are drawn to a close via the mechanisms proposed by the model. Finding that some elements of the 
process are not satisfactorily accounted for by this description, I will discuss extensions to the model 
that may improve its predictions, particularly under difficult conditions, where evidence for a decision 
is scarce. Finally, we will consider whether these models predict that humans draw choices to a close 
at an appropriate time.  
 
The sequential probability ratio test and serial sampling models 
 
One prominent answer to the question of when choices are made, first offered by Wald and Wolfowitz 
seventy years ago, is based on an extension of the likelihood ratio test that is foundational for signal 
detection theory (Green & Swets, 1966). When squinting in our attempts to determine whether the 
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animal in the distance is our loveable pet, or a fox to be chased away, signal detection theory decides 
on the basis of the likelihood ratio, by dividing the probability of the evidence given it being our pet, 
by the probability of the evidence given it being a fox (signal detection theory applies to momentary 
judgements in a static environment, and as such only considers one source of noise in deriving its 
solution). If we have no bias, a likelihood ratio higher than 1 should lead us to conclude that it was 
our pet, whilst a result lower than one suggests it is a fox. The principle of deriving the likelihood ratio 
in a static environment underpins the mechanism of the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT): in 
circumstances that require the sampling of (conditionally independent) evidence over time, the 
optimal solution is derived by calculating the product of the likelihood ratio for each independent 
successively-occurring sample of evidence – or (equivalently) the sum of the log likelihood ratios – up 
to a given threshold. The SPRT allows us to determine the smallest number of samples required in 
order to make a decision with a given accuracy level (Bogacz, Brown, Moehlis, Holmes, & Cohen, 2006; 
Wald & Wolfowitz, 1949).  
 
Whilst the SPRT is an exceptionally useful procedure, it also makes a rather implausible assumption: 
namely that observers are aware of the underlying distributions of evidence. Furthermore, it is not a 
particularly intuitive explanation of how humans (or animals) determine when to stop ‘on the fly’. 
Hence the birth of serial sampling models (SSMs). The general format of SSMs is similar to that of the 
SPRT: evidence is accumulated over time in the form of a decision variable until this decision variable 
(DV) reaches a “bound”, at which point a decision is triggered. In psychological terms, this bound may 
reflect our sense of certainty that our answer is correct, and we defer choices until that point. The 
frame in which the evidence is integrated is not specified in the original formulation of the model, 
thus the DV can be (as in the SPRT) defined as the log likelihood ratio. However many other 
formulations of the model (which are arguably more plausible) integrate evidence with reference to 
the format in which it is presented (for example, in an orientation discrimination task, the momentary 
evidence which is integrated would be the angular disparity of each stimulus from the reference) 
(Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2012). The bound reached (or in certain types of SSM, the identity of the 
evidence trace that hits the bound) determines the choice that is made. Thus such models are a 
parsimonious account of both what choice is made and when it is made.  
 
Arguably the most prominent serial sampling model in the field is the drift diffusion model, DDM (see 
figure 1.5). This model assumes that the relative evidence in favour of two options is accumulated to 
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one of two bounds, and includes amongst its free parameters: the height of the decision-triggering 
bounds relative to the evidence starting point, the rate of drift (i.e. the average gain at each timepoint 
of the DV), and the level of noise (or variability) in the integration process. These parameters are 
estimated by fitting to the empirically observed reaction time distributions. In this model, the current 
‘state’ of evidence in favour of each of the two options is modelled as a decision variable which drifts 
noisily towards one of two bounds (see figure). When the bound is breached, the accumulation 
process is terminated and the corresponding decision made (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & 
Rouder, 1998; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004).  
 
The DDM is not the only sequential sampling model: other examples of such models differ most 
obviously in whether they assume that relative or absolute inputs are accumulated. Race models, for 
example, assume that evidence for each option is accumulated as an independent decision variable; 
these variables race towards their own boundary and whichever trace hits that boundary first 
determines the choice that is made. Race models have two clear advantages over models like the drift 
diffusion: firstly, it’s intuitive to think how independent evidence traces could be represented 
neurally, and secondly, race models are able to represent more than two alternatives, and are 
therefore able to account for a much wider range of decisions (Bogacz, 2007; Furman & Wang, 2008; 
Tsetsos, Usher, & McClelland, 2011). However, in favour of the drift diffusion model, the influence of 
relative (rather than absolute) evidence on decisions is clear at all levels, from adjustments made due 
to background levels of light in sensory decisions (Baccus & Meister, 2002) to context dependent 
preferences in economic prospects (Tversky et al., 1990). This ubiquity perhaps explains the appeal of 
the relative model; either way, the drift diffusion model will be our key focus here due to its 
dominance in the field.  
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Figure 1.5: Illustration of the classic Drift Diffusion model (DDM) with three simulated paths. The 
starting point z is equidistant between the boundaries (0 and a) that reflect choice options A and B; 
shifting the starting point would lead to a bias towards one of the options. Figure taken from Ratcliff 
and McKoon (2008). 
 
Behaviour support for the drift diffusion model as an account of human 
stopping times 
 
What evidence is there then that the drift diffusion model is a good account of not just what people 
choose, but when they choose? Behaviour experiments have shown that it explains a host of features 
of reaction time data: the rightward skew of reaction time distributions arises naturally from the 
simple geometry of the model, as longer reaction times are associated with weaker traces (and 
therefore lower drift), meaning they cross the bound at more variable times. With a simple extension 
that involves variability in the drift rate or starting point of accumulation, the DDM can also captures 
empirically the longer reaction times seen in error trials (Ratcliff & Rouder, 1998). In the model, errors 
are made when the trace crosses the incorrect bound, and are also associated with lower drift. Thirdly, 
the model accounts for the speed accuracy trade off, as lower bounds cause speed to be emphasised, 
whilst higher bounds lead to greater accuracy but slower response times. In observed data, the 
general tendency for errors to be slower than correct trials is observed most frequently in the case 
that accuracy is being emphasised over speed; when the latter is emphasised, noisy traces are more 
likely to cross the incorrect bound quickly, thus the model accounts for this effect too. Finally, in order 
to account for decisions in which one decision is a priori more preferable, a bias can be introduced in 
the starting point of the decision variable in the model, such that the trace starts closer to the bound 
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representing the preferred option (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Ratcliff & Smith, 2004; Summerfield & 
Koechlin, 2008).  
 
Neural support for the drift diffusion model from non-human primates 
 
There is a prominent literature on how activity in the lateral intraparietal cortex (LIP) may reflect the 
predictions of the drift diffusion model. In the general form of the paradigm used, monkeys are 
trained to respond to a random dot motion (RDM) stimulus that contains motion information that 
tends left or rightward with varying degrees of coherence (the lower the coherence, the harder the 
task). Monkeys saccade towards a leftwards or rightwards target that reflects their choice about the 
net direction, and are rewarded with liquid for correct responses. During the experiment, the activity 
of a selection of LIP neurons that are spatially selective to the target locations – i.e. those that tend 
to fire when saccades are directed to the specific portion of space in which the targets are presented 
during the experiment – is recorded via extracellular single unit recording devices (see figure 1.6 and 
(Smith & Ratcliff, 2004) for an overview of this methodology). Using this method, some striking and 
consistent patterns of activity have been observed: on trials on which a correct response is made, the 
activity of neurons selective to the location of the correct target show a gradual ramping of activity 
during stimulus presentation, the gradient of which is greater when the stimulus coherence is higher. 
See figure 1.6 for an illustration of how such a pattern is clearly reminiscent of the noisy drift towards 
a boundary of the DV in the DDM, which itself is predicted to be steeper on higher coherence trials. 
Furthermore, regardless of stimulus coherence and ramping strength, LIP firing rates are shown to 
reach a common level just before choice was executed, suggesting – as the DDM would predict – that 
decisions are terminated when a fixed ‘threshold’ is reached (Huk & Shadlen, 2005; Kiani, Hanks, & 
Shadlen, 2008; Kiani & Shadlen, 2009; Kim & Shadlen, 1999; Palmer, Huk, & Shadlen, 2005; Roitman 
& Shadlen, 2002). Furthermore, on choices in which there may be a strong prior preference towards 
one option over the other, there is evidence from single unit recordings that neural firing reflects this 
prior via increased baseline activity (Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Rorie, Gao, McClelland, & Newsome, 
2010). When microstimulation is used to artificially inflate the drift, decisions are made faster, as 
would be expected if the decision variable is “boosted” closer to a bound. (Ditterich, Mazurek, & 
Shadlen, 2003). Thus this body of research provides a pleasingly intuitive demonstration of the 
potential neural implementation of the DDM, lending great support to the model as a good account 
of choices and stopping times.  
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Figure 1.6: Illustration of the typical tasks used in the single unit recording paradigm (top panel, figure 
from Yates et al 2017) and the firing rates of LIP neurons (and medial temporal neurons in the grey 
panel) as a function of coherence level (lower panel, figure from Gold and Shadlen (2007)).  
 
Challenges to the neural support for the drift diffusion model in non-
human primates 
 
However, perhaps all is not as it seems. It has been argued that the ramping signal in LIP could reflect 
attention and/or value, rather than the DV predicted by the DDM. Studies in experimental animals 
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often deliberately manipulate attention via reward contingencies associated with responses, and such 
studies rarely try to rule out the potential confound that the observed neural activity is simply due to 
attention to the to-be-rewarded choice (Maunsell, 2004). In the experiments described, the monkeys 
are highly proficient in the task, having completed thousands of training trials, and receive reward for 
correct answers. Thus it is certainly plausible that the neural response reflects an expected reward, 
rather than the disambiguation of a sensory stimulus which, due to extensive training, has long since 
ceased to be a challenge. Building on this idea, LIP neurons have been observed to correlate with the 
delay-discounted value of an offer shortly after its onset, before appearing to encode a choice in the 
build-up to action (Louie & Glimcher, 2010). This suggests that parietal regions are able to adapt 
rapidly and encode the changing subjective value associated with a choice (Sugrue, Corrado, & 
Newsome, 2004). It could be argued that encoding information in terms of its value rather than the 
sensory evidence does not negate the idea that the LIP reflects the decision variable: the DDM is a 
modality independent formulation of the evidence integration process and as such this drifting DV 
could reflect a range of different quantities, including the ramping relative probability of receiving a 
reward, arguably a highly relevant quantity for decision making.  
 
A second element of the LIP activity that remains hard to explain how it is able to implement a ‘bound’: 
although firing reached a stereotyped level before the choice was executed, reminiscent of reaching 
a threshold, gradual ramping arguably isn’t the type of activity we’d expect to see in a region 
associated with executing a binary choice, given that decisions are discrete rather than continuous. 
Furthermore, the fact that the activity rapidly attenuates after the decision is executed is indicative 
that the threshold is driven by input from other areas (Lo & Wang, 2006). This is not in itself necessarily 
incompatible with the notion that the pattern of activity reflects the decision variable, but for a full 
account it would be useful to understand which regions are involved in implementing the bound, and 
how their connectivity and communication may allow this to occur (more on this in relation to human 
data below).  
 
Irrespective of whether we can accept this reasoning, there is a significantly more problematic 
challenge to the idea that this ramping neural activity reflects the DDM-predicted DV, which is that 
the LIP firing has been shown recently not to have causal relevance to the eventual choice or to its 
timing. When the LIP area was temporarily inactivated via the local application of GABA agonist 
muscimol, using the same paradigm, decisions about motion direction were still made with the same 
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accuracy, and evidence was accumulated at the same rate (Huk, Katz, & Yates, 2017; Katz, Yates, 
Pillow, & Huk, 2016). Importantly, this inactivation occurred in the very regions that displayed this 
characteristic ramping activity when not silenced, and nonetheless no impact was seen. Similarly in 
rats, silencing of the posterior parietal cortex actually enhanced task performance (Akrami, Kopec, 
Diamond, & Brody, 2018). Therefore this is a seriously problematic challenge for the theory that LIP 
implements an accumulation process as proposed by the DDM, and may weaken its ability to account 
for decision timing. Arguably, this challenge was long overdue: decades of work have shown that 
lesions to the parietal cortex lead not to disorders of decision making, but disorders of attention 
(Posner & Petersen, 1990); given that lesions are one of the few neural methodologies we use that 
allow us to make causal conclusions with relative confidence, we ought perhaps to have paid greater 
heed. It seems that researchers were perhaps distracted by the intuitive appeal of seeing a neural 
process that so closely resembles the model, and forgot that simply because some activity looks like 
a mechanism, it does not mean it is implementing that mechanism. To assume that it is involves 
attributing a semantic meaning to patterns of neural firing. To give an analogy, when I am watching a 
cat video on my computer, I would not expect the flow of electrical information across the 
motherboard to resemble the movements of the cat on the screen. Arguably Shadlen and colleagues’ 
conclusions conflated the algorithmic and the implementational level of Marr’s process description, 
leading to appealing but erroneous deductions.  
 
Neural support for the drift diffusion model from human data 
 
This does not mean that hope is lost for identifying neural evidence that supports the DDM: functional 
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), electroencephalography (EEG) and magnetoencephalography 
(MEG) experiments in humans all open potential avenues. Focussing first on fMRI research, this paints 
an uncertain picture as there is not an established consensus of what would constitute evidence for 
the neural representation of a DV that evolves towards a bound. Arguably a higher BOLD signal is 
indicative of a harder choice, as more energy is required for the computation and the choice takes 
longer, meaning the sum of the firing will be higher. Such signals have been identified in the anterior 
insula and anterior frontal sulcus (Liu & Pleskac, 2011), and the medial prefrontal cortex (Pisauro, 
Fouragnan, Retzler, & Philiastides, 2017). However during a face/house categorisation task, Heekeren 
and colleagues found that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex was more active for easier decisions, that 
it correlated with the signal difference between face and house selective regions (suggesting that the 
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comparison of outputs from different neural pools may drive the DV) and was linked to behavioural 
performance (Heekeren, Marrett, Bandettini, & Ungerleider, 2004). Given this opposite pattern of 
results, it is hard to draw firm conclusions about their meaning with confidence (see (Mulder, van 
Maanen, & Forstmann, 2014) for further discussion).   
 
Furthermore, the DDM is a model of choice but is crucially simultaneously a model of reaction times, 
and neither of these experiments identify a link between the BOLD signal and decision termination. 
However, other findings may paint a clearer picture when it comes to trying to establish the neural 
basis of the decision bound. Information reaches the basal ganglia in the forebrain via excitatory or 
inhibitory pathways (Chevalier & Deniau, 1990; Redgrave, Prescott, & Gurney, 1999), and the basal 
ganglia receive information from LIP (Pare & Wurtz, 2001), meaning they may be well placed for a role 
in decision execution via the implementation of a bound (Lo & Wang, 2006), a notion exacerbated by 
the fact that in the striatum, D1 and D2 dopamine receptor uptake is associated with positive and 
negative sensorimotor reinforcement respectively (Doll & Frank, 2009; Frank, 2005; Frank, Seeberger, 
& O'Reilly R, 2004). Thus although evidence for the correlate of the DV itself is perhaps lacking, we 
arguably have more convincing evidence for the potential neural location of decision termination.  
 
Event related desynchronisation is the transient dampening or blocking of rhythms within a given 
frequency band that can be observed in electro- and magneto-encephalographic (EEG and MEG) data. 
Beta band frequency desynchronisation in parietal regions has been linked particularly to cognitive 
(rather than sensory) processing (Pfurtscheller, Neuper, & Mohl, 1994). Its link to cognitive processes 
has been suggested to take the form of involvement in the evidence integration process (Donner, 
Siegel, Fries, & Engel, 2009), based partly on work that has shown that beta power decrease in the 
hemisphere contralateral to the response effector is linked to motor response preparation (L. M. 
Doyle, Yarrow, & Brown, 2005). In EEG, scalp activity has been shown to ramp proportionally to the 
extent of sensory evidence, akin to a DDM decision variable (Philiastides, Heekeren, & Sajda, 2014). 
Focusing on specific components, the centro-parietal positivity component (CPP) shows a ramping 
profile, scaled by difficulty level, over the course of a perceptual decision making trial, and the peak 
of the component predicts response times (Kelly & O'Connell, 2013; O'Connell, Dockree, & Kelly, 
2012). Predicting response time is important given the focus of our current discussion, yet the fact 
that it can’t simultaneously predict choices themselves is problematic to a quantity that is being 
viewed as akin to a DDM decision variable, which does both. Some have argued that this suggests that 
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the CPP instead reflects a choice-independent quantity such as confidence (Urai & Pfeffer, 2014). 
Ultimately, then, the neural evidence for the quantities predicted by the DDM exists but remains 
ambiguous in both humans and non-human primates.  
 
Does the drift diffusion model make choices at the appropriate time? 
 
A remaining pertinent question is: does the DDM make decisions at a ‘good’ time? Even if neural 
evidence is somewhat lacking, we know it accounts well for behaviour, so are these choices 
appropriately timed? Like the SPRT, the DDM is able to produce the fastest decisions for a given level 
of accuracy, and is furthermore able to maximise desirable values better than other similar sequential 
sampling models (Bogacz et al., 2006). For example, Bayes risk (BR) is a cost function that is the 
weighted sum of decision time and error rate:  
 𝐵𝑎𝑦𝑒𝑠′	𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝑐1 ∙ 𝐷𝑒𝑐𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛	𝑇𝑖𝑚𝑒 + 𝑐2 ∙ 𝐸𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟	𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒	 
 
where c1 is a time cost, and c2 is a cost for errors (which, given that the two types of cost are 
comparable, must be scaled by time in some way). These two cost parameters can either be fit to the 
data, or established via a prior based on the relative importance in a given task of speed versus 
accuracy. Another way of assessing value over time is via the reward rate (RR): the proportion of 
correct trials divided by the average duration between decisions (see e.g. (Gold & Shadlen, 2002)). 
These two functions – Bayes’ risk and the reward rate – differ in their penalties – BR has an explicit 
cost for time, RR just assumes that long times are penalising in that they slow the reward rate. They 
also have a different emphasis on speed/accuracy - RR is unconcerned with getting the answer right, 
as long if it means that overall the reward is still high. BR on the other had has an explicit cost to 
incorrect choices, independent of the time cost. However, whichever definition is used, there will 
always be a set of parameters for the DDM that maximises the value given more effectively than other 
similar sequential sampling models (Bogacz et al., 2006). As such, we know that the DDM certainly 
has the potential to lead to appropriately-timed decisions. However, importantly, simply because 
there exists an optimal set of parameters does not imply that humans (or monkeys) are able to identify 
them.  
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Urgency signals in the drift diffusion model 
 
Furthermore, a specific area of contention is whether the DDM leads to appropriately-timed choices 
in particular when the decisions are hard. Consider the fable of Buridan’s ass: the hungry, thirsty 
animal is equidistant between sources of food and water. Given the equally strong appeal of both 
options, the ass is unable to choose where to go first, and therefore perishes. In everyday life there 
are decisions that even after a significant amount of evidence has been gathered remain difficult, 
either because no option is clearly correct, or because all options seem equally likely. In the original 
form of the DDM, ambiguous evidence would drift between the two boundaries for a prolonged 
period, unduly delaying the choice to be made. So how do agents bring decisions to a close when, 
even after collecting evidence, the answer is unclear? There is a reasonable amount of evidence that 
suggests that humans implicitly track the time elapsed during evidence accumulation. Intuitively, if it 
has taken us double the time than it took on a different occasion to reach the same level of evidence 
in favour of a decision, it suggests that the source of evidence this time round is noisier – the ratio of 
signal to noise is lower – and therefore our confidence should be lower. Having used this information 
to deduce that we are in a low signal to noise environment, we can further reason that further 
accumulation will likely confer little benefit in identifying the best choice – so it is better to curtail 
such decisions and move on. People seem to behave in line with this reasoning (Hanks, Mazurek, Kiani, 
Hopp, & Shadlen, 2011; Kiani, Corthell, & Shadlen, 2014; Zylberberg, Fetsch, & Shadlen, 2016).  
 
A more explicit mechanism that has been proposed via which agents may track the passage of time 
and draw decisions to a close is an ‘urgency’ signal: an evidence-independent signal that increases as 
the accumulation process continues, naturally drawing ambiguous decisions to a close. In the framing 
of the drift diffusion model, this could occur via a factor added to the drift, leading to steeper gain 
and an eventual boundary crossing even when evidence is weak, or via a collapsing bound, such that 
over the course of time, increasingly less evidence is required to trigger a choice. Evidence for such a 
signal has been widely supported via a number of avenues: model-based behaviour evidence from 
Thura, Cisek and colleagues supports their variant of a serial sampling model that explicitly 
incorporates an urgency signal (Thura, Beauregard-Racine, Fradet, & Cisek, 2012; Thura & Cisek, 
2014), a notion that is in line with Drugowitsch and colleagues who concluded that reaction times 
under various levels of task difficulty could only be explained by a model with an urgency signal 
(Drugowitsch, DeAngelis, Angelaki, & Pouget, 2015). Neurally, ramping activity in single neurons in 
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the absence of any coherent signal in the stimulus has been suggested to reflect an urgency signal 
(Churchland, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2008). An odour discrimination task in humans during fMRI combined 
behaviour and neural evidence, showing that the activity in the OFC and behaviour data together were 
best accounted for by a drift diffusion model with collapsing bounds (Bowman, Kording, & Gottfried, 
2012). These are but a few examples of a wealth of research that has supported the incorporation of 
an urgency signal into models that account for choice reaction times.  
 
However, two recent reviews of such experiments concluded that overall, reaction times were best 
fit by a fixed bound model (Hawkins, Forstmann, Wagenmakers, Ratcliff, & Brown, 2015; Voskuilen, 
Ratcliff, & Smith, 2016). However, these reviews arguably did not appropriately consider a crucial 
factor: urgency signals should only be obvious in tasks in which the decision is difficult, or where the 
decision difficulty varies considerably between trials and it is therefore unclear before the trial onset 
at what level to set the bounds. If the tasks are easy, the DDM predicts that the bound will be reached 
anyway, before such time as an urgency signal is apparent. In other words, the conclusion that an 
urgency signal doesn’t exist may have been drawn simply because in the experiments that were 
reviewed by Hawkins and colleagues, the tasks were too easy. This notion is supported directly by a 
study that compared easy and hard versions of a task directly,  which showed that indeed, collapsing 
bound models are evident only when the task difficulty varies from trial to trial, as would be expected 
(Malhotra, Leslie, Ludwig, & Bogacz, 2017). Ultimately, it seems reasonable to conclude that, in the 
absence of a clear choice, some factor must drive decisions to a close in order to prevent endless 
deliberation. Taken together, the evidence suggests that a time dependent ‘urgency’ signal, evidence 
for which has been seen behaviourally and neurally, is the most plausible explanation.  
 
Over the course of this section, a thorough examination of the evidence supporting the most 
prominent model of human stopping times – the drift diffusion model – has shown that it provides an 
excellent fit to human reaction time distributions, with the incorporation of an ‘urgency’ signal to 
bring decisions to a close when the evidence is ambiguous. Assuming agents are able to determine 
the appropriate parameters, it leads to the best-timed choices under a number of formulations. 
Neural evidence in favour of the model, whilst existent, is less easy to interpret.  
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1.5. Chapter summary and thesis outline 
 
I began this chapter by outlining the wealth of evidence that suggests that, when making simple 
decisions, humans reliability-weight evidence just as an optimal observer should. However, I also 
noted that traditional accounts of human optimality lack a plausible mechanism by which they could 
be implemented. In chapter 2, I present empirical evidence that humans reliability-weight information 
in a simple, multi-sample categorisation task. Using data from human behaviour as well as concurrent 
EEG recording, I provide evidence that this pattern of results is accounted for by a simple and 
biologically plausible mechanism.  
 
I then went on to note that the traditional definition of ‘optimal decisions’ – those that reliability-
weight the information in the manner of a Bayesian observer – may be an appropriate definition only 
in the simplest of tasks. When choices are corrupted by late noise – noise that arises from internal 
processes rather than external sensory sources, such as during the integration of multiple pieces of 
evidence – “optimal” choices may be better defined as those that are most likely lead to correct 
choices in the face of late noise. I detailed preliminary evidence that such choices involve the selective 
integration of decision information. In chapter 3, I provide empirical evidence that shows that humans 
selectively integrate decision information during a cognitively challenging multi-sample task. I show 
that this behaviour can be captured by a selective integration model, the predictions of which are 
manifest in the concurrent EEG data. 
 
Finally, I discussed factors that drive decisions to a close. In chapter 4 I describe a series of three 
experiments in which participants made decisions in a self-paced manner. I show that a model that 
integrates evidence selectively until a threshold that collapses over time is reached provides the best 
explanation of human reaction times. I show that the predictions of this model are again evident in 
the concurrently-recorded EEG data.  
 
The thesis is concluded in chapter 5 with a more general discussion of the common themes of the 
work from the three empirical chapters, during which I highlight questions that remain unanswered, 
and present ideas for future research directions.  
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2. Near-optimal integration of 
magnitude in the human parietal 
cortex 
 
Humans are often observed to make optimal sensorimotor decisions, but to be poor judges of 
situations involving explicit estimation of magnitudes or numerical quantities. For example, when 
drawing conclusions from data, humans tend to neglect the size of the sample from which it was 
collected. Here, we asked whether this sample size neglect is a general property of human decisions, 
and investigated its neural implementation. Participants viewed eight discrete visual arrays (samples) 
depicting variable numbers of blue and pink balls.  They then judged whether the samples were being 
drawn from an urn in which blue or pink predominated.  A participant who neglects the sample size 
will integrate the ratio of balls on each array, giving equal weight to each sample.  However, we found 
that human behaviour resembled that of a near-optimal observer, giving more credence to larger 
sample sizes. Recording scalp electroencephalographic (EEG) signals whilst participants performed 
the task allowed us to assess the decision information that was computed during integration. We 
found that neural signals over the posterior cortex following each sample correlated first with the 
sample size, and then with the difference in the number of balls in either category.  Moreover, 
lateralized beta-band activity over motor cortex was predicted by the cumulative difference in 
number of balls in each category. Together, these findings suggest that humans achieve statistically 
near-optimal decisions by adding up the difference in evidence on each sample, and imply that sample 
size neglect is not a general feature of human decision-making. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Decisions often involve integration of evidence from multiple sources.  We discussed extensively in 
chapter one the idea that optimal choices in simple decisions can be made when information is 
weighted by the trustworthiness (or reliability) of each source. When human sensorimotor behaviour 
is refined through experience, it often resembles that of an ideal observer (Kording, 2007; Pouget et 
al., 2013). For example, humans pointing towards a target assign more weight to prior knowledge 
about its location when sensory evidence is indistinct, as an ideal observer should (Kording & Wolpert, 
2004). Humans and monkeys can learn to weight a train of symbolic cues in direct proportion to the 
informativeness with which they predict a rewarded response (Gould, Nobre, Wyart, & Rushworth, 
2012; Wyart, de Gardelle, Scholl, & Summerfield, 2012; Yang & Shadlen, 2007). When visual and haptic 
cues offer potentially conflicting information about the size of an object, visual information is less 
influential when corrupted by noise (Ernst & Banks, 2002). When using information from product 
reviews to update their initial impression of the product, participants update more strongly when the 
number of people who contributed to the reviews was larger, and was therefore a more reliable 
source of information (De Martino et al., 2017). These findings have prompted the claim that humans 
and monkeys have evolved to make optimal decisions, i.e. those that account for the relative 
uncertainty associated with each source of choice-relevant information. 
 
However, human choices are not always optimal. For example, when asked to evaluate hypothetical 
scenarios involving numerical magnitudes, humans often make biased or inaccurate responses (Griffin 
& Tversky, 1992). Consider the problem of estimating whether men outnumber women on a 
university degree course. The approximate male:female ratio from a small seminar group is a less 
reliable estimator than that from a large lecture class, because our confidence in an estimate should 
be determined by its standard error, which is inversely related to n, i.e. to the sample size.  Given both 
observations (small seminar versus large lecture), an optimal solution to this problem – which is given 
by combining the binomial probability associated with each sample – will afford the larger sample 
more weight; simply averaging the two ratios may lead to a biased decision. However, when 
confronted with problems of this nature, humans can be excessively reliant on the relative balance of 
evidence, overlooking the information about sample size and drawing erroneous conclusions from 
data  (Griffin & Tversky, 1992; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974b). Instances of this suboptimality are not 
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limited to binomial estimation problems: when asked to judge whether the average height of a group 
of humans exceeds a fixed value, humans disregard whether the group is composed of 10, 100 or 
1000 individuals. Even researchers who use statistics regularly to evaluate data have been observed 
to display this ‘sample size neglect’  (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971).  
 
Why, then, do humans account for the reliability of information in some situations and not in others?  
One possibility is that sample size neglect might not be a ubiquitous feature of decisions, but instead 
depends on the format in which the decision information is provided. For example, sample size neglect 
might occur when decision problems are presented as descriptions of hypothetical scenarios, but not 
when participants learn to make decisions in an experience-dependent fashion, i.e. through feedback 
that reveals whether a classification judgment was correct or incorrect (Hertwig & Erev, 2009). 
 
Here, we asked whether humans performing a psychophysical task display sample size neglect, or 
whether they integrate information about numerical magnitudes optimally. Our task was an 
expanded judgment task, variants of which have previously been used to interrogate information 
integration during perceptual decision-making (Wyart, de Gardelle, et al., 2012; Yang & Shadlen, 
2007). Our approach thus investigates sample size neglect via an experimental framework that has 
been widely used to understand the neural and computational mechanisms by which perceptual 
inputs are integrated and categorised (Gold & Shadlen, 2007). Observers viewed a succession of eight 
discrete visual events (‘samples’) in which a variable number of pink and blue balls were displayed, 
and subsequently decided whether they had been drawn from a larger pool of predominantly pink or 
predominantly blue balls. Our initial question was whether humans gave more credence to samples 
that contained more balls. For example, consider two different samples each offering a 2:1 ratio of 
blue:pink balls, one with a total of 3 balls (2 blue, 1 pink) and one with a total of 12 balls (8 blue, 4 
pink).  If humans exhibit a sample size bias, their choices would reflect the integration of these ratios 
of evidence (i.e. they would weight samples with 3 and 12 balls equally).  However, if humans are 
optimal, they will give more weight to samples with more balls.  
 
We initially predicted, in line with the second body of research outlined above, that humans would 
show sample-size neglect during integration of magnitude information.  However, we found strong 
support for the opposing hypothesis: human choices were ‘near-optimal’, in that their choices 
resembled those that might be made by an ideal observer (in this case, one who was calculating the 
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binomial probability of the dots on each sample being drawn from one urn as opposed to the other).  
In the light of this finding, we turned our attention to understanding how this behaviour might be 
achieved at the neural and computational level. In our task, two simple strategies would allow 
participants to arrive at the near-optimal solution. Firstly, participants could add up the absolute 
evidence for either response, by integrating the blue and pink dots independently and comparing the 
resulting tallies (we call this the tally model; it is related to the ‘race’ model of perceptual decision-
making, (Smith & Vickers, 1988; Vickers, 1979)). Alternatively, participants could add up the relative 
evidence for either choice, by integrating the difference in the number of blue or pink dots on each 
sample (we call this the difference model; it is related to the drift-diffusion model of perceptual 
choice, (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008)). Because the behavioural data did not allow us to arbitrate among 
these possibilities, we turned to neural recordings, and measured the scalp electroencephalogram 
(EEG) whilst participants performed the task. Although we observed a correlate of the absolute 
number of pink or blue dots over posterior electrode sites, this was rapidly followed by a correlate of 
their relative difference.  Over centro-parietal sites previously implicated in perceptual categorisation, 
we observed stronger correlates of both the momentary and integrated difference signal. Together, 
these findings suggest that humans solved the task by accumulating the relative difference in 
magnitudes of evidence on each sample, allowing them to perform the task near-optimally via a 
computationally tractable strategy.  
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2.2 Methods 
 
Participants 
 
Fifty-four participants (31 female, 23 male) were recruited. All reported normal or corrected-to-
normal vision and no history of neurological or psychiatric disorders, and gave written informed 
consent in accordance with local ethical guidelines.  Participants for the behavioural pilot (n = 15) and 
control experiment (n = 19) received £10 in compensation, whereas those undergoing EEG (n = 20) 
received £25. Data from 4 EEG participants were excluded (prior to preprocessing) due to excessive 
movement and/or electrical interference, leaving n = 16 for that experiment. For behavioural 
analyses, we included all pilot and valid EEG participants (total n=31).   
         
Task design and stimuli 
 
 In both the behavioural and EEG experiments, participants completed a probabilistic decision-making 
task (Figure 2.1). On each trial, one of two virtual “urns” was pseudorandomly selected: either one 
with a 60:40 predominance of pink balls (50% trials), or one with a 60:40 predominance of blue balls 
(50% trials).  Eight draws (with replacement) of 2,4,6,8,10 or 12 balls were made from the relevant 
urn.  The blue and pink balls drawn were represented as dots in a circular aperture on each of the 
eight sample screens for each trial.  After viewing the 8 samples, participants indicated whether the 
samples were drawn from the predominantly pink urn or predominantly blue urn. 
 
The visual stimuli were presented using the Psychophysics-3 Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) running in 
MATLAB (The Mathworks, Natick, MA) on a 17’ CRT monitor with resolution of 1024x768 pixels and a 
refresh rate of 60Hz. All stimuli were presented on a black background. Participants viewed the stimuli 
in a quiet darkened room approximately 70cm from the screen.  Before the experiment began, 
instructions were presented to participants on screen, including a visual cue indicating the ratio of 
pink:blue balls in the two urns. Each trial began with a white central fixation cross with lines of length 
60 pixels (for 1000 ms), followed by a blank screen (1000 ms).  Subsequently, participants viewed a 
forward mask, eight sequentially occurring sample screens, and a backward mask, each occurring for 
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150 ms with 150 ms inter-stimulus interval (ISI). Each sample screen consisted of an array of blue, pink 
and white dots, each 20 pixels in diameter, randomly spatially distributed (minimum separation 10 
pixels) among 71 possible locations within a circular aperture of 300 pixels diameter.  The number of 
blue and pink dots was determined by randomly drawing between 2 and 12 balls from one of two 
virtual urns as described above. White balls were distracters, which served to decorrelate decision 
information from low-level visual input; 1-6 white balls were randomly added to each sample.  The 
mask screens were identical to sample screens except that the coloured balls were green and orange, 
and participants were instructed to ignore them. These screens helped ensure that participants were 
not unduly swayed by the first or last sample (i.e. avoided perceptual primacy/recency effects). 
 
Following the presentation of the samples, participants indicated via a key press whether they thought 
the balls on that trial were drawn from the mainly pink urn (m key, with right hand), or from the 
mainly blue urn (z key, with left hand).  Auditory feedback was given with a high tone (800 Hz) for 
correct answers and a low tone (400 Hz) for incorrect answers. Before they began the task, 
participants were given clear instructions, a visual representation of the decision problem and urns, 
and 2 practice trials with feedback. 
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Figure 2.1. Experimental protocol. Each trial commenced with a blank screen for 1 second, followed 
by a central fixation cross for 1 second. Eight draws (with replacement) of 2, 4, 6, 8, 10 or 12 balls 
were made from a virtual “urn”, either with a 60:40 predominance of blue balls (50% of trial) or with 
a 60:40 predominance of pink balls (50% of trials), and each draw was represented on screen as 
coloured dots within a circular aperture. Each screen also contained between one and six white 
distractor dots and was displayed for 150ms with 150ms interstimulus interval (ISI). These target 
screens were preceded and followed by a forward and backward mask created in an identical fashion, 
except that the coloured dots were orange and green, and participants were instructed to ignore 
them. At the end of the sample series, participants saw a screen prompting them to respond with a  
keyboard press. Feedback was given on each trial, with a high-pitched (800Hz) tone for correct 
response and a low-pitched (400Hz) tone for an incorrect response.  
 
 
 
The behavioural pilot differed from the EEG experiment in three ways: (i) the presentation time and 
ISI were 250ms each rather than 150ms, (ii) each participant completed 288 rather than 570 trials, 
and (iii) the forward and backward masks were omitted.  
 
Statistically optimal solution 
 
 Let us denote the number blue and pink balls on sample k as d1k and d2k respectively, with nk = 
d1k+d2k. The probability of drawing a blue ball from urn one (predominantly blue) was p and the 
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probability of drawing a blue ball from urn two (predominantly pink) was 1-p.  The converse was true 
for pink balls. By design, p = 0.6. 
 
The statistically optimal solution to the task is given by the integration of binomial probabilities. For 
any sample k, the likelihood that the balls are drawn from the blue urn is given by  
 𝑝′L = 𝐵(𝑑1L, 𝑛L, 𝑝)  
 
where B denotes the binomial distribution. The optimal decision rule is defined by whether the sum 
of the log likelihood ratios of each sample coming from either urn is greater or less than zero. On any 
sample k, the evidence or optimal decision update DU for or against each response can be quantified 
as the log-likelihood ratio:   
 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔P Q(R6S,4S,T)Q(R6S,4S,6UT)V 
 
Models of evidence integration 
 
 We considered three models of evidence integration and choice that human observers could be using 
to solve the task: a suboptimal model, and two models that arrived at the statistically optimal solution 
via two qualitatively different computations. Thus, these latter two make identical behavioural 
predictions, but different predictions about the neural activity that would accompany each sample. 
We first defined the suboptimal model, one in which evidence was not weighted by sample size.  In 
the ratio model, the momentary decision update, DUk,ratio, was based on the log ratio of blue to pink 
dots:  
 𝐷𝑈L,XYZ.[ = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 \𝑑1L𝑑2L] 
 
Thus, the ratio model ignores the sample size: for example, the same value of DU is obtained for d1k 
= 1 and d2k = 3 (where the number of balls nk = 4) as for d1k = 3 and d2k = 9 (where nk = 12). Choices 
were made according to whether the decision variable DVratio, was greater or less than zero: 
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 𝐷𝑉XYZ.[ =+ 𝐷𝑈L,XYZ.[_L56  
 
This policy accounts for the behaviour of participants in the experiments of Tversky and colleagues 
described above. 
 
Next, we considered two models that are formally equivalent to the statistically optimal solution, but 
that solve the task via more biologically plausible mechanisms.  We call these the difference and tally 
models. The difference model computes its decision update (DU) by taking the difference between 
the number of blue and pink dots on each sample, and adds up these differences to form the decision 
variable (DV). Choices are then made according to whether this DV is greater or less than zero: 
 𝐷𝑈R.``aXa4ba = 𝑑1L − 𝑑2L 
 𝐷𝑉R.``aXa4ba =+ 𝐷𝑈L,R.``aXa4ba_L56  
 
 
This model predicts that brain signals accompanying each sample should correlate with the difference 
between the number of pink dots and the number of blue dots, i.e. d1k-d2k. 
 
By contrast, the tally model adds up the number of blue and pink dots in each stream without 
computing their difference. This model thus computes two momentary decision variables for each 
sample, and the choice is made according to whether the sum of blue dots (DU1) exceeds the sum of 
pink dots (DU2) or vice versa (i.e. according to the sign of the DV): 
 
 𝐷𝑈1ZYdde = 𝑑1L 𝐷𝑈2ZYdde = 𝑑2L 
 𝐷𝑉ZYdde =+ 𝐷𝑈1ZYdde −+ 𝐷𝑈2ZYdde_L56_L56  
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This model predicts that brain signals accompanying each sample should correlate with the total 
number of blue and the total number of pink dots, i.e. d1k and d2k.  
 
Thus, whilst the quantity DV on which decisions are based is identical for the difference and tally 
models, because they arrive at this decision variable via different computations, they make different 
predictions about the neural activity that will accompany each sample. The difference and tally 
models are related (but not identical) to the diffusion and race models often used to model reaction 
times in psychophysical tasks (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Smith & Vickers, 1989; Vickers, 1979). 
 
For comparison with human data, DVmodel was corrupted with values drawn from a Gaussian 
distribution, with mean of zero and a standard deviation of σ, before being used to generate 
categorical (model) choices.  The noise parameter σ was fit to group performance separately for the 
tally and difference model versus the ratio model, but yielded very similar values (in log units: 0.51 
for the ratio model, 0.59 for the tally and difference models).  Note that varying this parameter simply 
changed overall model performance without affecting the qualitative pattern of results.  The 
distributions of DV associated with the tally and difference models were very similar; each was roughly 
normally distributed and ranged from -3 to 3 in log units. 
 
Behavioural analyses 
 
 We compared human and model performance in a number of ways. First, we plotted psychometric 
functions to envisage how the probability of responding pink, p(pink), varied as a function of the 
decision variables (DVs) predicted by the ratio, difference and tally models (each binned into deciles). 
Second, we used a probit regression model to estimate the influence that each of the sample positions 
(from first to last in the sequence) had on choice, and plotted how p(pink) was predicted by the 
number of blue and pink balls on each of the 8 samples, as follows: 
 𝑝(𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑘) = 𝜙 7𝑏 ++ (𝑤L ∙ 𝑑1L + 𝑤L ∙ 𝑑2L_L56 )8 
 
Where 𝜙 denotes the standard Normal cumulative distribution function.  
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Finally, we tested how the influence of each sample on choice differed as a function of the total 
number of dots, d1k + d2k = nk.  The ratio model predicts that all samples should have the same weight, 
irrespective of nk. The difference and tally models predict that the weight carried by each sample 
should increase as a function of nk, in line with the statistically optimal (binomial) process. On each 
trial, we sorted the 8 samples according to nk, from lowest to highest, denoting the rank of each 
sample j, and used probit regression to calculate the coefficients that best mapped DUratio onto the 
choices made by humans, and the various computational models:  
 𝑝(𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑘) = 𝜙 i𝑏 ++ 𝑤j ∙ 𝐷𝑈XYZ.[,j_j56 k 
 
The logic of this analysis is that if humans are integrating the ratio of evidence, then the resulting 
coefficients should be flat across different values of nk, (i.e. over the ranks j) whereas if they are 
performing (near-) optimally, then the coefficients should grow with j.  
 
EEG acquisition and preprocessing 
 
A Neuroscan EEG system with NuAmps digital amplifiers was used to record EEG signals from 32 
Ag/AgCl electrodes, located at FP1, FPz, FP2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, FT7, FC3, FCz, FC4, FT8, T7, C3, Cz, C4, 
T8, TP7, CP3, CPz, CP4, TP8, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, POz, O1, Oz and O2, plus 4 additional electrodes used 
in a bipolar montage as horizontal and vertical electro-oculograms (EOGs) and two electrodes located 
at the mastoids used as reference. The electrode impedances were kept below 10KΩ. EEG signals 
were recorded at a sampling rate of 1kHz and high-pass filtered online at 0.1Hz. 
 
Preprocessing was carried out using the EEGLAB toolbox for MATLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) and 
custom scripts. The data were downsampled to 250Hz, and epoched from 1s before the onset of the 
first sample to 6s after it, thereby covering the entire trial of 8 samples (including masks). The data 
were then visually inspected to remove trials containing non-stereotypical artifacts, and to identify 
electrodes showing electrical artifacts and therefore requiring interpolation. Following this, the data 
were bandpass filtered between 1 and 40Hz, and re-referenced to the average signal over all 
electrodes.  
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An independent component analysis (ICA) was then conducted using EEGLAB, and the resulting ICA 
components were visually inspected for artifacts, particularly stereotypical artifacts such as blinks and 
sustained high frequency noise. Trials with artifacts were excluded from all further analysis, leaving 
an average of 492 (range 378-544) trials per subject, each consisting of 8 overlapping stimulus events 
(sample onsets). 
 
Unless otherwise stated, we report statistical tests on EEG data averaged across occipital (O1, O2 and 
Oz) and parietal (P3, Pz, P4 and POz) electrode sites. We chose this approach because previous studies 
have identified dissociable patterns of activity over occipital and parietal electrodes in discrete-
sample integration tasks (Wyart, Nobre, & Summerfield, 2012). To correct for multiple comparisons 
across time, we used a nonparametric cluster correction technique, implementing a familywise error 
with an alpha of α=0.05 (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007).  
 
EEG analyses: encoding 
 
We used EEG to investigate how the quantities predicted by the difference and tally models were 
encoded in neural signals, with a view to arbitrating between them, using a ‘model-based’ approach 
to analysis of brain imaging data. Both of these models made identical predictions about choice 
behaviour, but made different predictions about the neural activity that would accompany each 
sample. Rather than calculating event-related potentials, we estimated how decision information was 
encoded in EEG signals using a single-trial approach. This “encoding” methodology involves using 
parametric predictors (such as DUmodel) within a general linear regression model to predict the sample-
to-sample variability in the EEG signal, at successive timepoints (-100 to 700ms) surrounding the onset 
of each sample.  
 
First, we took model-predicted quantities |DUdifference| and |DUratio| and standardized these by z-
transformation. Using rectified decision updates |DUk| ensures that we identify neural signals that 
encode absolute decision information, not those that favour one choice over another (i.e. blue vs. 
pink), as we were aiming to elucidate the nature of the mechanism rather than the nature of the 
choice per se.  (Consider, as an analogy, random dot kinematogram (RDK) motion discrimination tasks: 
the neural signal of interest from EEG recordings is one that correlates with the coherence level of the 
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dots, i.e. decision information independent of direction of motion, rather than one which correlates 
with the extent to which the information favours leftwards vs. rightwards motion). We then regressed 
these quantities in a point-by-point fashion against the single-trial EEG activity following each 
corresponding sample. The resulting parameter estimates (slopes of the best-fitting regression line) 
provide an estimate of how strongly the EEG signal (at each time point over the course of the sample) 
varies with these model-predicted quantities. This thus allowed us to assess the difference in neural 
processing of reliability-weighted and non reliability-weighted information. Although the analysis 
epochs following each sample are overlapping, we took careful steps to ensure that the correlation 
between the variables of interest between adjacent samples was minimised. Thus because the 
decision information provided by each sample is sufficiently uncorrelated, responses to adjacent 
stimulus events (samples) can be disambiguated, much as they can in parametric event-related 
functional neuroimaging designs (Josephs, Turner, & Friston, 1997).  
 
Subsequently, we repeated this procedure, including in the same regression the two quantities that 
are predicted by the difference and tally models respectively: the total number of blue and total 
number of pink balls (tally model) and the absolute difference in blue/pink balls (difference model). 
The aim of this analysis was to determine which of the two models was best able to account for the 
neural activity; including these predictors in the same regression ensured that they competed for 
unshared variance, allowing us to determine whether neural signals scaled more faithfully with the 
tally of evidence or the difference of evidence. 
 
In all of these analyses, decision information from the preceding and succeeding samples was included 
as additional nuisance covariates. This helped ensure that the resulting parameter estimates reflected 
neural encoding on the current sample, and were not corrupted by decision information from 
adjacent samples that overlapped in time with the epoch. This step, combined with the fact that the 
partial correlation between adjacent samples was very low as described, meant that we could be 
confident that the encoding analysis avoided confounding the influence of future and preceding 
samples. The resulting parameter estimates (slopes) for each timepoint (-100 ms pre-stimulus to +700 
ms post-stimulus) were then averaged across samples and entered into a second-level statistical 
analysis for comparison at the group level.  Regions of time (and space, i.e. electrodes) where these 
curves deviate reliably from zero across the cohort indicate where decision information is reliably 
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encoded in neural signals. This is process is also detailed in earlier publications using this method 
(Wyart, Nobre, & Summerfield, 2012). 
 
EEG analyses: decoding 
 
In a subsequent analysis step, we assessed how the strength of the relationship between decision 
information and neural signals assessed above (EEG encoding) predicted participants’ choices. This 
analysis step is closely related to the calculation of “choice probabilities” of single-cell recording data 
(Nienborg & Cumming, 2010) and to an analysis of the psychophysiological interaction (PPI) between 
behavioural and neural variables in fMRI analysis (Gitelman, Penny, Ashburner, & Friston, 2003). Here 
and in previous publications, this analysis is called “EEG decoding” (Wyart, Myers, & Summerfield, 
2015; Wyart, Nobre, et al., 2012) because it allows us to quantify how fluctuations in EEG encoding of 
DU are ‘decoded’ in downstream brain structures, and consequently manifest in choice. Such an 
analysis involves the use of multivariate parametric regression to quantify the extent of the 
modulatory influence of the EEG signal on the relationship between DUmodel and choice. A decoding 
analysis allows us to see whether samples that are encoded with higher than average strength (in 
other words, with positive residual variance) are more predictive of choice than those which are 
encoded with lower than average strength; if they are we would see a clear decoding curve (i.e. a 
significant effect of the residual EEG signal on choice). This method of estimating how the single-trial 
relationship between input (psychological variable) and brain activity (physiological variable) predicts 
choices allows a more direct measurement of how brain activity mediates the link between stimulus 
inputs and the weight or influence that a sample of information wields over choices.   
 
In order to calculate these “decoding” curves, we took the timecourse of the unexplained variance 
(residuals) of the regression of DUtally and DUdifference on the EEG signal.  We then entered this quantity, 
r, into a probit regression, alongside decision information, as a predictor of participants’ choices for 
each sample k and timepoint t: 
 𝑝(𝑝𝑖𝑛𝑘) = 𝜙 7𝑏 ++ 𝜔L ∙ 𝐷𝑈L,m[Rad ++ 𝜔L,Z ∙ 𝐷𝑈L,m[Rad ∙ 𝑟L,Z_L56_L56 8 
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Once again, averaging across samples and participants afforded a grand average and the opportunity 
to conduct group-level statistics. Positive deviations of r from zero indicate times at which brain 
activity not only scaled with decision information, but did so more strongly than on average (i.e. the 
gain of encoding of a particular sample was above average in comparison to the overall encoding 
curve). If this stronger neural encoding of the decision update DU results in a stronger effect of the 
decision update on choice, then this should show as a significant positive interaction between r and 
DU, as reflected in the weight wk,t. The methods used here have been used successfully in previous 
papers (Wyart, de Gardelle, et al., 2012; Wyart et al., 2015). 
 
EEG: lateralised beta-band activity 
 
Based on previous studies, which have shown that oscillatory activity in the beta-band range 
accompanies the buildup of information to a decision threshold, we investigated the encoding of 
momentary and cumulative decision information in time-frequency transformed signals. We 
measured how signed decision updates (DUtally and DUdifference) and the corresponding signed decision 
variables (DVs) were encoded in lateralised beta band activity (~10-40Hz), using a comparable 
technique to the encoding regressions above, in which these quantities were regressed together 
against relative lateralised single-trial spectral power over the motor cortex in 10 logarithmically-
spaced frequency bands between 9 and 43 Hz. The response made with the left index finger always 
corresponded to “blue” whilst the right index response always corresponded to “pink”. Thus the use 
of signed decision updates for analysing lateralised beta-band activity is crucial in this analysis because 
unlike the signals interrogated in previous encoding analyses, here the two alternatives (pink vs. blue) 
map onto putative neural signals that can be disambiguated at the whole-brain level using scalp EEG 
(i.e. hemispherically lateralised patterns of beta-band desynchronisation over the motor and 
premotor cortices). For each subject, we computed the inter-hemispheric difference in beta activity 
at lateral central electrodes by subtracting the spectral log-power of (CP+CP3) from (C4+CP4).  
 
Control analyses 
 
In a further effort to determine that our results from the main experiments were not being driven by 
low-level visual properties of the stimuli, we took the number of pink, blue and white balls respectively 
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on each sample, and standardised these by z-transformation. We then asked whether behavioural 
choice was significantly influenced by the white dots, and whether neural signals encoded more 
strongly those quantities that were decision-relevant (pink and blue balls) relative to those that were 
irrelevant (white balls),  
 
Previous studies that have focussed on the neural representation of number have found a parietal 
event-related potential that reflects the difference in magnitude (i.e. the total number of stimuli) 
between one group of dots and the next (Piazza & Izard, 2009; Piazza, Izard, Pinel, Le Bihan, & 
Dehaene, 2004). To control for similar effects in our data, we regressed the absolute difference in 
total number of dots (blue+pink+white) between one sample and the next against the EEG signal 
(using the regression methods described above, including samples 2-8 in the stream).   In particular, 
we were interested in whether any decision-related signals observed in our experiment could be 
trivially explained by previously described neural adaptation to number.  
 
Behavioural control experiment 
 
In the experiments described above, all dots were equally sized, and so the number of dots was 
correlated with the pixel area of the coloured dots on the display screen. Thus one question that arises 
is whether choices are driven principally by low-level visual properties of the stimuli, i.e. the area 
(number of pixels) that the coloured dots take up on screen, or by the number of dots per se. In order 
to arbitrate among these possibilities, we conducted a further behavioural experiment in which we 
varied the size of the pink and blue dots from sample to sample.  This ensured that the number of 
dots and the number of pixels favouring each choice were decorrelated. 
 
The design (including timing of stimuli and number of trials) of this behavioural control task, which 
was conducted on a new cohort of 19 participants, was identical to the first EEG experiment except 
for the size and position of the dot array. Dots were randomly spatially distributed (minimum 
separation 10 pixels) among 46 possible locations within a circular aperture of 500 pixels diameter. 
The diameter of the blue dots on each sample was randomly selected from a range of 11-45 pixels (35 
possible sizes), and the same process was applied independently to both the pink dots and the white 
dots on each sample, thus ensuring that the pixel area of each colour separately on each sample, as 
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well as the total filled pixel area, was decorrelated from the respective number of dots (Pearson’s 
correlation ~0.65). 
 
This control allowed us to regress both the number of dots and the size of the dots on each sample 
against choice, thereby allowing us to determine whether sample size exerted an influence over and 
above the physical size of the dots on screen.  
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2.3 Results 
 
Behaviour 
 
Participants chose the correct urn on 83±6% of trials, with reaction times averaging 407ms. After the 
addition of performance-limiting Gaussian noise to the DV, all three models achieved comparable 
accuracy to humans (85% for the tally and difference models, and 83% for the ratio model) and were 
able to predict psychometric functions well. We calculated how participants’ choices varied as a 
function of the z-transformed decision variables predicted by the tally and difference models and the 
ratio model, DVdifference, DVtally and DVratio.  The models performed equivalently (Figure 2.2a). The tally 
and difference models behaved in line with the optimal solution, and both (as described) made 
equivalent predictions with the exception of noise.  
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Figure 2.2. Behavioural results and model predictions. (A). Probability of selecting “pink” as predicted 
by the DVs for the ratio model (orange circles) and the two reliability-weighted models (tally model, 
purple circles; difference model, green circles); a DV below zero corresponds to responding “blue” 
and above zero corresponds to a “pink” response. (B). Impact (beta coefficient) of each sample on 
“pink” choices, ranked by the serial position (1-8) as a function of the number of pink balls (first eight 
bars ) and the number of blue balls (last eight bars) in the sample. Estimates were generated using 
probit regression. Grey bars show human data and orange-/purple-/green- coloured circles show 
predictions of the ratio/tally/difference models respectively. (C). Weights (beta coefficients) given to 
each sample as ranked by sample size (smallest to largest) in evidence integration, calculated using 
probit regression. Grey bars correspond to human behaviour, coloured circles show model estimates 
for weight given to the ranked samples. The ratio model, given that it does not reliability-weight the 
samples, is flat across ranks. In all figures, bars show SEM. 
  
We next used probit regression on the behavioural data to estimate the impact that the number of 
pink and blue balls in each sample (1-8) had on choice, as a function of its serial position.  As expected, 
“pink” choices were predicted positively by the number of pink balls, and negatively by the number 
of blue balls (figure 2.2b); this analysis suggested that all the samples contributed at least in part to 
the decision (all grey bars deviated significantly from 0).  
 
pink dots blue dots
a. b.
c.
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Finally, in order to test our main hypothesis, we determined whether or not subjects accounted for 
sample size (number of dots) when making decisions. To this end, we used probit regression to 
estimate the impact that each sample had on choice, ranked not by its position, but by the total 
number of coloured dots, nk (= d1k + d2k), i.e. by its overall reliability.  We used DUratio, the decision 
update as calculated by the ratio model, as a predictor. This ensured that the resulting coefficients for 
observers who did not weight information by sample size would be flat over ranks of nk, whereas an 
observer who weighted information by reliability would show a profile of steadily increasing weights 
(note that a mathematically equivalent alternative would be to use the statistically optimal solution 
as a predictor, in which case an ideal observer would show a flat profile of weights, whereas those for 
an observer who integrated the ratio of evidence would decline with n).  Consequently, for the ratio 
model (orange points, figure 2.2c), the weights did not vary with ranks of nk, but the weight given to 
each sample ranked by nk grew steadily for both the models that arrived at the statistically optimal 
solution (tally model, purple points, and difference model, green points). Again, the values predicted 
by these latter two models are equivalent to the statistically optimal solution, with any residual 
variability due to the noise term σ. 
 
Critically, the impact that each sample wielded over choices for humans depended on the sample size, 
just as it did for the statistically optimal solution and the two models that approximated it; this was 
confirmed by an ANOVA on the weights over ranks (F(7,240) = 51.6, p < 0.001). The beta weight in the 
human data for the largest samples was significantly higher than that of the smallest samples: t(30)= 
13.1, p < 0.001. In the subsequent neural analyses, we seek to distinguish which of the two 
approximations of the optimal (binomial) solution best describes human brain activity during 
performance of the task. The reasoning behind this approach is that it is implausible that neurons 
explicitly compute binomial probabilities, but rather derive the solution via a computationally 
tractable mechanism, such as those described by both the tally and the difference models. 
Furthermore, it allows us to tease apart the difference and tally models that make indistinguishable 
behavioural predictions.  
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EEG: encoding of decision update (DU) in broadband occipital and parietal 
signals 
 
How did humans achieve near-optimal performance on the task? Although the tally and difference 
models both derive the statistically optimal solution with predictions that match human behaviour, 
they make different predictions about the quantities that are computed en route to a decision. We 
thus analysed the link between decision information, neural signals and choices to provide an insight 
into the mechanisms by which humans were making decisions. 
 
First, we sought to correlate EEG activity with the decision update DU (i.e. the momentary information 
conveyed by each sample) predicted by each of the models. Initially, we focussed on comparing the 
ratio model to the difference model, only the latter of which predicts reliability-weighted behaviour. 
To this end, we regressed |DUdifference| and |DUratio| separately against the single-trial EEG data for 
each sample, and averaged over the resulting coefficients at each post-stimulus timepoint. The use of 
rectified predictors allows us to identify neural signals that correlate with the absolute decision 
information, rather than favouring one choice over another (e.g. pink over blue). Standardization 
ensured that the resulting coefficients were directly comparable. Consistent with participants’ 
behavioural tendency to act as if they were weighting the evidence by its reliability (Figure 2.2) the 
response to |DUdifference| was significantly greater than that to |DUratio|  (Figure 2.3a). In other words, 
behavioural data indicate humans pursue a near-optimal strategy, and neural data suggest that they 
do so by integrating reliability-weighted evidence rather than just the ratio of evidence on each 
sample.  
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Figure 2.3. Neural encoding curves. (A). Curves showing correlation between the predictions of the 
ratio model (orange curve) and the difference model (green curve), which approximates the binomial 
solution, with the EEG data after each sample. Shaded areas in the curves denote SEM. The bars at 
the top show periods from stimulus onset in which the curves consistently deviate significantly from 
zero across participants for difference (green) and ratio (orange) models. (B). Correlation between 
EEG signal and the DUs predicted by the tally model (blue and pink ball totals, blue and pink curves) 
and the difference model (blue and pink balls, green curve). Shaded areas in the curves denote SEM. 
The bars at the top show periods from stimulus onset in which the curves consistently deviate 
significantly from zero across participants for difference (green bar) and tally (blue and pink bars) 
models. Note that, for occipital electrodes, there is a period of significant activation corresponding to 
the tally model after stimulus onset, followed by significant activation corresponding to the difference 
model around 200ms, as though all evidence is being processed initially followed by the formation of 
the decision-relevant evidence signal. For all panels, statistics were computed using a nonparametric 
cluster-correction technique implementing a familywise error correction with an alpha of 0.05 (see 
methods). 
 
Subsequently, we asked whether humans performed near-optimally by (i) adding up the differences 
in numbers of balls and deciding whether this quantity was greater or less than zero (difference 
model), or (ii) adding up the total information in each stream in parallel, and deciding which was 
greater (tally model).  The former account predicts that participants compute DUdifference on each 
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sample; the latter account predicts that only DUtally is updated on a sample-by-sample basis.  We thus 
entered DU1tally, DU2tally and |DUdifference| as competitive predictors of the EEG signal at each scalp 
electrode and timepoint from 100 ms preceding sample onset to 700 ms following its onset (see 
Materials and Methods). We observed that the neural variance accounted for by |DUdifference| in 
parietal electrodes outweighed that accounted for by DU1tally and DU2tally, in that the beta weights 
were larger for the former and reached significance for longer, with a first negative deflection peaking 
at 230 ms and a second positive deflection at 470 ms after stimulus onset (figure 2.3b, right panel). It 
is important to note that these curves are not event-related potentials, but single-trial estimates of 
the encoding of decision information by brain activity. Interestingly, the same regression in occipital 
electrodes (figure 2.3b, left panel) showed an initial negative deflection for DU1tally and DU2tally 
followed 150 ms later by a negative deflection for |DUdifference|. One might expect, even under the 
difference model, that there would be an early representation of the total number of pink and blue 
dots, as this quantity is required in order to calculate the difference.  Thus, our interpretation of this 
finding is that the initial encoding of the total information is followed by the emergence of the 
decision-relevant quantity |DUdifference|. 
 
Repeating the above analysis at each electrode provided a topography of encoding of |DUdifference| and 
DUtally across the scalp, which we collapsed into bins of 100ms (figure 2.4, note that the two quantities 
DU1tally and DU2tally are combined for ease of presentation given their similarity). The spatial 
distribution of the resulting weights can be interpreted as the spatial topography of the underlying 
decision-related component in the EEG signal. The resulting patterns of significant activation were in 
accordance with the results from the regressions above, with the response to |DUdifference| (bottom 
row) outweighing that to DUtally (top row). In other words, these neural observations suggest that 
participants use a strategy that involves encoding the difference in information provided by each 
sample.  This allows them to derive the near-optimal solution, weighting information by its reliability.  
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Figure 2.4. Scalp topographies. Scalp-wide significant correlations between the EEG signal predicted 
by the tally model (top row) and the difference model (bottom row). Note that the tally model predicts 
that two quantities are encoded (number of pink balls and number of blue balls); these two quantities 
have been combined in this figure for ease of viewing but plotting them separately yields a 
qualitatively similar pattern. The plots show the t values corresponding to times and regions at which 
(on average in that time bin) the correlation for each model deviated significantly from zero.  
 
EEG: decoding of decision update (DU) in broadband parietal signals 
 
 The encoding regressions suggested that more of the neural variance was accounted for by the 
difference model, which encoded the relative evidence on each sample, than by the tally model, which 
encoded the absolute evidence. To support this notion further, decoding analyses – which are able to 
link the psychological variable (human choice) with the physiological variable (neural encoding of DU 
in the run up to choice) – were used to assess the relationship between the residual variance not 
accounted for by the encoding regressions, and human choice (see Materials and Methods). This 
technique allows the link between the neural transformation of DU and choice behavior (‘choice 
probabilities’) to be made more explicit. Decoding analysis asks how residual variance in the encoding 
(described above) of model-predicted quantities impacts choices, over and above the influence of 
stimulus choices.  Whilst the decoding analysis for the tally model showed no significant effect (figure 
2.5a), the time courses of the decoding regressions for DUdifference were in accordance with those seen 
in encoding in parietal electrodes (figure 2.5b). This analysis therefore provides support for the 
difference model over the tally model, and suggests that variation in encoding of the difference signals 
is predictive of participants’ responses. We note that because it shows the link between neural activity 
and behaviour, this finding also rules out spurious explanations for the observed decision encoding 
t value
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curves, such as the view that the apparent relationship between decision information and brain 
activity is somehow secondary to differences in attention or arousal. 
 
 
Figure 2.5. Neural decoding curves. The unexplained variance (i.e. the residual error) in the EEG signal 
from the encoding regressions in parietal regions for the tally model (A, purple curve) and the 
difference model (B, green curve) were used as predictors of choice in the decoding regressions, 
allowing us to link neural activity (in parietal electrodes) with behaviour choice. See methods for more 
details on this procedure. Shaded areas in the curves denote SEM. The dark green bar shows periods 
in which the correlation significantly deviated from zero in the parietal signal; note that, for the tally 
model, there was no such period of significance.  
 
EEG: lateralised beta-band activity 
 
Previous studies have observed that oscillatory activity in the beta-band range accompanies the build-
up of information to a decision threshold (O'Connell, Dockree, & Kelly, 2012). Next, thus, we measured 
how lateralized beta-band activity over the motor cortex varied with the cumulative decision evidence 
in favour of either choice. To this end, we wavelet-transformed EEG data into its spectral components 
in 10 logarithmically-spaced frequency bands between 9 and 43Hz (i.e. encompassing the 
approximate beta band range extending into lower gamma). First, we confirmed that lateralized beta 
band activity was present in the preparation of the motor response (made from 3500ms after the 
onset of the first stimulus in each trial) by computing the inter-hemispheric difference in EEG activity 
in the 9-43 Hz range between the lateral central electrodes (see Materials and Methods). The results 
confirmed that the difference in power in preparation for responding “pink” (the choice made with 
the right index finger) minus responding “blue” (made with the left index finger), was positive in the 
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contralateral hemisphere and negative in the ipsilateral hemisphere (figure 2.6a), with a focus 
between ~20 and ~30 Hz. 
 
Finally, we tested whether beta-band activity correlated with the accumulated decision-relevant 
evidence predicted by each of the models.  To this end, we conducted further regression analyses in 
which the momentary (DUdifference) and cumulative (DVdifference) predictions, as well as the momentary 
(DUtally) and cumulative (DVtally) predictions, were both entered as predictors of the inter-hemispheric 
difference in lateralized log-power in the 10 selected frequency bands (see Materials and Methods).  
Note that for these analyses we used the signed decision quantities (not rectified) in order to predict 
the leftwards vs. rightwards response. Consistent with the view that participants solve the task by 
integrating a difference signal, the cumulative difference signal DVdifference, but not the cumulative tally 
signal DVtally was a reliable predictor of beta-band lateralization over the motor cortex, as the 
relationship between the lateralised beta band activity was significantly associated with DVdifference 
from 100 ms onwards (figure 2.6b and c, rightmost panels), but was not significantly associated with 
DVtally (figure 2.6b and c, leftmost panels).  
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Figure 2.6. Time–frequency analyses. (A): Interhemispheric difference in log spectral power at 9–43 
Hz (i.e., mainly overlapping the beta band frequency, approx. 15–30 Hz) between “blue” choices, 
which were always made with the right index finger, and “pink” choices, made with the left index 
finger. The resulting quantity was positive in the contralateral hemisphere to the hand with which the 
choice was made and negative in the ipsilateral hemisphere. The period displayed is 2.6–3.2 sec after 
first stimulus onset, that is, close to execution of motor response. (B): Tally and difference model DVs 
were generated by computing the cumulative sum of the model-derived sample- by-sample quantities 
DUtally and DUdifference, respectively, across the trial. Note that the tally model predicts that two 
quantities are encoded (number of pink balls and number of blue balls); these two quantities have 
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been combined in this figure for ease of viewing. The resulting predictors were then regressed against 
the log spectral power difference between centroparietal electrodes C3 + CP3 and C4 + CP4, that is, a 
motor region that should correspond with motor preparatory activity. The left panel shows the 
correlation between the predictions of the cumulative tally DV and the difference in power between 
the two hemispheres, and the right panel depicts the same but in relation to the difference model DV. 
(C): The left and right panels show times/frequencies at which the respective quantities plotted in B 
(the middle left and right panels) deviate significantly from zero.  
 
Control analyses 
 
Next, in order to ensure further that the neural responses were driven by decision-relevant 
information rather than other, low-level factors, we first measured how both behaviour and brain 
activity correlated with the number of white distractor dots in comparison to pink and blue dots. 
These analyses allowed us to distinguish the behavioural and neural response to decision information 
(blue and pink dots) from that elicited by task-irrelevant sensory input (distractor white dots). Entering 
these quantities (white, blue and pink dots) together into the regression ensured that they competed 
for unshared variance. In the behaviour data, the response to white dots was minimal in comparison 
to that evoked by reliability-weighted coloured dots (figure 2.7a). In the neural data, the time course 
of the resulting regression coefficients showed that the number of white (distractor) dots drove a 
visual response (figure 2.7c)  peaking around 250ms post-stimulus. Whilst the neural encoding of the 
white dots was significant, it followed a qualitatively different pattern from the encoding responses 
to the decision-relevant quantities (pink and blue dots; indicated in figure 2.7c by pink and blue curves 
respectively) in both parietal and occipital electrodes. Combined with the behaviour analysis showing 
limited effect of white dots on choice, the qualitatively different neural encoding pattern suggests 
that the white dots were being processed via a different, decision-irrelevant mechanism. The 
responses to the coloured dots were characterized by negative and positive deflections peaking at 
~100 and ~400 ms post-stimulus respectively.  
 
We also examined the relationship between brain activity and the difference in magnitude (i.e. the 
total number of dots on each sample, both decision relevant (blue and pink) and decision irrelevant 
(white)) from one sample to the next, regressing the absolute difference in magnitude from sample 
to sample against the EEG signal over parietal electrodes (see Materials and Methods).  Perhaps 
surprisingly, we found no correlation between the change in magnitude and parietal EEG signals, with 
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no time window reaching statistical significance (figure 2.7d).  This suggests that our neural data are 
dominated by decision-related effects rather than the influence of passive adaptation to number. 
 
Control experiment 
 
Finally, in order to determine whether the observed effects of sample size were driven by the number 
of dots, rather than low-level visual signals such as the total pixel area taken up by the coloured dots, 
we conducted a further control experiment. In this experiment, a new cohort of participants (n=19) 
performed the same urn choice task, with one difference: the pink and blue dots were different sizes, 
ensuring that the pixel area taken up by the dots and the number of dots were dissociable on each 
sample, for each colour individually (correlation between number of pink dots and pink pixel area: r= 
0.65, correlation between number of blue dots and blue pixel area r= 0.66) and overall without white 
dots (r= 0.68) and with white dots (r=0.65). This enabled us to investigate sample size effects using 
the same regression approach, in which we predicted choices as a function of the ratio of dots, sorting 
samples into predictors by their sample size (see above) but now partialling out that portion of the 
variance that could be ascribed to pixel area. To achieve this, we entered the sample-wise pixel area 
for blue and pink categories as additional regressors into the design matrix.  The resulting coefficients 
are shown in figure 2.7b. The results show that whilst decisions are partly influenced by number of 
pixels, the effect of larger samples having greater influence on choices remains robust to the inclusion 
of these additional regressors, following the same pattern of increasing weight on choice with 
increasing sample size that was seen in the main analyses.  This was confirmed by an ANOVA on the 
weights over ranks: for the weights corresponding to sample size, F(7,144) = 32.6, p < 0.001. As before, 
the beta weight in the human data for the largest samples was significantly higher than that of the 
smallest samples: t(18)= 7.8, p < 0.001. However, the same was not the case for the beta weights 
corresponding to pixel area: although the weights deviated significantly from zero, the weights did 
not deviate significantly from each other (F=0.71, p=0.66 for blue pixel area and F=0.67, p=0.7 for pink 
pixel area).  
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Figure 2.7. Control analyses. (A): the first eight grey bars show weights (beta coefficients) given to the 
coloured (decision-relevant) dots in each sample, ranked by sample size (smallest to largest). The 
second set of eight grey bars show the weight given to white (decision-irrelevant) dots in each sample. 
The response to the coloured dots clearly outweighs the response to the white dots. (B): grey bars 
depict the weight (beta coefficients) on choosing “blue” of various aspects of the decision array. The 
first set of eight bars show weights given to each sample as ranked by sample size (smallest to largest), 
the second set of eight bars show the weight of total pixel area of blue dots per sample, and the final 
set of eight bars show the weight of the total pixel area of pink dots per sample, on choosing “blue.” 
All quantities were entered into the same (probit) regression to ensure they competed for unshared 
variance. In all, black bars denote SEM. (C): correlation between decision-relevant (blue and pink dots) 
and decision-irrelevant (white dots) information and the EEG signal in occipital electrodes (left) and 
parietal electrodes (right). Shaded areas in the curves denote SEM. The bars at the top show periods 
in which the curves consistently deviate significantly from zero across participants and trials; the 
colours of these bars correspond to the colours of the curves they reflect. (D): we regressed a quantity 
corresponding to the difference in number of dots (blue + pink + white) between one sample and the 
next against the EEG signal over parietal electrodes. The curve shows that the correlation between 
this quantity and the neural activity was small with no time points reaching significance. Shaded areas 
in the curve denote SEM. This suggests that the parietal encoding signal (see Figure 2.3) is indeed 
likely to reflect decision-related effects, rather than the influence of passive adaptation to number. 
 
 
  
n-ranked samples n-ranked samples blue pixel area pink pixel areawhite dots per sample
Parietal electrodes
a. b.
c. d.
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2.4 Discussion 
 
Humans making decisions are often faced with information that is indistinct, weak, or ambiguous.  
During sensorimotor choices, humans rely more heavily on inputs coming from sources that are 
clearly discernible, for example by weighting haptic information over visual information when the 
latter has been corrupted by noise (Ernst & Banks, 2002).  In one sense, it is remarkable that human 
behaviour has been optimised over evolutionary history to weight information by its reliability, just 
as a statistically ideal observer should.  On the other hand, it is perhaps natural that human decisions 
rely more on information that can be easily detected than that which cannot.  Even the simplest tasks 
can contain more than one source of uncertainty. Let’s consider another courtroom analogy. To a 
juror evaluating evidence, a witness whose testimony is rendered incomprehensible will be unlikely 
to hold much sway, compared to one that can be clearly understood (uncertainty due to sensory 
noise).  However, even where testimony is clearly perceptible, a juror might question whether a lone 
witness (rather than, say, ten consistent testimonies) is sufficient to condemn the accused 
(uncertainty due to knowledge of sample size). Here, we tested whether humans integrate 
information optimally when uncertainty is particularly influenced by the size of the sample. Unlike 
previous studies using description-based scenarios, we found that participants automatically weighed 
the information by sample size, behaving in a fashion that resembled an ideal observer.  
 
Previous research has revealed that humans often disregard the quantity or quality of information 
when making judgments (Griffin & Tversky, 1992). This ‘sample size neglect’ can be considered as a 
special case of a more general bias by which humans neglect the duration or extent over which 
information is available (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974a). However, this classic research presented 
decision problems in the form of descriptive scenarios, making it unclear whether optimality was 
simply limited by the format of decision information (description- vs. experience-based).  Here, we 
assessed human decisions using an expanded judgment task in which discrete samples of information 
arrived in sequence, following which participants made a categorical judgment about their 
provenance.  We found that participants paid more heed to samples that offered better-quality 
information: for example, decisions were more influenced by samples on which there were 12 balls, 
rather than 3 balls, even if the ratio of blue to pink balls was 2:1 in both cases.  In other words, this 
classic demonstration of suboptimal behaviour from the decision-making literature may indeed arise 
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simply due to the format in which information was presented. This has important implications for a 
range of real-word situations, including medicine, economics and public policy, where sample size 
neglect might lead to poor or biased decisions. 
 
The optimal solution to the urn-and-balls problem described here is to estimate the binomial odds 
ratio that the balls were drawn from either of the two urns, and decide according to the sign of its 
logarithm.  Note that samples were presented at 3 Hz, too fast to rely on explicit mathematical 
calculation; any integration must be of approximate number, or magnitude (Piazza & Izard, 2009). 
Thus, although humans behaved near-optimally, it is implausible that they were explicitly computing 
binomial probabilities to solve the task. Rather, there are two mechanisms that arrive at the binomial 
solution that participants could have used. The first is simply to tally up the approximate number of 
pink and blue dots independently, and respond whichever is greater (tally model). The second is to 
estimate the approximate difference between pink and blue dots on each sample, and respond 
according to whether it is greater or less than zero (difference model). Where the experimenter, 
rather than the observer, determines the viewing time that precedes choices (as in this experiment), 
these models make very similar predictions (identical, except for added stochasticity) regarding 
behavioural data, but differ in their neural predictions. The computational approaches described by 
the tally and difference models are related respectively to the ‘race’ and ‘diffusion’ accounts of the 
integration process that is a prelude to human categorical choices (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008; Vickers, 
1979).  
 
The tally model requires that independent totals of blue and pink dots are registered, but not their 
relative difference.  Nevertheless, we witnessed neural signals over the parietal cortex that scaled 
with the difference in the total number of blue and pink dots, even when other confounding factors 
had been taken into account.  This supports the difference model but not the tally model.  Indeed, a 
closer look at the encoding of information over occipital electrodes suggested that the number of blue 
and pink dots was encoded early (100ms), followed by the difference signal, exactly as if the brain first 
estimated independent totals for each sample, and then compared them. This is reminiscent of the 
successive encoding of absolute and relative economic value in magnetoencephalographic activity 
observed during a gambling task (Hunt et al., 2012). In the parietal cortex, the decision information 
predicted by the difference model exhibited a temporal profile characterized by an early dip (at ~220 
ms post-stimulus) and a later peak (at ~450 ms).  The same pattern of EEG activity has previously been 
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shown to scale with decision information in a task involving discrimination of the mean orientation of 
a stream of tilted gratings, with a negative deflection at ~250ms and a positive peak at ~500ms 
following each sample (Wyart, Nobre, et al., 2012). 
 
A wealth of research in humans and non-human primates has implicated the parietal cortex in the 
representation of approximate number (Piazza & Izard, 2009).  At the single-cell level, individual 
neurons show bell-shaped tuning curves over the number line (Nieder & Miller, 2003).  In human 
imaging studies, neural signals localized to the parietal cortex scale with the numerical disparity 
between two successively- or simultaneously-occurring stimuli (i.e. sets of dots), even in the absence 
of an overt estimation task (Piazza et al., 2004). The focus of our experiment was not to distinguish 
accounts based on number from those based on magnitude per se. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that 
our neural findings simply reflect low-level adaptation to number or magnitude, for four reasons. 
Firstly, a control experiment in which the pixel area taken up by the coloured dots and the number of 
coloured dots were decorrelated still showed a strong sample size effect, even when the lower level 
factor (pixel area) was included as a nuisance covariate in the regression. Secondly, the gain of 
encoding of number was qualitatively different for blue and pink stimuli, which were decision-
relevant, than for white stimuli, which were not. Thirdly, our decoding analysis suggested that the 
strength with which neural signals encoded the difference in number of pink and blue dots was 
predictive of later choices, as would be expected of a decision signal. Fourth, we observed a distinct 
neural signal over motor regions that reflected the build-up in magnitude differences over time.  
These findings suggest that the parietal signal observed here instead reflects the relative difference 
between decision information in favour of either category. One way of linking our findings with this 
literature is to assume that in the absence of an overt task, participants implicitly compare information 
arriving in sequence, calculating their difference as an implicit decision signal. Indeed, a similar pattern 
of adaptation to numerosity is obtained when participants make same-different judgments on 
successive stimuli.  In other words, the representation of numerosity in the parietal cortex might 
reflect a more general representation of the magnitude of the information relevant for a decision 
(Wyart, Nobre, et al., 2012).  
 
In sum, we show that in a simple perceptual decision-making task, humans integrate approximate 
number in a near-optimal (reliability-weighted) fashion.  Our study has implications for research in a 
number of domains, including economics and medical diagnosis, in which it is widely assumed that 
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humans estimate numerical quantities in a biased and suboptimal fashion. Humans can make near-
optimal judgments about values or other numerical estimates if the information is presented in an 
appropriate format. 
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3. Selective integration of information 
in multi-feature decision making  
In the previous chapter, we saw that in a simple categorisation task, humans made decisions that 
conformed to the statistically optimal solution, integrating all available evidence and employing it 
according to its reliability. However, whilst this task involved the need to integrate evidence across a 
series of eight samples, and as such featured ‘late’ integration noise – noise that corrupts the choice 
at stages that occur after the sensory level, for example during evidence integration (see chapter 1) – 
the paradigm used was a simple ‘single-feature’ task, i.e. one that has only one type of evidence in 
favour of each option, so the degree of late noise might be limited. In tasks in which late noise is more 
prevalent, the strategy that leads to the greatest chance of a correct decision involves a “rationally 
suboptimal” strategy: the selective integration of evidence with a momentarily higher value (Tsetsos 
et al., 2012; Tsetsos et al., 2016). Here, we investigated whether a selective integration process may 
underpin decisions between categories that are characterised by more than one feature (a ‘multi-
feature’ task). Using a second variation of the classic urn and ball paradigm employed in the previous 
experiment, participants again indicated whether a series of eight samples of coloured balls were 
drawn from an urn that had a 60:40 ratio of category A:B or vice versa, but this time the categories 
themselves comprised more than one feature (colour). In this more complex task, we show that 
performance is best captured by a selective integration model that exhibits selectivity for the locally 
winning features within a category, but not between categories. The use of concurrent EEG recording 
revealed the first direct neural evidence for this type of selective integration, again at the subcategory 
but not the category level. Whilst selective integration at the category level has been shown to lead 
to a higher chance of being correct when late noise is high, this does not hold for the subcategory 
selectivity shown in this task. This suggests that whilst selective integration may be a good general 
strategy for maximising accuracy, it does not improve decisions in all circumstances. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Good decisions require the lossless accumulation of evidence over time (Bogacz et al., 2006; Wald & 
Wolfowitz, 1949). A canonical view in the field holds that humans integrate evidence in line with a 
Bayesian (optimal) observer, limited only by decision noise arising from ambiguity in stimulus 
encoding and transduction (see chapter 1). However, agents are also prone to down-weighting or 
ignoring part of the available information, leading to apparently suboptimal behaviour. For example, 
in a multi-sample categorisation task that involved choosing between two streams of items, 
individuals consistently prioritised information that had locally higher attribute values (e.g. the larger 
number when judging which of two streams of digits had the higher average).  This strategy, known 
as ‘selective integration’, leads to transitivity violations (Tsetsos et al., 2016) and other preference 
reversals (Tsetsos et al., 2012).  
 
Despite leading to violations of rational choice strategy, the authors of these studies showed that 
selective integration can be optimal (i.e. reward-maximising).  To understand this seemingly 
paradoxical statement, it is important to consider the different stages at which decisions may be 
corrupted by noise. Noise can be external (i.e. in the stimulus itself) or internal (i.e. physiological 
noise), with dissociable impacts on choice (Wyart, Nobre, et al., 2012). Furthermore, internal noise 
can occur early, in sensory processing, or later, at the stage of evidence integration or choice 
execution. As shown by Tsetsos (2016), when decisions are corrupted by “late” noise, the best policy 
may be one that prioritises some information at the expense of other information.  Thus, decisions 
made on the basis of down-weighted information can be “robust” in the face of noise, leading to the 
best (most likely to be accurate) choices in the given context.   This is important, because “late” noise 
may predominate for many cognitive tasks (Drugowitsch et al., 2016; Herce Castañon et al., 2018). 
 
The selective integration model provides a process-level account that captures this accumulation-
with-loss process in a way that leads to robust decisions in the face of late noise. Consider a task in 
which observers compare two stimuli that are each composed of multiple attributes, by comparing 
each attribute value in turn. According to the model, after initial sensory processing, the inputs (e.g. 
an attribute for each of the 2 competing stimuli) are fed through a bottleneck (representing processing 
constraints) that allows the ‘local winner’ on each sample – i.e. the attribute with the highest value – 
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to be processed with enhanced gain relative to the alternative. The information is then accumulated, 
where it is subject to further ‘late’ noise (Tsetsos et al., 2016). The selective integration model has 
behavioural support from categorisation tasks involving integration of symbolic numbers, as well as 
those involving perceptual features such as bar height, hinting at its ability to account for general 
performance rather than tasks limited to a specific stimulus. Because the selective integration model 
postulates the existence of a bottleneck that leads to the incomplete processing of some information, 
it implies that the selective integration of information reduces neural processing load. However, 
although the model has behavioural support, this specific neural prediction of the model has not been 
tested directly.  
 
Furthermore, as of yet it is unclear whether this model is able to generalise to explain more complex 
multi-feature categorisation problems (i.e. those in which each category is comprised of several 
subcategories). For example, when choosing between which of two rescue dogs to adopt – a 
Pomeranian or a Labrador – based on their general appearance, the selective integration model would 
predict that information about the more attractive dog should be integrated preferentially. However, 
the ‘appearance’ attribute may itself be defined by several sub-features: for example, attractive dogs 
are ones with soft looking fur as well as those who often have an amusingly guilty facial expression. It 
is unclear whether this selective integration model would extend to predict that winning features 
within an attribute are also preferentially integrated alongside the winning attribute itself. It could be 
that the extreme fluffiness of the Pomeranian (currently number one on ‘The top 12 fluffiest dog 
breeds that ever floofed’1), and the tendency of the Labrador towards a resting guilt face, would be 
prioritised in the decision process, irrespective of which dog has the better overall appearance. 
Similarly, when comparing personalities, we may also believe that the most loveable dogs are the less 
intelligent ones, and prefer boisterous animals with booming bark rather than a fussy yap, so we also 
want to compare these individual features (intelligence and barking style) within the ‘personality’ 
attribute to drive our choices. Whilst healthy individuals have been shown to use an ‘attribute based’ 
decision strategy – comparing each attribute of the dogs in turn, i.e. comparing their appearance, 
then their personality – before an ‘option based’ strategy, which involves comparing the overall 
qualities of each of the dogs (Farashahi, Rowe, Aslami, Lee, & Soltani, 2017; Fellows, 2006), it is less 
clear how features within attributes are compared when making decisions. The selective integration 
                                                             
1 Retrieved from https://barkpost.com/fluffy-dog-breeds/ 
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model has not so far been applied to tasks that have involved this additional level of complexity. We 
may expect that in a multi-feature categorisation task, individuals would selectively integrate winning 
features (subcategories) as well as the overall winning attribute (category), but this remains to be 
seen.  
 
This leaves us with two unanswered questions: firstly, do we see behavioural signatures of selective 
integration in multi-feature categorisation tasks, and secondly, do we see neural indicators of 
selective integration? Here, thus, we used a multi-attribute binary categorisation task in conjunction 
with EEG recording to address these questions. Participants viewed a series of eight samples of 
coloured balls drawn from one of two virtual urns, and indicated whether the balls were drawn from 
the urn with a 60:40 ratio of category A:B, or from the other urn (ratio vice versa). Importantly, the 
two categories each comprised two subcategories (i.e. ‘features’, manifested as two different 
colours). Therefore, each sample had a locally winning category, as well as two locally winning 
subcategories (one per category). To foreshadow our results, rather than seeing selective integration 
of the locally winning category (as was seen in the previous, single-feature experiments), we instead 
saw within-category selective integration of the locally winning subcategory. This was captured by a 
modified version of the selective integration model that incorporated local down-weighting of 
subcategory (rather than category) information, and which explained human behaviour and EEG data 
well.   
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3.2 Method 
 
Participants 
 
The investigation consisted of two parts: part 1 was a solely behaviour experiment, and part 2 was a 
replication of part 1 with concurrent EEG recording. Forty-one (solely behaviour) and 20 (EEG) 
participants, all of whom reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, were recruited from 
University College London, the University of Oxford and the surrounding areas (total n=61). All 
participants provided written informed consent in line with local ethical guidelines. As compensation 
for their time, participants received £10 (solely behaviour) or £20 (EEG), plus up to an additional £9 
performance-based bonus (EEG version only). Data from participants who scored lower than 65% 
were excluded (n=4 and n=1 from the solely behaviour and the EEG versions respectively). 
Furthermore, data from the EEG experiment in which there was excessive movement and/or electrical 
interference in the signal were removed (n=4). This left n=37 for solely behaviour version, and n=15 
for EEG version (total n=52). Unless otherwise stated, all behavioural results are collapsed across the 
two versions.  
 
Task design and stimuli 
 
Participants completed a probabilistic decision making task (Figure 3.1) that was a variation of a classic 
urn and ball paradigm. On each trial, participants saw a series of eight samples of coloured balls 
(orange, blue, green and pink) drawn from a virtual “urn”. The urn was pseudo-randomly selected on 
each trial, and either contained a 60% predominance of category A (itself comprised of two of the 
four colours) and 40% category B (comprised of the other two colours), or 60% category B and 40% 
category A. For the solely behaviour experiment, category A was always comprised of the orange and 
green balls, and B always comprised of the pink and blue balls. In the EEG experiment, the two colours 
used to form each category varied between participants, but was always consistent for each individual 
participant for the duration of the experiment. However, for ease of presentation, the task will be 
described as though all participants had the same category-colour pairs as in the behaviour version 
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(i.e. as though for all 52 participants, category A was green and orange, and category B was blue and 
pink).  
 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Experimental protocol. Each trial commenced with a blank screen followed by a forward 
mask consisting of grey dots in every possible location of the target dots. Eight draws (with 
replacement) were made on each trial from one of two virtual “urns”: urn one had a 60:40 
predominance of category A:B, and urn two had a 60:40 predominance of category B:A. The two 
categories (A and B) were themselves comprised of two subcategories (colours): in the example 
illustrated here, ‘category A’ consisted of green and orange balls, and category B consisted of blue 
and pink balls. (The colours that comprised a category differed between participants, but remained 
constant for each individual for the entire experiment). Crucially, the ratio of the two subcategory 
colours within each category was uneven, as illustrated, such that in both categories, information 
from one subcategory was more prevalent than information from the other. Participants’ task was to 
indicate via key press whether the balls were drawn from the predominantly category A urn, or the 
predominantly category B urn (thus the asymmetric subcategory ratio is irrelevant to the optimal task 
solution, which treats all within-category information as equivalent). The draws from the urn were 
represented on screen as coloured dots within a circular aperture. Each screen also displayed between 
1 and 8 white distractor dots. A backward mask identical to the forward mask and a blank screen 
preceded the choice prompt screen. Participants received auditory feedback via a high (800Hz) tone 
for correct and a low (400Hz) tone for incorrect responses. Importantly, urns were counterbalanced 
such that the more prevalent colour within a category changed pseudorandomly and independently 
for each of the two categories that comprised an urn.  
 
 
Sample size
N = [8,10,12,13,16,18]
+EEG recording
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Crucially, the proportion of the two colours that comprised each category was not 50:50 – within the 
category (A or B) that comprised 60% of the urn on a given trial, the ratio of the less prevalent colour 
to the more prevalent colour was 5:7, and within the category that comprised 40% of the urn this 
ratio was 1:3. The colour within each category that was more or less prevalent (henceforth the 
“dominant” and “non-dominant” subcategories respectively) on a given trial also varied 
pseudorandomly from trial to trial. (Thus, in total there were eight possible colour to subcategory 
assignments, 4 per urn – see Table 3.S1).  
 
On each trial, eight draws (with replacement) of 8, 10, 12, 14, 16 or 18 balls were made from the 
relevant urn. The coloured balls were represented to participants on the screen as filled dots within a 
circular aperture (Figure 3.1). After viewing each of the 8 samples, the participants’ task was to 
indicate via keyboard press whether the balls were drawn from the predominantly category A (e.g. 
green and orange) urn, or the predominantly category B (e.g. pink and blue) urn. Note that 
participants were not explicitly instructed about the uneven within-category colour distribution.  
 
The stimuli were presented on a 17-inch CRT monitor with resolution of 1024 x 768 pixels and a refresh 
rate of 60Hz, using the Psychophysics 3 Toolbox (Brainard, 1997) running in MATLAB (Mathworks, 
Nantick, USA). Participants sat approximately 70cm from the screen in a quiet, darkened room. Before 
the experiment began, the task was explained to participants via an instruction screen that contained 
a visual cue indicating the ratio of balls in the 2 categories, with experimenter clarification if 
requested. Each trial began with a white central fixation cross (presented for 1000ms), a blank screen 
(1000ms) and then a forward mask followed by 8 sequentially presented sample screens and a 
backward mask, each presented for 150ms with a jittered inter-stimulus interval (ISI) of 100-200ms 
(average 150ms). There was then a jittered pre-response interval (in which participants saw a blank 
screen) of between 450 and 550ms, before a screen that prompted participants for their choice, which 
timed out with a ‘too slow’ message if response was overly torpid (>3 seconds).  
 
Each sample screen consisted of an array of orange, green, blue, pink and white dots, each 20 pixels 
in diameter, that were randomly spatially distributed among 71 possible locations, with minimum 
separation of 10 pixels, within a circular aperture of 150 pixel radius. The forward and backward masks 
consisted of grey dots at each one of these possible 71 locations. They were designed to reduce 
primacy and recency effects (behaviourally and neurally) and participants were instructed to ignore 
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them. The number of coloured dots, and the proportions of each of the four colours, was determined 
by drawing between 8 and 18 balls from a ‘predominantly category A’ urn, or a ‘predominantly 
category B’ urn, as described above. Two to eight white dots were randomly added to each sample; 
participants were also instructed to ignore these, and their purpose was to decorrelate low-level 
visual information from decision information.  
 
Participants’ task was to indicate via key press (‘z’ key with left hand, or ‘m’ key with right hand) 
whether balls were drawn from the predominantly category A (e.g. green/orange) urn, or the 
predominantly category B (e.g. pink/blue) urn. In the EEG experiment, the assignment of key code to 
urn was counterbalanced across participants. Participants received auditory feedback on every trial: 
a high tone (800Hz) indicated a correct answer and a low tone (400Hz) indicated an incorrect answer. 
 
 
Statistically optimal solution 
 
Let us denote the number of orange and green balls (i.e. the subcategories forming category A) in 
sample k as A1k and A2k, and the number of pink and blue balls (the subcategories that comprised 
category B) in sample k as B1k and B2k respectively. The total number of balls on each sample is 
denoted nk. The probability of drawing a green or orange ball from the predominantly orange/green 
urn (urn A) was p, and the probability of drawing a green or an orange ball from the predominantly 
pink/blue urn (urn B) was 1-p. By design, p = 0.6.   
 
The optimal solution to the task treats all within-category information (i.e. the two subcategories that 
comprise each category) equivalently, and is given by the integration of binomial probabilities. For 
any sample k, the likelihood that the balls are drawn from the predominantly green/orange urn (urn 
A) is given by: 
  𝑝′L = 𝐵(𝐴1L + 𝐴2L, 𝑛L, 𝑝) 
Eq. 3.1 
 
where B denotes the binomial probability distribution. The optimal decision rule (optimal DV) is 
defined by whether the sum of the log likelihood ratios of the balls in each sample coming from either 
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urn is greater or less than zero at the end of the trial. Thus, on each sample k, the optimal decision 
update (DU) for or against each response is quantified as the log likelihood ratio: 
 𝑙𝑜𝑔 o 𝐵(𝐴1L + 𝐴2L, 𝑛L, 𝑝)𝐵(𝐴1L + 𝐴2L, 𝑛L, 1 − 𝑝)p 
 
Eq. 2 
 
Models of evidence integration 
 
The integration of the difference of category evidence (i.e. A1k+A2k – B1k+B2k) is formally equivalent 
to the binomial decision update, and provides a neat account of how a computationally complex 
process could be implemented in a neurobiologically plausible manner (see chapter 2). Thus, in the 
following, we will use the difference method to derive the decision variable for all models. 
 
Unlike the optimal solution, we hypothesised that participants would selectively ingrate more 
prevalent category/subcategory information. In other words, we believed that on a given sample, A1k 
and A2k would not simply be summed and compared to B1k and B2k, but instead information within a 
category may be selectively weighted based on its prevalence (eg A1k may be integrated preferentially 
over A2k if the former is more prevalent), and additionally information between categories may be 
selectively weighted. In other words, Ak may be integrated preferentially over Bk (where Ak = A1k + A2k 
and Bk = B1k + B2k) if the former is more prevalent, over and above any within-category weighting. In 
what follows, the category that comprised 60% of the urn is referred to as the “majority” category, 
and the category that comprised 40% of the urn as the “minority” category, irrespective of which 
colours this happened to be on a given sample. Furthermore, we define the more prevalent colour 
within each category as the ‘dominant’ subcategory, and the less prevalent colour as the ‘non-
dominant’ subcategory. Thus using this ‘prevalence framing’ terminology (as opposed to ‘colour 
framing’), each sample featured information from two categories – majority and minority – and a total 
of four subcategories: majority dominant, majority non-dominant, minority dominant and minority 
non-dominant. 
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We defined five key models with various degrees of selectivity: an near-optimal model that was 
affected only by noise (i.e. one with no selectivity, referred to as the ‘logistic model’), a leaking model, 
which incorporated an information decay (no selectivity), a category-selective model which 
preferentially integrates majority over minority information, a subcategory-selective model which 
preferentially integrates dominant over non dominant information, and a doubly-selective model 
which preferentially integrates majority over minority information, dominant information over non 
dominant information, and features an interaction between majority and dominant information.  
 
In their implementation, these models were nested, differing according to which of a set of five 
parameters were free or fixed. The first parameter, sigma 𝜎 , is the inverse slope of the logistic 
function, and is proportional to the level of “late” noise in the decision, with higher values denoting 
greater noise. The second parameter reflected a bias, 𝜗, and was the inflection point of this slope.  𝜗 
allowed us to capture trivial choice patterns that may have been caused by a response hand bias.  
Gamma 𝛾  reflected an information leak. Lower values of gamma denote a greater rate of 
(exponential) information decay over the course of a trial. ωcat down-weighted all information that 
was not in the majority category (the equivalent of prioritising information in the majority category). 
Similarly, ωsubcat down-weighted all information that was not in the dominant subcategories, 
irrespective of whether or not it was in the majority or minority category. The model with both a ωcat 
and a ωsubcat parameter (the doubly-selective model) allowed an interaction in the weighting of 
category and subcategory membership. See table 1 for details of which models contained which free 
parameters. If a parameter was not free in a given model it was fixed to 1, i.e. it had no effect.   
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Table 3.1: free parameters per model 
 
Model Sigma 𝝈 Bias 𝝑 Gamma 𝜸 Selective 
weight ωcat 
Selective 
weight ωsubcat 
Logistic model 
 
✓ ✓    
Leaking model 
 
✓ ✓ ✓   
Category-selective 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓  
Subcategory-selective 
 
✓ ✓ ✓  ✓ 
Doubly-selective 
 
✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
We defined two further models that are detailed in the supplementary information: one which simply 
integrated the information in proportion to its magnitude, but without respect to its category 
membership, and another that integrates selectively only the most prevalent subcategory on each 
sample. These were post-hoc additions to ensure our results could not be explained trivially by 
alternative mechanisms.  
 
Defining information prevalence 
 
Prevalence – i.e. which colours comprised the majority category, and which colours comprised the 
dominant subcategories – was defined according to the ‘local winner’, i.e. according to the locally 
prevalent information on a given sample:  
 𝐴1L + 𝐴2L > 𝐵1L + 𝐵2L 			→ 	𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑐𝑎𝑡L = 𝐴L, 			𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑡L = 𝐵L 𝐴1L + 𝐴2L < 𝐵1L + 𝐵2L 			→ 	𝑀𝑎𝑗𝑐𝑎𝑡L = 𝐵L, 		𝑀𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑎𝑡L = 𝐴L  
 
For cases in which A and B were equally prevalent, the two categories were given identical weighting 
of (1 + 𝜔bYZ)  /2.  
 
The two dominant subcategories on each sample were defined in an analogous way: 𝐴1L > 𝐴2L 			→ 	𝐷𝑜𝑚L = 𝐴1L, 			𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚L = 𝐴2L 𝐵1L > 𝐵2L 			→ 	𝐷𝑜𝑚L = 𝐵1L, 			𝑁𝑜𝑛𝑑𝑜𝑚L = 𝐵2L 
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The opposite assignment was given for the opposite inequality, and subcategories within a given 
category were given identical weighting if the two were equally prevalent of (1+𝜔{|}bYZ) /2 
 
This allows whichever colour constitutes each category or subcategory to vary between samples (k) 
within a trial (e.g. the majority dominant colour may be A1 on sample k, but B1 on sample k+1, within 
the same trial t). Note that this does not reflect the generative structure of the task, which assigned 
colours to subcategories consistently across all 8 samples in a trial and was not directly observable by 
participants. The definition is based purely on the momentary information available on a sample-to-
sample basis, without reference to the information from previous samples, and as such implies that 
any selective integration occurs based on the transient rather than cumulative information available.  
 
 
Decision update  
 
On each sample k, the decision update (DU) for the models was calculated by computing the 
difference between category A information and category B information, after any relevant weighting. 
On each sample, minority category information, and non-dominant subcategory information, were 
downweighted by ωcat and ωsubcat respectively, whilst the information in the majority category and 
dominant subcategories was fully integrated. In the illustrative equation that follows, A is the majority 
category, and B the minority category (if the assignments were the opposite, the ωcat would apply to 
A instead). Furthermore, in this illustrative equation, A1 and B2 are the dominant subcategories in 
their respective categories (and if the assignments (independently for each category) were the 
opposite, the ωsubcat would apply to the other subcategory). Thus, on each sample: 
 𝛼𝐴L = 𝐴1L +	𝜔{|}bYZ,L𝐴2L 
 𝛼𝐵L = 𝜔bYZ,L(𝐵1L +	𝜔{|}bYZ,L𝐵2L) 
 
Where α denotes that relevant weighting has been applied. The decision update was then calculated 
as follows:  𝐷𝑈m[Rad,L = 𝛼𝐴L − 𝛼𝐵L 
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The decision variable (DV) represented the accumulative evidence on each trial, with a leak of 
information 𝛾 incorporated:  
 𝐷𝑉m[Rad =+ 𝐷𝑈L ∙ 𝛾_UL_L56  
 
Late noise was simulated by passing the resulting DV through a logistic choice function for each 
subject, with inverse slope 𝜎 and the inflection point 𝜗 as free parameters in all models (see above), 
in order to generate choice probabilities.  
 
Finally, simulated model choices were generated by comparing these choice probabilities (CP) to 
uniform random numbers between 0 and 1, ‘category A’ was selected if CP>random number.  
 
Parameter fitting and model comparison 
 
To find the free parameter values for each model that allowed it to account best for human 
performance, we used gradient descent (Matlab function fmincon) on the five models to find the 
parameters that meant the model fit most closely to the human data.  We found the negative log 
likelihood (-LL) – the logarithm of the model’s probability of choosing the same option as the humans 
– via gradient descent on even-numbered trials only. The best fitting parameter values (i.e. those that 
generated the minimum –LL, denoting greater similarity between human and model choices) were 
then selected and applied to the odd-numbered trials. The -LL derived in turn from the application to 
the left-out trials was used as the critical value for each model. For optimisation , the sigma parameter 
was given a lower limit of 1 and no upper limit. The gamma parameter had a lower limit of 0 and an 
upper limit of 1. The weighting parameters all had a lower limit of 0 and an upper limit of two, to 
account for the situation that a participant in fact over-weighted the relevant sub/category. The bias 
parameter could range from -10 to 10. The resulting crossfit -LLs were the quantity entered into the 
VBA toolbox for formal Bayesian model selection.  
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Our second method of comparing model and human data was qualitative comparison between human 
and model performance (see below for further details).  For the qualitative analyses, we simulated 
model choices using best-fitting parameters generated from the gradient descent procedure applied 
to the whole dataset (i.e. with no leave-one-out procedure), in order to generate more robust 
parameter estimates.  
 
 
Behavioural analyses 
 
We compared human and model performance qualitatively in a number of different ways. Firstly, we 
plotted psychometric curves to illustrate the probability of responding ‘category A’ as a function of 
the optimal DV (for humans), and for the model-predicted DVs and corresponding simulated model 
data for each model.  
 
Next, to address our key questions, we used probit regression to assess how the influence of 
information within each of the subcategories (A1, A2, B1, B2) was influenced by that information’s 
category or subcategory membership. For example, if there is selective integration of the majority 
category, the influence of the number of balls in subcategories A1 and A2 on choosing category A is 
predicted by the selective integration model to be enhanced if category A is the majority (i.e. “locally 
winning”) category on a given sample. Thus we took the number of balls in each of the four colours – 
A1, A2, B1 and B2 – as regressors predicting p(choose category A), as well as the interaction of the 
number of balls A1, A2, B1 and B2 with a quantity that was +1 if the relevant colour formed the 
majority category on that trial, and -1 otherwise. We summed these predictors across the eight 
samples in a trial, and used them to predict P(choose category A): 
 𝑝(𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑠𝑒	𝐴) = 	𝜙	 7𝑏 +	+ 𝛽1L ∙ 𝐴1L_L56 ++ 𝛽2L ∙ 𝐴2L_L56 ++ 𝛽3L ∙ 𝐵1L_L56++ 𝛽4L ∙ 𝐵2L 	+	+ 𝛽5L ∙ 𝐴1L ∙ 𝐼L_L56 ++ 𝛽6L ∙ 𝐴2L ∙ 𝐼L_L56_L56++ 𝛽7L ∙ 𝐵1L_L56 ∙ 𝐼L ++ 𝛽8L ∙ 𝐵2L ∙ 𝐼L_L56 8 
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where 𝜙 denotes the standard normal cumulative distribution function, and 𝐼 denotes the indicator 
quantity that is 1 if the colour is in the majority category on a given sample and -1 If it is in the minority 
category. 
 
Similarly, if there is selective integration of the dominant subcategories, the influence of the number 
of balls in, for example, subcategory A1 will be enhanced if A1k is the dominant subcategory (relative 
to A2k) on a given sample, and the same holds for the dominant subcategory in that sample from 
category B. To test this, we performed an identical regression, but the indicator quantity 𝐼 denoted 
whether or not A1k and B1k were the dominant subcategories on a given sample with +1 or -1 
respectively.   
 
EEG acquisition and preprocessing  
 
A neuroscan EEG system with NuAmps digital amplifiers was used to record EEG signals from 64 Ag-
AgCL scalp electrodes, with a further four electrodes used in a bipolar montage as horizontal and 
vertical EOGs, and a further two electrodes located on the mastoids as a reference. The electrode 
impedances of all functioning electrodes were kept below 10 kΩ The EEG signals were recorded at a 
1kHz sampling rate, and were high pass filtered online at 0.1Hz.  
 
The data were preprocessed using the EEGLAB toolbox for MATLAB (Delorme & Makeig, 2004) 
alongside custom scripts. The data were down-sampled to 250Hz and then bandpass filtered between 
1 and 40Hz. Electrodes that consistently malfunctioned or produced highly noisy signal (based on 
visual inspection of the data) were interpolated, the data were re-referenced to the average signal 
and then epoched from 1000ms before the first sample onset to 5000ms afterwards (thereby covering 
the entire trial). Epcohs were visually inspected to remove trials containing non-stereotypical artifacts. 
An independent component analysis was then conducted using EEGLAB, and the resulting 
components were visually inspected to remove artifacts (particularly blinks). Finally, the resulting data 
were re-epoched from 500ms before to 700ms after each sample.  
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EEG analyses: Encoding  
 
The use of nested models meant that behaviour predictions at the trialwise (choice) level were often 
similar, despite implying quite different underlying mechanisms. However, we were able to gain a 
more in-depth understanding of the mechanisms at play at each timepoint by investigating the 
concurrent EEG activity. Particularly, we were interested in which models best explained the variance 
in the neural signal. Thus, to this end, rather than calculating ERPs, as in Chapter 2 we used a general 
linear modelling approach (at the single sample level) that allowed us to ascertain how the variability 
in the EEG signal was influenced by various sources of information on each individual sample, at each 
timepoint over a period spanning -100ms-700ms from stimulus onset.  
 
We began by performing an identical regression to that described for behaviour, but this time 
predicting the average EEG signal in the occipitoparietal (PO7, PO5, PO3, POz, PO4, PO6, and PO8) 
region rather than predicting choice. We focused on this region based on its previous associations 
with evidence integration (e.g. (Roitman & Shadlen, 2002)). The eight predictors were entered 
competitively in the same regression in order to ensure that they competed for unshared variance, 
and the decision information (the number of dots in A1, A2, B1 and B2) from the previous and 
following samples was included in the regression as “nuisance” covariates. This step enabled us to 
ensure that the parameter estimates were not influenced by information from the adjacent samples 
that overlapped in time with the epoch.  Thus, the resulting parameter estimates indicated the unique 
correlation at each timepoint following sample onset between the neural signal in the given region, 
separately for the eight predictors.  
 
We expected all decision-relevant information to have some impact neurally, but our key question of 
interest was whether or not prevalent category and/or subcategory information was encoded with 
significantly greater gain (i.e. steeper slope of encoding) than less prevalent information, and if so 
which model(s) predicted this pattern. To this end, parameter estimates from the regressions were 
then averaged across samples and entered into second level statistical analyses in order to ascertain 
whether the encoding of the decision information (the number of dots in each subcategory) was 
enhanced according to whether the information was in the majority category and/or in the dominant 
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subcategory. Regions of time and space (i.e. electrodes) at which these betas deviate significantly 
from zero across all participants indicated that these effects are reliably encoded in neural signals. In 
order to correct for multiple comparisons across time, we used a nonparametric cluster correction 
technique with an alpha of 0.05 (Maris & Oostenveld, 2007).  
 
 
Control analyses 
 
We wanted to establish that any asymmetric weighting due to category membership was not a by-
product of the task design or response contingencies. The existence of any systematic biases at the 
processing level, rather than the response level, could be problematic for overall interpretation of our 
results. To this end, we first assessed the extent to which participants were biased to respond with 
their dominant hand (the structure of the task meant that the participant’s right hand would signal 
the correct answer exactly 50% of the time). Next, we assessed performance (i.e. percent correct) 
separately for trials on which the correct answer was ‘A’ or ‘B’. Following this, we conducted a signal 
detection style analysis by calculating d’ and the criterion separately for each category, to ensure that 
any differences seen in performance between the two categories were a result of a criterion 
(response) bias, rather than a sensitivity (and therefore potentially mechanistic) difference. These 
results motivated the inclusion of a bias term in the models.  
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3.3 Results 
Behaviour analyses 
 
Results are collapsed across the two versions of the experiment (solely behaviour, and EEG) in all 
behaviour analyses reported here. Throughout, model performance is generated using the 
parameterisation that minimised the -LL in the gradient descent procedure, as described above.  
Participants chose the correct urn on 78.58 ± 6% of trials, with a response timeout on 0.001% of trials 
and an average reaction time of 0.65s on all other trials.  All models performed very similarly to 
humans (table 3.2).  
 
Table 3.2: overall performance (% correct) per model 
 
 
 
We began by plotting human psychometric functions (choice probabilities as a function of binned DV). 
The relationship between the DV and choice was as expected: the choice probability grew with the 
magnitude of the DV (Figure 3.2b). A small response bias was evident in the data that may reflect 
greater tendency for participants to respond with their dominant hand. 
 
Next, we conducted a probit regression, taking the number of dots across a trial from each of the four 
subcategories – A1, A2, B1 and B2 -  as well the interaction between these quantities and an indicator 
variable that was 1 if the relevant subcategory was one of the two majority subcategories, and -1 
otherwise, to estimate whether the impact that information had on p(choose category A) was 
Model 
 
Average score from simulated 
choices 
Logistic model 
 
79.32 ± 6% 
Leaky model 
 
79.01 ± 6% 
Category-selective model 
 
79.41 ± 6% 
Subcategory-selective 
model 
 
77.94 ± 6% 
Doubly-selective model 
 
77.44 ± 7% 
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influenced by whether or not it was in the majority category. The results showed that whilst, as 
expected, the information in the two subcategories that comprised category A positively predicted a 
category A choice, and the information from the two subcategories in category B negatively predicted 
a category A choice, there was no interaction of this impact with majority category membership. In 
other words, counter to the predictions of the standard selective integration model, locally winning 
category information was not disproportionately favoured during decisions. (Fig 3.2c).  
 
When we repeated this regression to assess whether the dominant subcategory membership 
influenced the manner in which information was processed, we saw an intriguing pattern of results: 
in contrast to the majority information, if information (A1, A2, B1, B2) was in a dominant subcategory 
on a given sample, it had a significantly greater impact on choice, as shown by the interaction terms 
in figure 3.2d. This novel pattern of results is indicative of selective integration of information in the 
locally winning subcategory, but not the locally winning category.  
 
Models of evidence integration: qualitative comparisons 
 
A model that can aptly describe human data must capture qualitative patterns of performance 
(Palminteri, Wyart, & Koechlin, 2017) as well as quantitative effects. We took the parameter values 
from the gradient descent procedure that minimised the -LL values for five models and used these to 
generate model choices (see method). We repeated the behavioural analyses above, but this time 
predicted model (rather than human) choices, in order to compare the two qualitatively. All models 
mirrored the human psychometric curves closely (figure 3.2b, purple dots, supplementary figure 
3.1S, coloured dots).  
 
The model performance from the two regression analyses was more diagnostic of its ability to account 
for human data: whilst all models mimicked the behaviour effect that showed that majority category 
membership lead to no greater impact on choice than minority category membership, only the 
subcategory-selective and the doubly-selective models were able to capture the phenomenon 
whereby dominant subcategory information had an enhanced impact on choice relative to non-
dominant subcategory information (figure 3.2 c and d, purple dots, supplementary figure, coloured 
dots). This qualitative effect was reflected quantitatively by the fact that the four beta weights for the 
interactions differed significantly from zero for humans (all |t|>3.13, all p<0.001) as well as for the 
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subcategory-selective model (all |t|>5.84, all p<0.001), where the critical alpha level corrected for 
multiple comparisons is 0.0125.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.2. Model fitting and behaviour results. (A). Quantitative model comparison: expected 
frequency (bars) and exeedance probability (stars) derived from Bayesian model comparison for the 
category-selective, subcategory-selective and doubly-selective models. For both measures, higher 
values suggest that the model provides a better explanation of the human data to which it is being fit. 
Our focus on these three models was due to the fact that only models with a weighting parameter 𝜔 
were able to account for qualitative results, as shown in the other panels of this figure and 
supplementary figure 3.1S. (B). Probability of humans (lines) and the subcategory-selective model 
(purple dots) choosing category “A”, as a function of the value of the optimal decision variable (i.e. no 
selectivity, bias or noise). (C). Impact (beta coefficient) of humans (bars) and the subcategory-selective 
model (purple dots) choosing ‘category A’ of information in the four subcategories (A1, A2, B1 and 
B2; first four bars/dots), and the interaction between this quantity and whether or not the information 
formed the majority category (final four bars/dots). i_maj was 1 if the relevant subcategory was in the 
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majority category, and -1 otherwise. The lack of interaction shows that the impact of the information 
in A1, A2, B1 and B2 was not affected by whether or not it was in the majority category, counter to 
what the selective integration model would predict. (D). Impact (beta coefficient) of humans (bars) 
and the subcategory-selective model (purple dots) choosing ‘category A’ of information in the four 
subcategories (A1, A2, B1 and B2; first four bars/dots), and the interaction between this quantity and 
whether or not the information was in one of the two dominant subcategories (final four bars/dots). 
Unlike the majority regression results, the results here show that information has an enhanced impact 
on choice if it in a dominant subcategory. i_dom was 1 if A1 or B1 were the dominant subcategories, 
and -1 otherwise, thus (for example) A1*i_dom reflects the increase of impact on choice that A1 has 
when it is the dominant subcategory, and A2*i_dom relects the decrease of impact A2 has on choice 
when A1 is the dominant subcategory.  
 
Quantitative comparison 
 
Having thus established that only models that contained at least one weighting parameter were able 
to capture key qualities of the human data, we compared the three models that featured this 
weighting parameter – the category-selective, subcategory-selective and doubly-selective models – 
using the VBA toolbox. The VBA toolbox calculates the Bayesian posterior probability of each model, 
using a random effects procedure that allows the best fitting model to differ between participants. 
The quantities of interest here are the exceedance probability – the measure of how likely it is that 
each model is more frequent than all other models in the comparison set – and the model frequency, 
which denotes the proportion of participants in the cohort for whom a given model had the highest 
posterior probability of explaining their data. Because we used a cross-fitting procedure, we were able 
to enter the minimum -LL from the best fitting parameter values derived from gradient descent 
without the need to apply further penalty. The results of the model comparison strongly favoured the 
subcategory-selective model over the category- and doubly-selective models (figure 3.2a): the 
exceedance probabilities and frequencies for the category-, subcategory- and doubly-selective 
models were 0.01, 0.99 and 0 respectively, and the expected frequencies (with chance at 33%) were 
34%, 66% and 0% respectively, indicating a strong quantitative advantage for the subcategory-
selective model.  
 
As described, models with a weighting parameter 𝜔bYZ and/or 𝜔{|}bYZ  implemented the selectivity 
by down-weighting all information that was not in the majority or dominant subcategories by the 
value that the parameter took, and fully integrating the majority/dominant information. Models 
that assume individuals selectively integrate information (either at the category level, the 
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subcategory level, or both) would predict that the values of the weighting parameters that lead to 
the best fit to human data would be lower than 1, as higher than 1 implies anti-selectivity, i.e. that 
the majority/dominant information would itself be processed with lower gain relative to the other 
information. Nonetheless, we allowed the values in the gradient descent search to range between 0 
and 2, to allow for this possibility. We conducted a t test against 1 for the best fitting weight 
parameter values (𝜔bYZ and/or 𝜔{|}bYZ) derived from the gradient descent search (see table 3.3 for 
the average parameter values). The average value of 𝜔bYZ in the category-selective and doubly-
selective model was 0.94 in both models, and this was, as expected, significantly lower than 1 across 
the cohort: t(51)=-2.301, p=0.04 and t(51)=-2.177, p=0.034 respectively. The same pattern was seen 
for subcategory selectivity: the average value of 𝜔{|}bYZ  in the subcategory-selective model and the 
doubly-selective model was 0.77 and 0.75, t(51)=-4.121, p<0.001 and t(51)=-4.07, p<0.001 
respectively. The best fitting parameter values for all parameters for all models, averaged across 
participants, were as follows: 
 
Table 3.3: best fitting parameter values 
 
Model Sigma 𝝈 Bias 𝝑 Gamma 𝜸 Selective 
weight ωcat 
Selective 
weight ωsubcat 
Logistic model 
 
10.61 -3.86 - - - 
Leaking model 
 
6.74 -2.71 0.87 - - 
Category-selective 
 
7.05 -2.88 0.86 0.94 - 
Subcategory-selective 
 
6.05 -2.45 0.87 - 0.77 
Doubly-selective 
 
6.26 -2.54 0.87 0.94 0.75 
 
 
 
 
Late noise simulations 
 
Selective integration at the category level has previously been shown to protect against the negative 
influence of late noise on decision accuracy. Here, in a multi-feature paradigm, we found evidence for 
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a new type of selective integration, as although the parameter values were lower than 1 for 𝜔bYZ, the 
best fitting model integrated selectively only at the subcategory- rather than category-level. Therefore 
we wanted to ask whether there is an advantage to selective integration at the subcategory level, as 
occurs in our best fitting model, in the face of late noise?  
 
To answer this, we generated choice probabilities (i.e. p(correct)) for the logistic model, which has no 
weighting, the category-selective model, and the subcategory selective model, at different levels of 
selectivity and different levels of late noise (with all other possible free parameters fixed to have no 
impact).  
 
As a sanity check, we first showed that in the logistic model, the only impact on correct choices was 
noise: as simulated late noise increased, simulated performance decreased (figure 3.3, upper panel). 
In line with previous work, the category-selective model was more robust than the optimal model in 
the face of late noise: at the higher levels of noise, performance declines as selectivity decreases 
(lower weight values denote higher selectivity), figure 3.3, middle left panel. At lower levels of noise, 
category-selective model performance is relatively stable across levels of selectivity, though weighting 
values greater than 1 (i.e. relative down-weighting of the majority category) harm performance at 
every value of noise, as we would expect.  However, the simulated values for the subcategory-
selective model painted the opposite picture: at all levels of noise, higher selectivity (lower weight 
values) appeared to be detrimental to performance (figure  3.3, middle right panel).  
 
However, applying down-weighting will have a general impact on performance as it lowers the overall 
value of the DV, therefore decreasing the signal to noise ratio. Thus the appropriate comparison to 
see the effects of selectivity, rather than general harm that may be caused by decreasing the size of 
the DV, is to compare performance of a selective model with an “equivalent-gain” model: one that 
down-weights all information equivalently (non-selectively) by a factor that brings the total decision 
information onto the same scale as the selective integration models. Comparing the performance of 
an equivalent gain model with that of the category-selective model shows more clearly the advantage 
of the latter, and also demonstrates clearly that under any level of late noise (low or high), weighting 
parameter values of higher than 1 are detrimental (Figure 3.3, lower left panel). Interestingly, 
subcategory selective integration has no advantage at any level of weighting or any level of late noise 
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above the equivalent gain model. See the discussion section for the implications this may have on the 
selective integration framework.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3. Late noise simulations. The first three subplots each predict the probability of a correct 
choice under varying levels of noise (y axis) and selectivity (i.e. weight, x axis). A lower weight means 
higher selectivity (i.e. stronger down-weighting of the less prevalent subcategory). On all subplots, 
white circles show the actual best fitting parameters for each individual subject. The top subplot 
depicts the probability of a model with no selective weighting, thus the only thing affecting 
performance is the level of noise, with performance decreasing as noise increases as we would expect. 
The left and right middle panels show the category- and subcategory-selective models respectively. 
With category selectivity, performance under high late noise is enhanced by higher selectivity (lower 
weight), but under lower noise, performance is relatively unaffected by selectivity. The opposite 
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pattern is seen for the subcategory selective model. However, when these selective models are 
compared against equivalent gain models (i.e. models that down-weight information across all 
subcategories such that gain is equivalent  to the selective models), the relative advantage of the 
category-selective model is more evident: the bottom left panel shows p(correct) for the category-
selective model minus p(correct) for the non-selective model with equivalent. The same is shown for 
the subcategory-selective model on the lower right hand panel: interestingly there is neither an 
advantage nor a disadvantage for subcategory selectivity relative to no selectivity at equivalent gain.  
 
EEG analyses 
 
The behaviour data show qualitative and quantitative support for a model that selectively integrates 
subcategory information on the basis of its prevalence. Rich information from neural recording at 
each timepoint over the course of the trial allows us to garner more in-depth support for the 
mechanisms that the subcategory-selective model proposes subserve the decision process.  
 
Encoding analyses 
The subcategory-selective model predicts enhanced gain for dominant over non-dominant 
subcategory information, but no difference in encoding for majority over minority category 
information. Is this reflected in the neural data? We began, as a sanity check, by regressing at each 
timepoint from -100ms to 700ms following stimulus onset the total information on each sample from 
category A (A1k+A2k) and category B (B1k and B2k) respectively against the average EEG activity in 
occipitoparietal electrodes. We expected to see significant encoding of this decision information, 
which was indeed evident (figure 3.4a).  
 
We next repeated the regression taking as predictors the information on each sample from each 
subcategory separately (i.e. A1k, A2k, B1k, and B2k) and the interaction of this information with an 
indicator that was 1 if the subcategory was in the majority category and -1 otherwise (in an identical 
way to the behavioural regressions, with the only difference that the information was regressed 
against the sample-wise signal in these EEG regressions and therefore was not summed across the 
trial). The encoding of the decision information in parietal regions was not affected by whether or not 
it was in the majority category (figure 3.4b). However, when the regression was repeated but this 
time with an indicator variable that reflected whether or not the information was from the dominant 
subcategory, the results showed enhanced encoding of information from the dominant subcategory 
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(figure 3.4c). This finding clearly mirrors that seen in behaviour, providing a parsimonious link 
between the neural and behavioural data.  
 
That we are able to gather neural support for the effects predicted by the best fitting model is 
important because it verifies that, as well as behaviour, the continually evolving neural activity is 
closely linked to the model predictions at all stages of the unfolding trial. Furthermore, the revelation 
that some information is processed with enhanced gain from the outset provides support for selective 
integration at the time of encoding: if information were fully integrated but only later prioritised or 
demoted to have a higher or lower impact on choice, we would not expect to see this enhanced 
processing of dominant information at the time of encoding. To our knowledge, this is the first direct 
neural evidence supporting the general notion of selective integration of decision information.  
 
 
Figure 3.4. Neural encoding curves from parietal regions. (A). Relationship between EEG activity in 
parietal regions and the level of category A information (blue curve) and category B information 
(green curve). The lines at the top show periods of time at which these ‘encoding curves’ deviated 
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significantly from 0, indicating that the relevant quantity is encoded with above-chance strength. (B). 
The influence that being in the majority category has on the encoding of decision information in each 
subcategory (A1 and A2, B1 and B2). i_maj was 1 if the relevant subcategory was in the majority 
category, and -1 otherwise. The impact is minimal, suggesting that the encoding of decision 
information is minimally modulated by category prevalence. (C). The influence that being in the 
dominant subcategory has on the encoding of the relevant subcategory. i_dom is 1 if A1 or B1 are in 
the dominant subcategory, and -1 otherwise. The results show that the encoding is indeed 
significantly affected by subcategory membership: if the given information is in the dominant 
subcategory, it is processed with enhanced gain relative to the non-dominant subcategory. This 
pattern is predicted by the subcategory-selective model.  
 
 
 
 
Control analyses 
 
The EEG participants each saw different colour-category combinations – for example, one participant 
may have had category A comprising green and pink balls, with B comprising orange and blue balls, 
whilst the next participant may have had a category A comprising pink and orange balls, and B 
comprising green and blue, etc. Thus, the colour and response hand assignment was counterbalanced 
to the extent we could be confident there would be no resulting biases. However, the behaviour-only 
participants all had category A comprised of blue and pink balls, and category B comprised of green 
and orange balls. Furthermore, these participants always indicated a category A choice with the right 
hand. Therefore, as a control analysis, we investigated the nature and extent of any biases that may 
have arisen from this underlying structure for this group of participants. 
 
We first saw that there was a strong right-hand response bias: the ratio of right to left hand responses 
(and therefore proportion of times participants chose ‘A’ over ‘B’) was 56:44. Whilst ideally the link 
between a response hand and a specific choice would not have existed, such a bias is not uncommon 
in a majority right-handed population, and is what motivated the choice to counterbalance response 
contingencies in the EEG version that followed. It was also the case that when the correct answer was 
‘A’, participants were correct 84.6% of the time, as opposed to 71.7% of the time when ‘B’ was the 
correct answer. This could have been due to the response hand bias, or due to the salience of the pink 
and blue dots above the orange and green dots, or a combination. This bias could be problematic in 
the interpretation of results if it influenced the manner in which information was actually processed, 
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rather than just influencing behaviour at the response level. To test for this, we calculated d prime 
(sensitivity) and bias separately for responses for each of the categories. Fortunately, the results 
showed identical sensitivity (d’=1.59 for both ‘A’ and ‘B’), but very different criteria: for ‘A’ (right hand) 
responses participants adopted a liberal threshold of 0.7, whereas for ‘B’ (left hand responses) people 
were much more conservative with a criterion of 1.43. Thus overall, although there are response-hand 
and potential colour biases present, we do not believe this influenced the nature of processing at the 
mechanistic level. However, to be extra cautious, we included (as described) a bias term in all models 
as a free parameter, which allowed all models to account naturally for this effect, and meaning that 
the value of other parameters should not simply be driven by spurious inconsistencies such as this 
response hand bias.  
 
Summary 
 
The model that best accounted for human performance in this multi-attribute categorisation task was 
one that selectively integrated subcategory information on the basis of its prevalence. The predictions 
of this model captured qualitative patterns seen in human data, such as the enhanced impact the 
decision information had on choice if it formed part of the dominant subcategory. Neurally, key 
signatures of this model were evident: dominant subcategory information was processed with 
enhanced gain. Counter to our predictions, we saw no selective integration at the category level, 
meaning that our findings, whilst clearly linked to previous work on this topic, showed a qualitatively 
different phenomenon. Unlike selective integration at the category level, we found no evidence that 
suggested subcategory selectivity alone had a beneficial effect in protecting against the influence of 
late noise.   
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3.4 Discussion 
 
Decisions are susceptible to corruption from external noise. A canonical viewpoint holds that human 
perceptual decisions take into account all available evidence in a procedurally optimal manner, and 
choices are limited only by this uncontrollable source of variance (Ma, Navalpakkam, Beck, Berg, & 
Pouget, 2011; Navalpakkam, Koch, Rangel, & Perona, 2010). However, recent work suggests that 
factors beyond susceptibility to such ‘peripheral’ noise are required to explain variability in human 
choices (Drugowitsch et al., 2016) and furthermore that “early noise”, occurring at the stage of 
sensory processing, and “late noise”, occurring at the stage of decision formation, have dissociable 
influences on the decision process (Herce Castañon et al., 2018; Li et al., 2017; Tsetsos et al., 2012; 
Tsetsos et al., 2016). Cognitive tasks, which are particularly susceptible to the effects of late noise, 
benefit from selective integration of information about alternatives with a momentarily higher value, 
as despite being counter to an optimal (full integration) strategy, it provides a robust defence against 
the corrupting influence of late noise on a decision whilst employing a computationally efficient 
strategy.  
 
Here, we employed a multi-feature binary choice task that required the integration of multiple 
samples of evidence over time, in order to investigate the effects of selective integration. Whilst the 
choice that agents were required to make was a simple categorisation task (“Are the balls drawn from 
urn A or B?”), the categories themselves were comprised of more than one feature (colour). Using 
this design, we found a that participants selectively integrated information from the more prevalent 
feature within each category, but did not selectively integrate information at the category level. In 
other words, of the four subcategories (A1, A2, B1 and B2), A1 was selectively integrated if it was 
more prevalent than A2, or vice versa (and the analogous process for B1 and B2), but if A1+A2 was 
more prevalent than B1+B2, this did not affect the way that the total category information was 
processed.  
 
Selective integration, whilst in some senses suboptimal, has been shown to confer two important 
advantages: firstly, it leads to more accurate decisions when late noise is higher, and secondly, it is a 
computationally efficient mechanism as it allows good decisions to be made without the need to 
integrate all the decision-relevant information fully. However, the former has only been shown in uni-
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feature tasks. A particularly striking feature of the pattern of subcategory selectivity shown in this 
multi-feature task is that, unlike selective integration at the category level, it does not protect 
decisions in the face of late noise. Furthermore, although it remains beneficial from the perspective 
of computational load to down-weight information, the late noise simulation showed that there was 
no advantage (or disadvantage) to selective integration as opposed to a model that slightly lowers the 
processing of all information (rather than selectively), such that the computational load is equivalent. 
We were surprised by this finding and note that there are (at least) two interpretations. Firstly, it 
could be that these results are indicative of a general theme: whilst selective integration is beneficial 
in simple categorisation tasks, it is harmful in others, and as such people are able to behave ‘optimally’ 
in the face of late noise only under limited circumstances. Secondly, the fact that subcategory 
selectivity is not beneficial as late noise increases in this experiment could be a simple by-product of 
the task design. Specifically, subcategory assignment (i.e. which colours were in the majority category 
and the dominant subcategories) although consistent across a trial in the generative task structure 
could change several times between samples across a trial. The benefits of selective integration on 
each  sample in the trial under such circumstances be cancelled out on other samples, whereas if 
there was higher consistency it would be more beneficial. This would mean that in general, selective 
integration at the subcategory level is advantageous, despite it not being beneficial here. Determining 
which (if either) of these explanations is more likely to be correct requires further empirical 
investigation.  
 
After seeing that the results were well explained by a subcategory-selective model, we conjectured 
that people may in fact selectively integrate only the most prevalent subcategory (rather than both 
of the dominant subcategories), as it was an intuitive strategy to solve the task that would involve a 
low computational load. However, a model that behaved in this way fared badly (see supplementary 
information). Again this could be because the most prevalent subcategory could change several times 
over the course of the trial, making a momentary focus on the locally winning subcategory an un-
robust strategy. Another version of this model that also failed to capture performance began with a 
wider focus of attention, increasing its selectivity for the prevalent subcategory as the trial progressed 
and the correct answer became more apparent, in the manner of a confirmation bias (Nickerson, 
1998). However, whilst not supported here, it could be the case that a model that hones its selectivity 
over time may account for behaviour in tasks that require longer periods of integration. Such tasks 
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would require higher computational load that may be reduced by a confirmation-bias style process of 
gradually enhancing selectivity over the course of each trial.  
 
 
A key advantage attributed to selective integration over full integration is this computational 
efficiency: good decisions can be made at lower neural computational cost. However, previously there 
has been no neural evidence for this conjecture: specifically, although behaviourally, effects 
consistent with selective integration of information have been clearly demonstrated, it is possible that 
these occur due to full processing of information that is only down-weighted later in the decision 
process (for example, via an asymmetric leak rate for locally winning pieces of information). In other 
words, a less computationally efficient process could give rise to identical behaviour effects. Here, the 
use of concurrent EEG recording provided important support for the idea that selective integration 
occurs at the time of presentation, as we demonstrated that from the initial processing stages, 
information from the dominant subcategory was processed with enhanced neural gain relative to that 
not in the dominant subcategories.  
 
A substantial corpus of work shows that information that falls under the focus of attention is 
prioritised in neural processing (e.g. (Corbetta, Miezin, Dobmeyer, Shulman, & Petersen, 1990; 
Maunsell & Treue, 2006; Reynolds & Chelazzi, 2004) amongst many others). Initially, we defined 
information prevalence (i.e. which subcategory forms the majority category and the dominant 
subcategories) in two ways: the first was the definition we use throughout, which assigns category 
membership based on ‘local prevalence’, i.e. the information that is momentarily more prevalent on 
a given sample. The second definition was according to ‘global prevalence’: the majority category and 
the dominant subcategories were defined according to which subcategory was more prevalent in the 
running tally of evidence in a trial on each sample. The latter definition implies that individuals 
calculate and refer to the cumulative decision variable (DV) at each timepoint, whilst the former 
implies a simpler attentional policy in favour of the momentarily winning information. The global 
prevalence definition did not provide a good account of human behaviour, hence the focus on models 
defined according to the momentary definition. That the best fitting models used a momentary 
attentional policy is in some ways surprising: neurally, the cumulative DV appears to be encoded 
(Mazurek, Roitman, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 2003; Roitman & Shadlen, 2002), and the importance of the 
running tally of evidence in determining which regions of decision space are processed with enhanced 
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gain has been demonstrated (Cheadle et al., 2014). However, these findings are by no means mutually 
exclusive: the focus on momentary prevalence sheds light on the nature of the local attentional policy 
that by necessity must precede later encoding of the cumulative information, and is in line with an 
extremely well-established body of work on the influence of selective attention on evidence 
integration (e.g. (Busemeyer & Townsend, 1993; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010). 
 
External noise is an irreducible feature of everyday decisions. A strong body of work holds that human 
decision makers employ a statistically optimal evidence integration strategy, corrupted only by this 
external noise. However, such work overlooks the impact of internal noise that occurs later in the 
decision process: under the influence of late noise, “suboptimal” strategies, such as selective 
integration of decision information, have been shown to improve accuracy. Here, we asked whether 
we would see the same effect in a more complex task and found that, although people clearly 
exhibited the selective integration of more prevalent information, this did not have the same 
beneficial effects against the influence of late noise. This suggests that whilst selective integration 
may generally benefit accuracy under late noise, and therefore as a general strategy is optimal, there 
are circumstances and tasks which benefit only from the reduced computational processing it allows 
rather than its influence against late noise.  
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Supplementary information 
 
Urn structure 
The urns were counterbalanced such that the subcategory membership of one colour could not be 
predicted in advance (e.g. it was not the case that “green” was always more prevalent than “orange”) 
and was not predictive of the subcategory membership of colours in the alternative categories. Table 
3.S1 illustrates the possible underlying urn structures, using as an example a participant who had 
category A comprising orange and green, and B comprising pink and blue: 
 
Table 3.S1: Urn counterbalancing  
 
 Urn Colours Proportions Category Subcategory  
1 A A1 (e.g. Green) 35% 60% Majority Dominant 
A2 (e.g. 
Orange) 
25% Non-
Dominant 
B1 (e.g. Pink) 30% 40% Minority Dominant 
B2 (e.g. Blue) 10% Non-
Dominant 
2 A A1 (e.g. Green) 25% 60% Majority Non-
Dominant 
A2 (e.g. 
Orange) 
35% Dominant 
B1 (e.g. Pink) 30% 40% Minority Dominant 
B2 (e.g. Blue) 10% Non-
Dominant 
3 A A1 (e.g. Green) 35% 60% Majority Dominant 
A2 (e.g. 
Orange) 
25% Non-
Dominant 
B1 (e.g. Pink) 10% 40% Minority Non-
Dominant 
B2 (e.g. Blue) 30% Dominant 
4 A A1 (e.g. Green) 25% 60% Majority Non-
Dominant 
A2 (e.g. 
Orange) 
35% Dominant 
B1 (e.g. Pink) 10% 40% Minority Non-
Dominant 
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B2 (e.g. Blue) 30% Dominant 
5 B A1 (e.g. Green) 30% 40% Minority Dominant 
A2 (e.g. 
Orange) 
10% Non-
Dominant 
B1 (e.g. Pink) 35% 60% Majority Dominant 
B2 (e.g. Blue) 25% Non-
Dominant 
6 B A1 (e.g. Green) 30% 40% Minority Dominant 
A2 (e.g. 
Orange) 
10% Non-
Dominant 
B1 (e.g. Pink) 25% 60% Majority Non-
Dominant 
B2 (e.g. Blue) 35% Dominant 
7 B A1 (e.g. Green) 10% 40% Minority Non-
Dominant 
A2 (e.g. 
Orange) 
30% Dominant 
B1 (e.g. Pink) 35% 60% Majority Dominant 
B2 (e.g. Blue) 25% Non-
Dominant 
8 B A1 (e.g. Green) 10% 40% Minority Non-
Dominant 
A2 (e.g. 
Orange) 
30% Dominant 
B1 (e.g. Pink) 25% 60% Majority Non-
Dominant 
B2 (e.g. Blue) 35% Dominant 
Note that the actual colours paired to form the categories varied between participants; (see methods). 
The behaviour only version featured only urns 1, 2 5 and 6, thus was still counterbalanced beyond 
reasonable possibility that participants could predict category membership, but to a lesser extent than 
in the EEG version.  
 
Additional models  
 
We defined two further models to those described in the main results. The first was designed to 
ensure that any apparent selective integration effects could not be explained trivially by a model that 
was simply sensitive to the magnitude of evidence favouring each subcategory, without reference to 
its sub/category membership. The proportion model weighted each colour based on the proportion 
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of the sample it represented. As in the main text, let A1k and A2k represent the number of dots in the 
two respective subcategories that comprised category A on sample k, and let nk represent the total 
number of dots in sample k: 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐴1L = 𝐴1L/𝑛L 
 𝛼𝐴1L = P𝐴1L + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛_𝐴1L ∙ 𝐴1L ∙ 𝜔TX[T[XZ.[4V 
 
Where α denotes that weighting has been applied, and with an analogous process for each of the 
other three subcategories (A2, B1 and B2). The DU and DV were then calculated as follows:  
 𝐷𝑈TX[T[XZ.[4,L = (𝛼𝐴1L + 𝛼𝐴2L) − (𝛼𝐵1L + 𝛼𝐵2L) 
 𝐷𝑉TX[T[XZ.[4 =+ 𝐷𝑈TX[T[XZ.[4,L_L56 ∙ 𝛾_UL  
 
Where ϒ denotes an information leak. Thus the proportion model contained just two free parameters, 
one weighting parameter and a leak parameter.  
 
The second additional model was identical in structure to those in the main text but featured 
“enhanced” selective integration, selectively integrating only the majority dominant subcategory and 
down-weighting everything else by a single weighting parameter ω with an information leak ϒ.  
 
For both models, choices generated in an identical manner to the process described in the main text. 
Both models were rendered inferior by the VBA model comparison process described in the main text. 
They are included here as they did not form part of our original hypotheses, but nonetheless were 
obvious alternatives that we wished to rule out explicitly. 
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Figure 3.S1. Performance of alternative models, and control analysis. (A). Psychometric curves (i.e. 
P(choose A) as a function of the optimal decision variable) for the logistic (blue), leaky (cyan), 
category-selective (green) and doubly-selective (pink) models, in comparison to human data (lines). 
(B). Impact (beta coefficient) of humans (bars) and the models (coloured dots) choosing ‘category A’ 
of information in the four subcategories (A1, A2, B1 and B2; first four bars/dots), and the interaction 
between this quantity and whether or not the information formed the majority category (final four 
bars/dots). i_maj was 1 if the relevant subcategory was in the majority category, and -1 otherwise. 
(C). Impact (beta coefficient) of humans (bars) and the models (coloured dots) choosing ‘category A’ 
of information in the four subcategories (A1, A2, B1 and B2; first four bars/dots), and the interaction 
between this quantity and whether or not the information was in one of the two dominant 
subcategories (final four bars/dots). Only the doubly-selective model was able to capture the effect 
seen in human behaviour whereby the information had an enhanced impact on choice if it was in a 
dominant subcategory.  
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4. Human optional stopping in a 
heteroscedastic world 
 
 
In the previous two chapters, we have seen how humans make good choices both under conditions 
of low late noise (chapter two, which used a simple task) and higher late noise (chapter three, which 
used a more complex task). However, a decision can only be ‘good’ if it is made at the appropriate 
time: when making decisions, agents must trade off the benefits of information harvesting against the 
opportunity cost of prolonged deliberation. Deciding when to stop accumulating information and 
commit to a choice is challenging in natural environments, where the reliability of decision-relevant 
information may itself vary unpredictably over time (variable variance or “heteroscedasticity”). We 
asked humans to perform a categorisation task in which discrete, continuously-valued samples 
(oriented gratings) arrived in series until the observer made a choice at their own pace. Human 
behaviour was best described by a model that adaptively weighted sensory signals by their inverse 
prediction error, and integrated the resulting quantities to a collapsing decision threshold. The model 
mimicked the output of a Bayesian model that computed the full posterior probability of a correct 
response, and successfully predicted adaptive weighting of decision information in neural signals. 
Adaptive weighting of decision information may have evolved to promote timely choices in 
heteroscedastic environments. 
 
In this chapter, we move away from the urn and balls paradigm employed in the previous two 
chapters. I refer to the urn and balls task as a comparison task: the choice being made is “A or B”, and 
information in favour of both categories is presented to participants simultaneously. Whilst in the 
tasks described in the previous two chapters, information in favour of A will be negatively correlated 
with information in favour of B (i.e., the more “A” information there is on screen, the less “B” 
information there is likely to be), it is not perfectly predictive: looking at information from only one 
category would not allow you to make a fully informed inference. An alternative type of task is a 
categorisation task. The choice is still the same – A or B – but in categorisation tasks, only one piece 
of information is available at a time, and the amount by which this information favours “A” is perfectly 
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negatively correlated with the extent to which it favours B – i.e. if the information strongly favours A, 
it strongly disfavours B by the same extent.  
 
In this chapter, I make use of a categorisation task. This is largely in order to make the work more 
directly comparable to previous work on this topic. However, the two are not unrelated, and I will 
expand in chapter 5 on the overall insights these two different approaches can give us.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
Time is of the essence for an agent who wishes to make good decisions. Longer deliberation promotes 
decision accuracy, by allowing precise estimates of noisy sensory variables to be formed over time. 
However, deliberation incurs an opportunity cost, postponing the receipt of the positive 
reinforcement signals that accompany good choices. Excessive deliberation can thus be pernicious, as 
exemplified by Buridan’s classic fable in which a donkey who is both hungry and thirsty expires whilst 
choosing between proffered food and water. Successful decision policies must thus strike a delicate 
balance between the acquisition of sufficient choice-relevant information and the timely harvesting 
of rewards. Understanding how humans and other animals negotiate this problem has long been a 
central concern in psychology, neuroscience and behavioural ecology. 
 
Over the past half century, a normative framework has been developed to understand how an agent 
should decide to stop sampling information and commit to a binary choice (Bogacz et al., 2006; 
Drugowitsch, DeAngelis, Klier, Angelaki, & Pouget, 2014; Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Gold & Shadlen, 
2001; Malhotra et al., 2017; Moran, 2015; Wald & Wolfowitz, 1949). The genealogy of many current 
theories can be traced back to the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT), which proposes that 
agents aggregate the (log) likelihood ratio of evidence up to a fixed threshold, at which point a 
response is initiated (Gold & Shadlen, 2002; Wald & Wolfowitz, 1949). This policy allows decision 
commitments to be made at a desired level of certainty about the response , and motivates the 
popular “drift-diffusion” model (DDM), under which cumulative estimates of noisy inputs drift 
towards a flat decision bound (Ratcliff & McKoon, 2008). The drift diffusion model has the advantage 
of approximating the behaviour of the SPRT without the unrealistic requirement that humans know 
in advance the full distribution from which the evidence is being sampled (Summerfield & Tsetsos, 
2012). In the psychophysical literature, the DDM has drawn strong support from the finding that after 
fitting to response times, the parameters obtained are sufficient to predict the psychometric function 
that relates decision accuracy to the strength of sensory signals (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Ratcliff & 
McKoon, 2008).   
 
For optional stopping problems, models based on a fixed bound are only optimal when the observer 
can infer the appropriate trial-wise mapping between sensory signals and the probability of a correct 
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response. This allows the bound height to be flexibly adjusted to optimise speed against accuracy, and 
thus maximise rates of return (Bogacz, 2007). However, in many natural environments, evidence may 
vary unpredictably in both its strength (i.e. mean) and reliability (i.e. variance), so that the relevant 
mapping (likelihood function) is a priori unknown on each trial. In other words, the world is 
“heteroscedastic”. For example, the evidence presented in a law court may be strongly indicative of 
crime culpability or merely circumstantial (evidence strength), but the witness reporting the evidence 
might be trustworthy or untrustworthy (evidence reliability). Similarly, economic prospects, such as 
an investment opportunity, may vary unpredictably in terms of both the mean and variance of a 
distribution of possible outcomes, i.e. in both their expected value (strength) and risk (reliability). In 
heteroscedastic settings, reward-maximising solutions to the optional stopping problem can be 
computed using tools from dynamic programming, but these calculations incur prohibitive 
computational costs and may be biologically unfeasible for fast sensorimotor judgments (Drugowitsch 
et al., 2014; Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Frazier & Yu, 2008; Malhotra et al., 2017). The assumptions 
under which evidence likelihood is computed, and the form of the bound that prompts decision 
commitment, thus remain key points of controversy in psychology and neuroscience (Boehm, 
Hawkins, Brown, van Rijn, & Wagenmakers, 2016; Hawkins et al., 2015; Malhotra et al., 2017; Thura 
et al., 2012). 
 
Here, we investigated the neural and computational mechanisms underlying human optional stopping 
in a heteroscedastic environment. We used an expanded judgment task, in which humans viewed 
streams of successive oriented gratings, and indicated in their own time whether grating tilts were 
drawn from a distribution whose mean fell clockwise (CW) or anticlockwise (ACW) to a reference 
angle. Our approach differs from those taken previously in three important ways. Firstly, decision 
information on each trial consisted of discrete, continuously-valued samples of evidence (i.e. grating 
tilts). Unlike many previous psychophysical studies, this discrete-sample approach allowed us to 
quantify precisely the available decision-relevant information on each sample, and to model decisions 
and their latencies under a family of computational models that make qualitatively distinguishable 
hypotheses. Secondly, we manipulated two distinct sources of uncertainty – the mean and the 
variance of the generative distribution over tilt – neither of which was signalled to participants on 
each trial. In this setting, a non-time-varying bound will fail to maximise reward, and normative 
solutions based on the SPRT require Bayesian inferences about the most likely generative statistics in 
order to compute, rather than mere summation of sensory signals. This thus allowed us to ask directly 
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whether participants engaged in signal summation (as in the DDM) or whether they accurately 
computed the posterior likelihood of each sample conditioned on the possible means and variances 
(as in the SPRT). For example, in a highly variable stream of evidence, a stronger sensory signal (e.g. a 
grating tilted far from the reference) is less diagnostic of the correct answer than in a less variable 
stream, and so optimal deliberation times will be longer for more variable evidence. Thirdly, we 
allowed participants to draw samples at their own pace. This additionally allowed us to measure, using 
a single-trial analysis approach, how neural signals accompanying each sample covaried with both 
time and evidence during the formation of decisions. Specifically, we tested for the emergence of an 
“urgency” signal that grew with the occurrence of each discrete sample, up to the point at which a 
choice was made. 
 
In this task, we found that human decisions and stopping times were captured by models in which 
evidence was accumulated to a bound that collapsed over time, but not by fixed-bound models. Over 
three experiments, collapsing-bound models fit the data qualitatively and quantitatively better than 
fixed-bound models on every metric tested. This behavioural finding was supported by the 
observation of an evidence-independent neural marker, observed over the parietal and central 
cortices, that built up over discrete samples towards a response. This signal is indicative of a time-
varying “urgency” signal that drove decisions to a close, even in the absence of an explicit deadline 
(Churchland et al., 2008; Drugowitsch et al., 2012; Hanks, Kiani, & Shadlen, 2014; Murphy, Boonstra, 
& Nieuwenhuis, 2016; Thura et al., 2012). This provides an unusually clear demonstration of the 
mechanisms by which human decisions about sensory signals are drawn to a close. 
 
We also found that models based on mere summation of sensory signals (i.e. based on the DDM) fared 
more poorly as explanations of human behaviour than those that computed posterior probabilities of 
the mean and variance of the generative distributions (i.e. based on the SPRT). We leveraged both 
behavioural and neural data to ask how such a computation might be implemented. Inspired by 
previous work involving categorisation of fixed-length sequences of samples, we show that the 
behaviour of the SPRT can be approximated by a model that accumulates sensory signals into a 
decision variable in a biased fashion, with reduced weight given to sensory samples that are 
conditionally surprising, implemented via an adaptive gain control process (Cheadle et al., 2014; 
Louie, Khaw, & Glimcher, 2013; Niwa & Ditterich, 2008). The decision variable computed by this 
adaptive weighting model approximated the SPRT, and allowed it to mimic both humans and the SPRT 
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on a range of qualitative and quantitative metrics. Moreover, the adaptive weighting model 
successfully predicted that neural encoding of decision information in EEG signals is attenuated on 
samples which are inconsistent with current beliefs.  
 
These findings suggest that human optional stopping in a heteroscedastic world is dictated by a frugal 
decision policy, that is based on summation of sensory signals, but adaptively down-weights decision 
information by the surprise it engenders (Summerfield & Tsetsos, 2015). This may be implemented 
via a normalisation mechanism that allows decision information to be efficiently coded neurally 
(Carandini & Heeger, 2012). Adaptive gain control in optional stopping tasks approximates the 
decision policy of a model, based on the SPRT, that optimally integrates posterior likelihood ratios to 
a collapsing bound.  
 
  
 123 
4.2 Methods 
 
Eighty-five participants, recruited from the University of Oxford and the surrounding area 
(experiments 1 and 3, EEG version), and from University College London (experiments 2 and 3, 
behaviour-only version), took part in three separate iterations of the experiment (n=15, n=37 and 
n=33 respectively). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and reported no 
history of neurological or psychiatric disorders. Consent was given in accordance with local ethical 
guidelines. Participants were either paid for their participation, or completed the task as part of an 
undergraduate research project (table 1). The data from 10 participants in experiment 2 were 
excluded due to task non-compliance (a modal reaction time of 2 samples or fewer (n=9), or strong 
bimodal response time distribution at 2 and 3 samples (n=1). The latter was removed post hoc due to 
the unusual response pattern, but prior to any statistical analysis). In experiment three, 17 of the 33 
participants participated in the EEG experiment, of whom two were excluded due to excessive 
movement and/or recording artefacts. Of the thirteen additional datasets from experiment three, 
which were collected as part of an undergraduate project, 5 were excluded due to poor performance 
(range 49-57% correct in contrast to 68-80%). Excluded participants were removed from all further 
analyses, leaving n=15, n=27 and n=23 for experiments 1, 2 and 3 respectively (total n=65). 
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Figure 4.1. Task and simulations.  A. Schematic of an example trial.  Participants first viewed a circular 
placeholder with a central blue fixation point, and two further blue dots indicating the reference 
orientation (frame 1).  They pressed the space bar to request a sample, which appeared with the place 
holder for a 250ms (frame 2), followed by a further fixation screen (frame 3). After each sample, they 
could either press again to request another sample, in which case they returned to frame 2 (with a 
different grating drawn from the same distribution), or make a choice by pressing one of the two 
arrow keys (frames 4/5), upon which they received feedback in the form of the fixation dot turning 
green (correct) or red (error). Cumulative winnings were shown in a yellow bar in the lower part of 
the screen.  B. The generative distributions for low mean (cyan), medium mean (pink) and high mean 
(purple), for trials on which the mean was ‘clockwise’. The darker colour on each plot reflects the 
probability of the stimulus having an orientation clockwise of the reference, and the paler colour 
reflects the probability of the stimulus having a anticlockwise orientation. The distributions for trials 
on which the correct answer was anticlockwise were identical, but with the reference line on the 
opposite side of the distribution means. C. The dependence of p(correct) on the sum of evidence (X), 
the number of samples elapsed, and the sum of squared evidence (X2) in various environments. 
p(correct) is shown as the absolute of the likelihood ratio (colour scale). Top left panel: where the 
mean and variance of the generative distributions is known to the observer.  Note that here, sum(X) 
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is a sufficient statistic for computing p(correct). Top right panel: where the variance is known to the 
observer, but the mean is not. Here, p(correct) depends on both sum(X) and time, as previously 
described (Kiani & Shadlen, 2009).  Bottom: where neither the mean nor the variance of the 
generative distribution is known to the observer. This is the case in the experiments conducted here. 
Time and sum(X) are no longer sufficient statistics for computing p(correct). However, it can be 
computed if some estimate of the dispersion of the evidence, such as sum(X2), is additionally 
computed. D. Mapping function from X (tilt) to DU (decision update) for the SPRT and adaptive gain 
models. Although the functions are different, they both involve steeper slopes for low-variance 
distributions (darker colour) than high-variance distributions (lighter colour). Dots are individual trials; 
lines are best cubic fits. Note that for the DDM, all points would lie on a straight line. 
 
 
Task design and stimuli 
 
In all versions of this self-paced categorisation task, participants determined on each trial whether the 
orientation of a stream of stimuli (Gabor patches) was on average clockwise or anticlockwise with 
respect to a reference (Fig 1a). The stimuli on each trial were drawn independently from a distribution 
of angular orientation whose mean was ±2, 4 or 6 degrees relative to a reference (±0, 2 or 4 degrees 
on experiment 1, with 66% of trials in the 0 mean condition leading to ‘correct’ feedback, on a 
pseudorandom basis), and whose variance was 4, 8 or 16 degrees. Mean and variance were generated 
independently and randomly on each trial. Participants viewed as many stimuli as they desired on 
each trial, pressing the spacebar (experiments 2 and 3) to request each stimulus, until they felt 
confident enough to commit to a response using the right hand. In experiment 1, stimuli were 
presented automatically at a rate of 2Hz rather than being actively requested. Participants completed 
648 and 540 trials in experiments 1 and 2 respectively. In experiment 3, participants performed the 
task for exactly 1 hour, with no upper or lower limit on the number of trials they would complete.  
 
The experiment took place in a quiet darkened room with participants’ faces approximately 70cm 
from the presentation computer screen. The visual stimuli were presented using the Psychophysics 
Toolbox running in MATLAB. Before the experiment began, the instructions were explained clearly 
and participants had the opportunity to practise the task and ask questions. Each experiment was 
divided into several blocks whose lengths were determined either by a time or trial limit (table 1). At 
all times, the display showed a grey screen with a central hollow black circular aperture (figure 1a), 
flanked by two reference dots (diameter 5 pixels) that would bisect the centre of the circle if joined 
with a straight line. The location of the reference dots thus determined the reference angle against 
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which participants compared all incoming stimuli. This location changed randomly block by block, and 
was drawn from the full range of possible angles (0-180 degrees), meaning that the reference could 
represent any possible angle within the circle. An additional dot was present in the centre of the 
circular aperture for clarity (experiment 3 only).  
 
Each trial was initiated when the participants requested the first stimulus by pressing the spacebar 
(experiments 2 and 3); in experiment 1 the stream of stimuli onset automatically.  Each stimulus 
consisted of an oriented Gabor patch that was displayed for 150ms within the circular aperture. The 
orientation of the Gabor patch was determined by the mean and the variance of the distribution 
relative to the reference from which it was drawn (see above). Because the Gabor patches were drawn 
from a distribution, it was often the case that despite the true mean being ‘clockwise’, several samples 
(stimuli) could appear to favour anticlockwise. Thus it was necessary to take several samples in order 
to ascertain the general tendency (see Figure S1a for p(correct) for a perfect integrator per condition 
across a trial). Participants continued to sample by pressing the spacebar for each new stimulus (or 
continuing to view the automatic stream in experiment 1) and committed to a choice (clockwise or 
anticlockwise) when they felt confident. Visual feedback was given in the form of a green or red 
central dot (5 pixel diameter) for correct and incorrect responses respectively. At the bottom of the 
screen was a ‘reward bar’, which was partially full at the onset of the experiment, and which 
corresponded to the amount of bonus money a participant could receive. At the same time as the 
visual feedback, the bar increased by a given increment if participants were correct and decreased by 
a higher increment if they were incorrect (see table 1 below). This asymmetric payoff structure was 
necessary to ensure that the strategy to maximise reward rate was not simply to guess the answer 
after viewing just one stimulus. In experiments 2 and 3 there was a short delay after viewing the 
stimulus before participants were able to request another stimulus or commit to a choice. This 
ensured that stimuli couldn’t be requested by accident, and gave time (in EEG) for motor signals to 
abate. Between trials there was a slightly longer delay during which participants could not initiate a 
new trial; in experiment 2 the aperture and reference dots disappeared during this time, in 
experiment 3 the feedback red or green remained on until participants were able to begin a new trial. 
In experiments 1 and 2, the maximum number of stimuli a participant could view per trial was 20; if 
they reached 20 without making a choice then “incorrect” feedback was shown and a new trial began. 
In experiment 3, the number of stimuli a participant could view on any trial was 100, this number was 
purposely chosen to be far higher than we (correctly) assumed any participant would go. However, 
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had any participant requested 100 samples, pressing the spacebar would no longer have had an effect 
and they would have been obliged to commit to a choice in order to move on to the next trial.  
 
Table 4.1: Summary of minor methodological differences between the three 
versions of the experiment 
 
 Experiment 1 Experiment 2 Experiment 3 
Aperture/gabor 
diameter 
100px 100px 190px 
Number of blocks  
 
6 x 108 trials 5 x 108 trials 4 x 15 minutes 
Experiment length 
 
648 trials 540 trials 1 hour 
Reward/penalty 
amount 
 
+1 reward 
-1 penalty 
+1 reward 
-3 penalty 
+2 reward 
-4 penalty 
Reward bar length at 
experiment onset 
 
Empty Half full (150 px), reset 
every block 
One third full (100 px), 
did not reset 
Min delay between 
stimuli 
 
50ms 150ms Jittered 0.2-0.3 seconds 
Min delay between 
trials 
1000ms 150ms Jittered 1-2 seconds 
Bonus structure Could earn £1 per block, 
p(reward) corresponded 
to how full reward bar 
was 
Could earn £2 per block, 
p(reward) corresponded 
to how full reward bar 
was 
£2.50 per quarter of max 
length of reward bar at 
the end of experiment 
(e.g. if it was half full, 
bonus was £5) 
Payment £8 plus bonus £5 plus bonus £15 plus bonus (EEG), 
voluntary (part of 
course) (behaviour only) 
Max stimuli viewable 
per trial 
 
20 20 Participants given no 
limit  
Response buttons for 
choice 
R/L mouse button for 
CW/ACW 
R/L mouse button for 
CW/ACW 
R/L arrow key for 
CW/ACW 
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EEG acquisition and preprocessing 
 
EEG signals from 64 Ag-AgCl electrodes, plus four additional electrodes used in bipolar montage as 
horizontal and vertical EOGs, and two electrodes used as references at the mastoids, were recorded 
using a Neuroscan EEG system with NuAmps digital amplifiers. The EEG signals were recorded at a 
sampling rate of 1 kHz and were high pass filtered online at 0.1Hz. The impedances of all functioning 
electrodes were below 10 kΩ at recording onset. 
 
All preprocessing was completed using MATLAB custom scripts and the EEGLAB toolbox  (Delorme & 
Makeig, 2004). First, data were downsampled to 250Hz, band pass filtered between 1 and 40Hz, then 
split into epochs of -1 to 1 second from each stimulus (sample) onset. It was necessary to epoch 
sample-wise rather than trial-wise due to the uneven number of samples taken per trial, and therefore 
widely varying trial lengths. The data from all channels were then visually inspected to remove epochs 
containing high frequency noise typical of muscle artefacts or electrical surges. Rejected samples 
formed no further part of the EEG analyses. Data from consistently bad channels (observed either 
during recording, during visualisation of the data, or both) were interpolated spherically (range of 
channels interpolated per participant: 0-5, average 2.9 channels interpolated per subject). The data 
were then re-referenced to the average signal. An extended independent component analysis (ICA) 
was then conducted, and components with activity typical of blinks or electrical noise were rejected. 
Finally, data were baselined relative to the first 250ms in each epoch (-1000 to -750ms preceding 
sample onset).   
 
Models 
 
SPRT Model 
The sequential probability ratio test (SPRT) specifies the minimum decision time required in order to 
achieve a given level of accuracy. To achieve this, an estimate of p(correct) is required. This can be 
computed using a sequential Bayesian approach that infers, after the occurrence of each stimulus, 
the posterior probability distribution over an exhaustive space of values for 𝜇  and 𝜎 , and then 
marginalises over this distribution to compute a (log) posterior ratio for CW v ACW on each sample k, 
as follows: 
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 𝐷𝑈L = 𝑙𝑜𝑔o 𝑝𝑋L	~	𝑁	(𝜇 ∈ [	1: 12], 𝜎 ∈ [1: 32]	)𝑝𝑋L	~	𝑁	(𝜇 ∈ [−1:−12	], 𝜎 ∈ [1: 32]	)p + 𝜀	 
 
Equation 4.1 
 
Where DUk denotes the decision update on sample k, and in all models: 
 𝜀~𝑁(0, 𝜍) 
 
Where 𝜍 was a parameter that varied freely from 0.5 to 20 (0.1 to 20 in experiment 1). Given that the 
mean and variance distributions were unknown to participants, we initiated the SPRT model on each 
trial with a flat prior across distributions with 24 possible values of mean (±1-12) and 32 possible 
values of variance (1-32). These values were chosen to have a maximum value that was twice the 
highest possible generative value.  
 
Drift Diffusion Model 
The drift diffusion model (DDM) utilises a less computationally expensive decision update, simply 
integrating the evidence on each sample (in this case, evidence (Xk) is the angular disparity between 
the sample and the reference):  
 𝐷𝑈L = 𝑋L + 𝜖 
 
Equation 4.2 
 
Adaptive gain model 
Finally, we considered a model that also bases its decision update on the information provided by 
each sample, but weights this information according to a prediction error term such that highly 
deviant stimuli are incorporated with lower gain:  
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𝐷𝑈L = 𝑋L𝑐 + 𝑋L − 𝑋L + 𝜖 
 
  Equation 4.3 
 
where 𝑋 is the expected value of 𝑋 on sample 𝑘, given by the mean tilt of all stimuli up to 𝑘 − 1, and 𝑐 is a small regularisation constant (here, 0.05). 
 
Stopping rules 
 
Two versions of each of the three models were defined: one that incorporated a fixed bound, and one 
that incorporated a collapsing bound. For both versions, decisions were triggered when the model 
stopping rule (SR) was true: 
 𝑆𝑅Lm[Rad = o+ 𝐷𝑈m[Rad,jLj56 p ∙ 𝛾LUj ≥ 𝜏 − (𝜆𝑘) 
 
 
Where 𝑘  denotes the current sample within a trial, and 𝛾  reflects a leak parameter (akin to the 
gradual decay of information in memory), freely varying between 0.8 and 1 in the fixed bound models, 
and set to 1 in the collapsing bound models. The threshold parameter τ also varied freely (range 1-
20). Finally, 𝜆 denotes an urgency parameter, free to vary between 2 and 10 for the collapsing bound 
models and set to zero for the fixed bound models.  
 
 
Free parameter estimation  
 
The best fitting parameter values – noise, threshold, and leak or urgency – were determined via an 
exhaustive search. The parameter values that gave rise to the lowest mean square error between the 
model and human reaction time distributions were selected. Model choices were generated on the 
basis of the sign of the model decision variable at the point that the decision was triggered.   
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Lookahead models 
 
In addition to our models of interest, we considered two “lookahead” models that, in a manner 
reminiscent of dynamic programming, ‘simulated’ future timesteps in order to respond at the point 
at which expected value was highest. However, these models provided a poor fit to the data 
(Supplementary methods, Figure 4.S1b and c).  
 
Behavioural analyses 
 
We compared human and model performance in a number of ways. First, we plotted stopping time 
histograms separately for correct and error trials for the humans and models across 10 (experiments 
1 and 2) or 25 (experiment 3) evenly spaced bins. Secondly, we compared condition-wise stopping 
times (collapsed across sign of mean at equivalent levels). In the low mean condition, variance level 
makes very little difference to the conflict in the evidence stream: close to half of the stimuli will be 
drawn from either category, irrespective of the variance level (this is visually evident from the plots 
of the generative distributions in figure 4.1b). Thus we expected a relative increase in reaction time 
according to variance level only in higher mean conditions, which we tested using a two way ANOVA 
(3 levels of mean by 3 levels of variance) on the average stopping times (STs, i.e. the number of 
samples viewed before commitment) for each condition.  
 
Many previous studies have investigated decision latency by comparing distributions of stopping 
times. The nature of our design, in which we knew the precise quantities of all choice-relevant 
information at each sample, allowed us to employ a novel analysis technique: we took the quantities 
of interest on each sample and used them to predict whether or not a commitment would be made 
after that sample. In other words, we ascertained which quantities may be the most predictive of 
decision termination. To this end, we regressed the cumulative decision information, time elapsed, 
and the squared decision information (as a proxy to variance) on a given sample, onto a categorical 
output variable that was 1 if the participant committed to a choice following that sample (stimulus), 
and 0 otherwise. We then repeated this procedure with the model stopping times for comparison. All 
collapsing bound models predict an influence of time elapsed, the DDM and the AG predict a positive 
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influence of the absolute decision evidence. With respect to variance, the DDM makes the opposite 
prediction from the other two models: according to the DDM, extreme samples (i.e. those particularly 
found in more variable streams) will speed decisions, as the large jumps in evidence make it more 
likely that the decision variable crosses a bound earlier. However, for the Bayesian SPRT, extreme 
values are probabilistically less likely, and are therefore associated with a weaker prior and lower 
integration gain, making them less likely to cause a threshold to be breached and a decision made. 
Thus the SPRT predicts that higher variance will slow decisions. The AG model also predicts a 
downweighting of extreme information, due to its tendency to lead to a larger disparity (prediction 
error) with the running evidence, thus also leading to lower gain and slower decisions. 
 
A model that simply sums all evidence, such as the DDM, expects a linear relationship between the 
amount of evidence (angular disparity) each stimulus contains and that sample’s influence on choice, 
with no difference in this relationship as a function of the variance of the generative distribution. The 
SPRT and the AG models on the other hand both assume a nonlinear relationship that varies across 
variance levels (see Figure 1d). This is because both models predict lower gain associated with more 
variable stimuli. To ascertain which of these patterns (linear versus nonlinear) more closely captured 
human performance, we conducted a robust regression, binning each sample according to its size (i.e. 
its angular disparity from the reference) and using this to predict its impact on choice, separately for 
each condition of variance, separately for human and model choices.  
 
 
 
Model comparison 
 
All formal model comparisons were conducted using the VBA toolbox (Daunizeau, Adam, & Rigoux, 
2014). All models had an identical number of free parameters and thus no adjustments were required 
to the scores entered into these comparisons.  
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EEG analyses: encoding 
 
In many cases, different mechanisms (such as those proposed by each model) can lead to similar 
behaviour choices. Turning to the neural recordings taken from a subset of participants in experiment 
three allowed us to ascertain directly which underlying mechanism best accounts for neural data.  
 
The adaptive gain model calculates its decision update by summing the evidence provided on each 
sample after weighting it according to the prediction error (see equation 4.3). Thus it predicts signals 
corresponding to the momentary level of evidence (the angular disparity between the stimulus and 
the reference), the prediction error, and the interaction between the two.  
 
The SPRT model also predicts a representation of the level of evidence on the sample, as the quantity 
is central to its decision update process. Over and above this, the SPRT model would predict a neural 
representation of the log posterior ratio of evidence, i.e. the quantity the model actually integrates 
(see equation 4.1).  
 
To ascertain which (if either) of these predictions are supported by our data, rather than calculating 
event related potentials (ERPs), we took parametric predictors within a general linear regression 
model to predict sample to sample fluctuations in the average EEG activity across frontal (F1, Fz, F2, 
FC1, FCz and FC2) and parietal (P5 P3 P1 Pz P2 P4 and P6) electrodes. We evaluated the following 
regression model: 
 
 
 𝐸𝐸𝐺Z = 𝛽¤ + 𝛽6 ∙ |𝑋| + 𝛽¥ ∙ |𝐷𝑈| + 𝛽¦|𝑋 − 𝑋T§| 
 +	𝛽¨(|𝑋© − 𝑋T§| ∗ |𝑋|) + 𝛽« ∙ log(𝑁¯) + 𝛽° ∙ |𝑋T§| + 𝛽± ∙ |𝑋4§| + 𝛽_ ∙ 𝐹 + 𝛽³ ∙ 𝐿 
 
Equation 4.4. 
 |𝑋| represents the (absolute) momentary decision information conveyed by the relevant sample. |𝐷𝑈| reflects the log posterior ratio of evidence, i.e. the momentary quantity predicted by the 
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SRPT model (equation 1). The prediction error term |𝑋 − 𝑋T§|  denotes the absolute angular 
difference between the current stimulus and the mean of all previous stimuli in the current trial up to 
that point, thus generally yielding higher values for samples from more variable streams. The adaptive 
gain model predicts an interaction between this prediction error term and the level of evidence 𝑋, 
reflected by 𝛽¨, as information that is more discrepant should generate a lower update. The final five 
terms (𝛽« − 𝛽³) are nuisance predictors that signal decision information on the previous (|𝑋T§|) and 
subsequent (|𝑋4§|) samples, and variance associated with the first sample (𝐹) and last sample (𝐿; i.e. 
the sample that prompted commitment) in the trial. Finally, 𝑁′, encodes proximity to the eventual 
choice, equivalent to the “response-locked” regressor sometimes employed in psychophysical 
studies. 𝑁′ starts strong and gradually weaken as the trial progresses, akin to an adaptation signal. 
The regression was repeated for EEG activity averaged across parietal as well as frontal regions.   
 
 
We regressed all 9 predictors against the single trial EEG activity from the corresponding trial, point 
by point over 500 evenly spaced datapoints that spanned from -1s to 1s from sample onset. The 
resulting encoding curves reflect parameter estimates: they show the slope of the best fitting 
regression line at each time point, thus indicating how strongly the EEG signal varies with the model-
predicted quantities. Given the entirely self-paced nature of this experiment, epochs from adjacent 
samples sometimes had a degree of overlap. However we believe that the responses to each 
individual sample can be sufficiently disambiguated due to the inclusion of pertinent information from 
the surrounding samples as nuisance regressors, as described above. Furthermore, information from 
one sample to the next was decorrelated particularly due to the method used, which involved ignoring 
information about trial membership: all samples from all trials were regressed sequentially against 
the EEG signal, meaning that samples from a different generative distribution followed on the heels 
of those that had formed part of a different trial with different underlying structure. The methods we 
used for disambiguation are akin to the principles in parametric event related functional 
neuroimaging designs (Josephs, Turner and Friston 1997). Entering all of the quantities in the same 
regression ensured that they competed for unshared variance, meaning that we could be confident 
that any effects were the result of the predictor’s unique influence on the EEG signal.  The resulting 
slopes were then averaged across samples, and statistical analyses were conducted at this group level. 
Significance of beta deviations from 0 was assessed using a nonparametric cluster correction 
technique, implementing a familywise error (FWE) with an alpha of 0.05.  
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EEG analyses: Lateralised beta band activity 
 
Previous studies have shown beta band desynchronisation in the build up to motor execution of a 
decision in the contralateral hemisphere to the hand making the choice. In our experiment, samples 
were requested with the left hand and a decision commitment was made by the right. Thus we would 
expect to see desynchronisation in the left hemisphere, i.e. contralateral to the response hand. 
Furthermore, this signal should be influenced by quantities that are predictive of choice execution. In 
particular, our paradigm allowed us to determine whether the cumulative decision information 
and/or time elapsed were more predictive of this lateralised desynchronisation motor preparation 
signal.  
 
To this end, we computed the interhemispheric difference in neural activity across 10 logarithmically 
spaced frequency bands (~10-40Hz) at lateral central electrodes, by subtracting the spectral log power 
of C3+CP3 from C4+CP4. We then regressed the absolute decision information predicted by the 
models: the cumulate of the angular disparity, the cumulate of the log posterior ratio and the 
cumulate of the prediction error, as described in the encoding analysis above, as well as the log of the 
sample number (i.e. time elapsed) against the resulting signal, in order to ascertain whether there 
was an evidence-independent neural signature of urgency. As a control, we also included the inverse 
of the urgency signal, i.e. the quantity that started large and decreased over the course of a trial, to 
control for the large neural adaptation signal typically seen. The resulting parameter estimates were 
averaged across samples separately for each frequency band before being entered into group-level 
statistical analyses, in which we used a nonparametric cluster correction technique with familywise 
error of alpha =0.05 to assess significance.  
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4.3 Results 
 
In the general form of the decision problem discussed here, observers view successive samples of 
information, each characterised by a continuously-valued feature. In the experiments described here, 
feature values denote the tilt of each grating relative to a reference orientation. Observers may view 
as many samples as desired before indicating their belief that they are drawn from a Gaussian 
distribution with positive or negative mean, 𝑁(+𝜇, 𝜎) or 𝑁(−𝜇, 𝜎) (i.e. that in the limit, they are on 
average tilted CW or ACW of the reference angle). In the experiments we describe, we varied 𝜇 and 𝜎 each at three levels relative to the reference. The task was performed for a fixed time period or 
number of trials, with real financial incentives for correct and incorrect responses (see Figure 4.1a 
and methods for details). 
 
Models 
 
The probability of a correct response can be computed using a sequential Bayesian approach that 
infers, after the occurrence of each sample, the posterior probability distribution over an exhaustive 
space of values for 𝜇 and 𝜎, and then marginalises over this distribution to compute a (log) posterior 
ratio for CW vs ACW. This model is known as the sequential probability ratio test (SPRT). For 
heteroscedastic inputs, the likelihood function that maps sensory features onto decision values 
evolves dynamically as beliefs about the most likely values of 𝜇 and 𝜎 change over the course of the 
trial. We note that this is not the fully optimal policy, which would require estimation of the expected 
value of responding now vs. later using dynamic programming; however, models incorporating these 
calculations offered a poor fit to human data (see figure 4.S1b and c). 
 
In a hypothetical case (not characteristic of the experiments here) where 𝜇 and 𝜎 are known to the 
observer, this SPRT model is equivalent to one that integrates the sum of evidence, i.e. to the DDM. 
Under the assumption that observers (erroneously) assume that information is drawn from a 
distribution with a single value for 𝜇 and 𝜎 that is fixed over all trials, thus, we considered the DDM 
here as it is the natural rival to the SPRT for explaining our data. Finally, we proposed a related model 
that sums the grating angles over time after modulation by a normalisation term that depends on 
prediction error. This model implements an adaptive weighting process whereby samples that are 
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inconsistent with the running mean (i.e. surprising samples) are down-weighted relative to those that 
concur with expectations. We chose to include this model because a very similar account captures 
qualitative features of human behaviour in tasks involving a fixed number of samples.  
 
In figure 4.1, we plot the decision values for the SPRT and adaptive weighting models as a function of 𝑋  for an example participant dataset, separately for each level of variance of the generative 
distribution 𝜎 (for the DDM, the decision values are simply equal to 𝑋L, and so the points would lie 
on the identity line).  Note that for both the SPRT and adaptive weighting models, the mapping from 
inputs to decision values varies with 𝜎 in a similar fashion. These two models thus approximate each 
other and should be expected to perform similarly in explaining qualitative aspects of human 
behavioural data.   
 
Behavioural data and fitting 
 
Using a first passage process – i.e. one that determines that point at which the decision variable first 
hits the bound on a given trial – we fit the SPRT, DDM and adaptive weighting models to human 
stopping times on correct and error trials in 3 behavioural experiments (Exp.1, n = 15; Exp.2, n = 24; 
Exp.3, n = 27; see methods for details). Exp. 2 and 3 differed in minor ways; in Exp. 1 gratings were 
shown at a rate dictated by the experimenter (4 Hz), rather than being sampled in a self-paced fashion. 
For all models, we allowed the boundary height and noise term 𝜀 to vary as free parameters.  For 
fixed-bound variants, we also included a leak term that captured potential loss of information during 
integration. For collapsing bound models, we replaced the leak parameter with a term that allowed 
the threshold height to decline over time by a fixed amount on each step, leading to a linearly 
collapsing bound. We included both fixed- and collapsing-bound versions of each of the three model 
variants, yielding 6 in total. In what follows, we compared models via quantitative metrics (i.e. log 
likelihoods) and random effects analysis (i.e. Bayesian model selection), but we also simulated best-
fitting variants of our models to generate predictions about qualitative features of the human data, 
allowing us to draw strong conclusions about the computations underlying optional stopping based 
on model falsification (Palminteri et al., 2017).  
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Stopping time distributions.  
We first compare the fits to stopping time distributions for Exp. 3 (the EEG dataset) in figure 4.2a (see 
Figure 4.S1d and e for Exp.1 and Exp.2 respectively). Visual inspection suggests that the collapsing-
bound models fit better than the fixed-bound models in all three experiments, and this was confirmed 
by frequentist comparison of the mean-squared error for every pairwise comparison (Exp.1: all t-
values > 6.42; Exp. 2: all t-values >5.18; Exp. 3: all t-values > 2.42; all p-values < 0.001 for experiments 
1 and 2, all p<0.05 for experiment 3). For a more formal quantitative analysis we pooled over all three 
experiments and compared model log likelihoods using Bayesian model selection. This analysis 
strongly favoured the collapsing bound models (expected frequencies for fixed-bound models were 
all less than 2%, whereas chance is 16.7% for the 6 models; and 31.4%, 23.6%, and 41.3% respectively 
for the SPRT, DDM and adaptive weighting models with collapsing bound). Expected frequencies for 
the collapsing-bound SPRT and normalisation models were above chance (p < 0.002 and p < 0.001 
respectively) but did not exceed chance for the DDM with collapsing bound (p = 0.08). 
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Figure 4.2. Behaviour and modelling. (A): human distributions of stopping times for correct (thicker 
black line) and error (thinner black) trials, and the corresponding fits of fixed- and collapsing-bound 
variants of the DDM, SPRT and adaptive weighting models (thick and thin coloured lines). Collapsing 
bound models fit better. (B): average (log) stopping times (in samples) for trials with low, medium and 
high mean, i.e. distance to the reference (x-axis) and low, medium and high variance, i.e. distance to 
the reference (dark, medium and pale green respectively).  Leftmost panel: humans; other panels, 
models. Rows 1-3 are experiments 1-3 respectively. The particular increase in reaction time as a 
function of variance in the high (easy) mean condition can be explained by the task structure: when 
the mean is low (hard), the ratio of samples favouring either category (CW v ACW) will be almost 
50:50, with only a very small bias towards the generative correct category, irrespective of the 
variance. However when mean is high, the variance condition has a much larger influence on the ratio 
All figures:
Low variance
Med variance
High variance
SPRT model (collapsing bound)
Drift diffusion model (collapsing bound)
Adaptive Gain model (collapsing bound)
a.
c. d.
e.
Level of mean
PredictorsPredictors
Binned stopping time
b.
Size of stimulus (angular disparity from reference)
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of samples in favour of either category (see figure 1 for an illustration of the generative structure). 
(C): coefficients from regressions predicting next-sample commitment based on sum(X), samples 
elapsed (N) and sum(X2).  White bars are humans; each panel shows the fit of a model (blue, green 
and red dots reflect SPRT, DDM and AG models respectively). Rows 1-3 are experiments 1-3 
respectively. The SPRTCB and AdaptiveCB models capture the negative influence of sum(X2), but the 
DDMCB does not. (D): the impact on p(choose clockwise) of sample information (X), the prediction 
error |𝛿𝑋|, and the interaction of the latter two. The AdaptiveCB model predicts a negative interaction, 
meaning that the strength of impact of a stimulus on the decision decreases as the prediction error 
associated with that stimulus increases. (E): subjective versus objective weighting of the decision 
evidence, separately for the three conditions of variance (low, medium and high in pale, medium and 
dark green respectively). The impact of more extreme angles, and angles from more variable streams, 
is lower in the human data. This is captured by the AG and SPRT models, but not the DDM. Cf figure 
4.1D, which shows the expected pattern based on simulated data.  
 
The best-fitting variants of each collapsing-bound model were then used (without further 
assumptions) to make predictions about four qualitative features of the human data: (i) condition-
wise mean stopping times; (ii) predictors of next-sample commitment; (iii) adaptive weighting of 
information by the sample history; and (iv) weighting of sensory features in choice. For these 
comparisons, we focussed on collapsing-bound models because the fixed-bound models fit the 
stopping time distributions more poorly. However, for completeness, we present the full results in 
Fig. 4.S1 (fixed-bound models fit the human data more poorly on every measure considered here). 
 
Condition-wise mean stopping times 
First, we compared model predictions about the mean stopping times independently for each level of  |𝜇|  and 𝜎. We show these in figure 4.2b. The SPRT and adaptive weighting models all predicted that 
stopping times should vary as an interaction of by |𝜇| and 𝜎, with commitments delayed when the 
samples were drawn from more variable distributions, but this slowing exacerbated as |𝜇| deviates 
further from zero. This occurs because for both of these models, outlying feature values (i.e. more 
deviant tilts) are penalised more sharply during conversion to momentary decision signals, leading to 
shallower slopes of integration where samples are more variable, in particular when 𝜇 is further from 
zero. By contrast, the DDM predicts an inversion of this effect: that that stopping times should be 
shortest when samples were more variable. This latter prediction follows from the dynamics of 
bounded integration under the DDM, whereby more variable evidence ensures that the diffusion 
process occupies a potentially wider range of states, and is thus more likely to contribute to a first 
passage process, in particular when evidence strength is low (Zylberberg et al., 2016). Human stopping 
time data displayed in the interaction between |𝜇|  and  𝜎  predicted by the SPRT and adaptive 
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weighting models in all 3 experiments (Exp.1 F2.6,36.9 = 11.39, p < 0.001; Exp.2: F3.3,85.4 = 5.37, p < 0.001; 
Exp.3: F3.6,82.1 = 4.41 p < 0.004; ANOVA on log stopping times). Comparing least-squares fits of the 
models to these data aggregated over experiments, we found that the DDM performed overall worse 
than the other models (t-test on mean squared error: DDM vs. SPRT t65 = 2.30, p < 0.02; DDM vs. 
adaptive weighting t65 = 4.39, p < 0.004). This confirms the pattern suggested by the quantitative fits 
above, and argues against the DDM as a description of human optional stopping in our experiment. 
 
Predictors of next-sample commitment 
Next, we considered a second qualitative feature of the data, capitalising on our use of a task that 
permitted precise quantification of the information provided by each sample (i.e. momentary tilt 
values). We used probit regression to predict whether participants would decide to commit or defer 
on a given sample (Malhotra et al., 2017), as a function of three time-varying quantities as predictors: 
(i) the absolute sum of feature values up to that sample (i.e. the DV computed by a noiseless DDM); 
(ii) the number of samples viewed thus far; and (iii) the sum of squared feature values. This choice of 
predictors was motivated by the observation that in the heteroscedastic setting provided by our 
experiment, these three variables are sufficient statistics for the computation of 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡)  (see 
figure 4.1c). Once again, the DDM makes a prediction that diverges from the other models, in that it 
proposes that the sum of momentary evidence, rather than the passage of time through the trial (i.e. 
samples elapsed), should be the strongest predictor of next-sample commitment. The other models 
predict that samples elapsed is the strongest predictor of next-sample commitment, and that a larger 
sum of squared evidence has the effect of delaying commitment. This latter pattern was observed in 
human data, again providing evidence against the DDM as a model of human performance in our task 
(Figure 4.2c). To assess the significance of this effect, we used coefficients from each model to predict 
human commitments, and compared the resulting model likelihoods using Bayesian model selection 
aggregated over the 3 experiments. Comparing among the 3 collapsing bound models, expected 
model frequencies were 54.6%, 7.7% and 37.8% for the SPRT, DDM and adaptive weighting models 
respectively, indicating a clear disadvantage for the DDM. 
 
Adaptive weighting by sample history 
A third qualitative prediction that can be used to arbitrate among the models concerns how the 
statistics of tilts observed on each trial determine their weight (or impact) on the categorical choice, 
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i.e. CW vs. ACW response. It follows from the adaptive weighting mechanism model that sensory 
samples that are incongruent with those occurring previously will carry less weight in eventual 
choices, because they lead to larger prediction errors. To quantify this effect in all 3 models, we used 
a previously-described approach, in which probit regression is used to predict choices (CW vs. ACW) 
as a function of (i) the sum of sensory evidence (i.e. tilts), (ii) the absolute difference between each 
grating and its predecessor, and (iii) the interaction between (i) and (ii). In previous studies involving 
integration of a fixed number of samples, we have observed negative coefficients for (iii), indicative 
of a downweighting of surprising or inconsistent evidence (a “consistency” bias) (Cheadle et al., 2014). 
Here, the human consistency bias was significant in all 3 experiments (Exp.1: t14 = 14.04, p < 0.001; 
Exp. 2: t26=6.50, p<0.001; Exp. 3: t23=6.08, p<0.001; and this pattern was replicated by the SPRT and 
normalisation models, but not by the DDM. (Figure 2d). Quantitative analysis using Bayesian model 
selection, revealed lower expected frequencies for DDM than other models (2% vs 85% for SPRT and 
12% for adaptive weighting model; p < 0.001). 
 
Weighting of sensory features in choice 
A fourth prediction that differs qualitatively among the models concerns the form of the likelihood 
function that maps tilt values onto choices for different levels of 𝜎. The approximate expected form 
of this function for the SPRT and adaptive weighting models is visualised in Figure 2e. In humans, this 
function was estimated by counting grating tilts that fell within 7 bins of angle with respect to the 
reference, and entering these tallies into a design matrix that was then used to predict choices via 
(robust) logistic regression. We conducted this analysis independently for trials defined by each level 
of 𝜎. The resulting coefficients were plotted for humans, and for the 3 collapsing bound models using 
an identical analysis of model choices (Figure 4.2e). The DDM predicts that this mapping function 
should be linear, and identical for all 3 variance conditions. The SPRT and normalisation models, by 
contrast, predict a choice function that is sigmoidal (rather than linear) in form, with outlying tilt 
values “squashed” or down-weighted.  Moreover, they both predict that these sigmoidal choice 
functions will have a steeper slope for low-variance than high-variance conditions; this effect is more 
exaggerated for the SPRT model. The human data are shown for comparison in the leftmost column 
of the figure.  We compared slopes of sigmoidal functions fit to these choice functions for each 
variance conditions separately, finding them to be reliably steeper for the low variance condition in 
all three experiments (Kruskall-Wallis test, Exp.1: p < 0.02, Exp.2: p < 0.005, Exp.3: p < 0.001). This 
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finding argues strongly against the DDM, which implements a decision policy that does not account 
for variability in the generative distribution on each trial. 
 
Together, these behavioural analyses provide a rich picture of the dynamics of human optional 
stopping in a heteroscedastic environment. We draw three conclusions.  Firstly, models based on a 
fixed bound cannot jointly explain human stopping times and choices. Fixed-bound models fit more 
poorly than collapsing-bound models on every qualitative and quantitative metric used here, 
providing a notably clear demonstration that humans do not draw decisions to a close (at least in our 
task) using a flat decision threshold (Figure 4.2a). Secondly, models that involve unbiased linear 
accumulation of evidence to a collapsing bound (e.g. based on the DDM) fail to explain the qualitative 
pattern of stopping times as a function of evidence strength and reliability (Figure 4.2b), to account 
for how the statistics of stimulation predict next-sample commitment (Figure 4.2c) to capture how 
the disparity between current and previous sample value influences choices (Figure 4.2d), or to 
correctly predict the form of the choice function that humans use to map sensory features onto 
decision evidence (Figure 4.2e). These qualitative observations seem to rule out an unbiased, linear 
integration process as driving human choices in this task. Thirdly, we report that the slope of the 
human weighting function (transducer) varied as a function of the dispersion of sensory features in 
the stimulation sequence. This suggests that humans either inferred the generative statistics of the 
sequence online during stimulation (SPRT model), or used an approximation that allowed them to 
behave as if they were doing so (adaptive weighting model). 
 
EEG data 
Encoding analyses 
In the analyses above, we examined qualitative features of the behavioural data with a view to ruling 
out various classes of optional stopping model.  However, two models – the SPRT and adaptive gain 
model – were similarly able to predict all the major features of the human data, and on most measures 
did not differ substantially in their quantitative fits. We thus turned to an analysis of neural signals 
recorded whilst a subset of participants from Exp.3 performed the task, with a view to arbitrating 
between these models at the implementational level. 
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Rather than driving our analysis on the basis of event related potentials (ERPs), we employed a single 
trial approach (as described previously, (Wyart, de Gardelle, et al., 2012; Wyart et al., 2015), also see 
methods) that allows us to assess how the strength of the neural signal is influenced by parametric 
decision-relevant quantities such as the DU predicted by each model, thereby revealing the unique 
influence of each quantity of interest. To do this, we regressed such quantities against the EEG activity 
evoked by each sample to derive beta weights (i.e. the slope of the relationship between the quantity 
of interest and the EEG signal) at successive timepoints following sample onset. The resulting weights 
were then averaged across the cohort; time periods at which these weights deviated significantly from 
0 indicate that the relevant quantity is being encoded with above-chance strength.  
 
Both the SPRT and the adaptive gain models predict an influence of the decision evidence 𝑋, as this 
quantity is used to derive the decision update for both models.  However, only the Adaptive Gain 
model predicts significant encoding of the prediction error term, as well as its interaction with the 
decision evidence 𝑋, as these quantities are used to compute the model’s decision update. The DU of 
the SPRT, on the other hand, which is equivalent to the log posterior ratio of evidence, is only 
predicted by the SPRT model to influence neural signals.  
 
We regressed these quantities against the neural activity averaged over parietal and frontal 
electrodes. The results of the analysis are shown in Figure 3a (parietal) and b (frontal). Encoding of 
|X| exhibited a characteristic negative-positive deflection at ~200/450ms over parietal electrodes 
(red trace; top row), and the sign reversed pattern in frontal electrodes (bottom row) that closely 
replicates the encoding of decision information described previously (Wyart, de Gardelle, et al., 2012; 
Wyart et al., 2015). However, there were also a number of additional findings. In line with the 
predictions of the adaptive gain model, there is significant encoding of the prediction error signal over 
parietal and frontal electrodes (again with sign reversed pattern in the two regions) 400ms after 
stimulus onset. This signals a component of the EEG signal that was modulated when samples viewed 
were incompatible with the running stream of evidence. Importantly, in both regions there was also 
a significant interaction between the prediction error and the decision evidence, meaning that the 
strength of encoding of the decision was modulated by the degree of prediction error, as predicted 
by the adaptive gain model.  
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In contrast, parietal regions showed no significant encoding of the LPR, i.e. the quantity accumulated 
by the SPRT model. The lack of such a signal in parietal regions is particularly pertinent given previous 
links between this region of cortex and the accumulation of decision-relevant information (e.g. 
(Hanks, Ditterich, & Shadlen, 2006; Kiani et al., 2008; Kira, Yang, & Shadlen, 2015; Roitman & Shadlen, 
2002)). In frontal regions, there was a short period of activity that correlated with the predictions of 
the LPR model. However, given that it occurred pre-stimulus, it is hard to draw any strong conclusions 
about its potential role in the evidence accumulation process.  
 
 
Figure 4.3: Neural encoding of model-predicted information. Curves depicting the correlation 
between model-predicted quantities and the EEG signal in parietal (A) and frontal (B) regions from -
100 to 800ms following each sample. The shaded regions around the solid lines depict SEM. The 
coloured lines show periods of time during which the signal significantly deviated from 0. The adaptive 
gain model predicts the encoding of the prediction error signal that is seen here. The SPRT model 
predicts encoding of the LPR, but no significant encoding is seen in either parietal or frontal regions.  
 
Thus, analysis of the signal over parietal and frontal regions yielded results that clearly supported the 
notion that at the implementational level, the behaviour predicted by both the adaptive gain and the 
SPRT models is manifested via the relatively simpler calculations of the adaptive gain model, rather 
than the computationally expensive mechanism implied by the SPRT.  
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Lateralised frequency band activity 
In behavioural comparisons, collapsing bound models overwhelmingly captured reaction time data 
more closely than the fixed bound models, implying that a time-sensitive signal that is independent 
of the cumulative evidence is influential in driving choices to a close. Our next step thus sought to 
determine whether such an “urgency” signal was present in our data. We motivated the analysis on 
the basis of previous work indicating that desynchronisation in beta band activity in central regions of 
the hemisphere contralateral to the hand that executes the motor response is strongly present in the 
build-up to choice selection. In this task, by design, participants requested samples and committed to 
choice with the left and right hands respectively. Thus quantities that are strongly linked to choice 
execution should be strongly predictive of the relative increase of contralateral (left) hemisphere 
(electrodes C3 and CP3) desynchronisation over ipsilateral (right) hemisphere desynchronisation 
(electrodes C4 and CP4).  
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Figure 4.4. T values derived from beta weights from a regression assessing the correlation between 
the log time elapsed and the interhemispheric difference in the EEG signal from -500 to 1000ms 
following stimulus onset. Desynchronisation in beta band activity is associated with preparation to 
execute response; factors that influence this process should therefore cause greater 
desynchronization. Time elapsed has a highly significant impact on desynchronization; the upper 
panel reflects overall t values, the lower panel depicts only values which exceed a cluster corrected 
alpha of 0.05.  
 
We regressed a quantity corresponding to the log time elapsed, alongside the cumulative decision 
evidence, the cumulative prediction error and the cumulative LPR quantity competitively against the 
interhemispheric difference of the wavelet transformed central scalp EEG data in 10 logarithmically 
spaced frequency bands, on each sample from -500 to 500ms following stimulus onset. As an 
additional nuisance regressor we included the quantity 𝑁′, which starts large and decreases over the 
course of a trial (akin to an adaptation signal). We found that, when controlling for the influence of 
increases of these other decision-relevant factors, there remained a striking and highly significant 
independent influence of time elapsed, strongly indicative of an ‘urgency’ signal influencing motor 
response (Figure 4.4). Interestingly, none of the decision-relevant quantities significantly influenced 
this lateralised build up. 
 
 Summary 
 
Over the course of three behaviour experiments, collapsing bound models were clearly and 
consistently better at accounting for human data than fixed bound models. Of the three different 
models, two closely approximated human behaviour: an optimal model (‘optimal’ in the same sense 
as the SPRT), and a simpler model that processes discordant evidence with lower gain. Whilst these 
two models give very similar behaviour results, they implicate very different underlying processing 
mechanisms, thus neural data were used to arbitrate between the two. The neural signal over parietal 
and frontal regions correlated with the predictions of the simpler adaptive gain model, rather than 
the optimal SPRT model.  
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4.4 Discussion 
 
Lengthy deliberation over a difficult decision is costly: information acquired per unit of time is 
generally minimal. Fast decisions on the other hand often result in poorer choices. How do agents find 
the right balance? It has been known for several decades that in order to achieve a given level of 
accuracy in a free response task, evidence should be accumulated to a fixed (if trial difficulty is 
constant) or collapsing (if trial difficulty varies) threshold. In these situations, the sum of decision 
evidence and time elapsed are sufficient statistics to estimate the probability of being correct at any 
given moment (in the former case). However, decision difficultly is influenced by factors other than 
just strength of the evidence: choosing the best cycle route to the shop is made harder by the 
knowledge that the shortest path suffers from constantly fluctuating pedestrian traffic. When 
evidence variance influences decision difficulty over and above evidence strength, time elapsed and 
sum of evidence are no longer sufficient statistics to estimate the probability of making a correct 
choice. 
 
Here, we investigated explicitly what drives agents to commit to a decision when the evidence 
strength and variance are manipulated orthogonally from trial to trial. We found that an ‘adaptive 
gain’ model, which assumes agents sum the evidence provided by each stimulus in a weighted manner 
that causes inconsistent information to have lower impact on choices, captured human data closely. 
The qualitative predictions of this model approximated those of a Bayesian SPRT model, which 
integrates the posterior probability of each stimulus being drawn from the relevant distributions. 
Despite behavioural similarity, the two models clearly implicate very different underlying 
mechanisms. Analysis of the concurrent EEG activity allowed us to tease apart the model predictions 
in a manner that behaviour alone could not, and strongly favoured the adaptive gain model as the 
best explanation for human evidence integration and decision termination.   
 
The adaptive model implicates a gain control mechanism via which the strength of evidence 
accumulation is modulated on the basis of the local statistics of the available information, in a manner 
reminiscent of the adaptation of low level sensory systems to the ambient surroundings (Bartlett, 
1965; Carandini & Heeger, 2012; Fairhall, Lewen, Bialek, & de Ruyter Van Steveninck, 2001). The 
model’s ability to explain human data here replicates previous results from a task that employed an 
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experimenter-paced multi-sample orientation discrimination paradigm: as here, it was found that 
information was transformed in a nonlinear manner, with enhanced processing of that closest to the 
running tally of evidence. This down-weighting of statistically deviant information has been observed 
in a number of other studies: in averaging tasks in which all information is presented simultaneously, 
outlying information is ‘robustly averaged’ such that it carries lower eventual weight on choice (de 
Gardelle & Summerfield, 2011; Li et al., 2017). However, none of these paradigms were paced entirely 
by the participant –  i.e. with each sample arriving at the participant’s request until they decided they 
had seen sufficient information – therefore it was unclear whether, when the viewer dictates the 
pace, the down-weighting of outlying information is an element of the process that is sacrificed in 
favour of reaching the bound more quickly, and therefore making a faster decision. Here, we showed 
clearly that the down-weighting of discrepant information does indeed still feature strongly in self-
paced decisions, despite this time cost.  
 
We hope that our data are able to shed further light on the debate of the nature and existence of an 
‘urgency’ signal. Behaviourally, we found that collapsing (rather than fixed) bound models fit our data 
better in every scenario investigated, supporting the idea that an evidence-independent time-
dependent signal does indeed influence choices. However in many other situations, static bounds 
have been shown to capture evidence better (Hawkins et al., 2015). What may be the cause of these 
disparate findings? One explanation is trial difficulty: a choice that remains challenging even after a 
long time has passed is indicative of a low signal to noise environment, meaning that harvesting 
additional information will have little benefit and it is more beneficial to decide randomly and move 
on to a more fruitful choice (Juni, Gureckis, & Maloney, 2016). Collapsing bounds are one way to 
prompt such choices. If the decision is sufficiently easy, there is no need for an additional signal, as 
bounds will be reached and decisions triggered on the basis of the strength of the evidence alone. 
Neurally, we found striking evidence of an ‘urgency’ signal in the frequency band decomposed signal 
that was independent of the evidence in the trial. We are not the first to show neural evidence for 
urgency: for example, LIP activity apparently ramps to a bound even in a zero coherence condition, 
which may be attributed to an urgency effect (Churchland et al., 2008; Hanks et al., 2011). However, 
measuring an ‘urgency’ signal is non-trivial (Braunlich & Seger, 2016): over the course of a trial, the 
absolute values of many decision-related factors (such as the level of accumulated evidence) as well 
as factors which may not be related to the decision (e.g. the ramping of activity in vmPFC) increase. 
How can we be confident that we have uniquely isolated an ‘urgency’ signal from the mix? We used 
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several techniques in an attempt to control for this.  In the neural analysis, we included in our 
regressions a quantity that started high and logarithmically decreased – akin to a neural adaptation 
signal – as well as the quantity that started small and logarithmically increased, akin to an actual 
urgency signal. By including the former as an additional regressor, we could ensure that unique effects 
of general trial ramping were included in the adaptation signal, and by taking the log, we ensured that 
signals of interest were not just those with a general increase or decrease in activity (as may be 
expected from the type of spurious signal described). We also note the importance of interpreting 
this signal alongside behaviour; combining the clear behaviour evidence with the neural analysis adds 
extra strength to our interpretation of both.  
 
Notably, the drift diffusion model (DDM), which postulates that evidence is accumulated linearly until 
it reaches a bound, provided a poor fit to the reaction time data in this environment. The DDM has 
been highly successful in explaining reaction times in humans and non human primates, and it has a 
wealth of neural support in particular from single unit recordings. Why then does it fare badly as an 
explanation here? We suggest three causes. The first pertains to the orthogonal influences of 
evidence strength and evidence variability on trial difficulty in our experiment. Previous studies have 
often used a measure of “coherence” to determine trial difficulty, whereby the variability itself is the 
determinant of evidence strength, and thus the two are not dissociable. The explanatory power of the 
DDM in its current form seems ill-suited to generalise to scenarios such as the one we employed, in 
which a number of influences can lead to an identical evidence state (decision variable). Furthermore, 
previous work has often focused on fitting the DDM to reaction time distributions (though see (Kang, 
Petzschner, Wolpert, & Shadlen, 2017)). Our task also allowed us to interrogate the data with sharper 
precision: due to the entirely participant-paced nature of the experiment, the decision to view more 
information, as well as to commit to a decision, were both active choices. This allowed us to have high 
certainty at any given time the exact statistics of the decision information seen so far and at time of 
choice, and as such we were able to predict outcomes on a sample to sample basis, and to develop 
heretofore untested models that we put to the test using these rich data. Finally, it ought also to be 
noted that the DDM and the adaptive gain model are in nature very similar, with the key difference 
being the nonlinear weighting of information during integration.  
 
A utility-maximising agent, when faced with the choice of whether to gather more information, or to 
commit to a choice now, should simulate the value of all possible future states and commit at the 
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point that will yield the highest expected (Drugowitsch et al., 2012). However, whether or not such 
demanding computations are plausible for a biological agent remains questionable. We created a 
simplified version of such a forward-simulating model: a ‘greedy’ model that calculated the expected 
value of the sample one step into the future, and committed on the current sample if the opportunity 
(expected value of taking another sample) was negative. However, despite its normative motivation, 
this model failed to produce a pattern of performance that was close to human performance.  
 
Across the field, much is known about what decision people will make, and factors – optimal or 
otherwise – that influence choices. However, decisions are only good when they are made at the 
appropriate time: assessing every menu option of every café in town to find the perfect lunchtime 
sandwich will result in me making the best selection, but not until well after the cafes have shut for 
the day. In order to be worthwhile, choices must be executed in a timely manner, and relatively less 
is known about the factors that drive decisions to a close. Here we described human behaviour via a 
mechanism that executes choices when evidence, scaled by its consistency to that seen so far, reaches 
a bound that collapses over time to avoid prolonged deliberation under conditions of low certainty. 
By elucidating the mechanism, this opens an avenue to understanding what makes decision timing go 
“wrong”, such as overly-impulsive choices associated with some mental illnesses, and opens the 
possibility of determining targeted interventions for such problems.  
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Supplementary material 
 
Alternative models 
 
The SPRT is optimal in the sense that it determines the minimum reaction time required to achieve a 
given level of accuracy. However the fully optimal solution as to when to respond can only be derived 
via dynamic programming. Such a process involves simulating a potentially limitless number of future 
steps in order to calculate the expected value at each one. Although this seemed an unlikely 
explanation of the mechanisms humans were using, we nevertheless wanted to rule out the idea that 
a simpler model, that simulated the immediate future and used this to determine whether or not to 
stop, provided a superior fit to the human data. To this end, we noted that agents can maximise their 
reward per unit time by taking into account the relative value of responding now and later. The 
expected value (EV) of responding at time t after information onset can be described as follows: 
 𝐸𝑉Z = 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟)Z × 𝑅¸ + 𝑞(𝑐𝑜𝑟)Z × 𝑅U𝑡 + 𝐼𝑇𝐼 + 𝑡¤  
 
Where 𝑅¸  and 𝑅U  are the rewards and penalties associated with correct and incorrect choices, 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟)Z  and  𝑞(𝑐𝑜𝑟)Z are the probabilities of correct and incorrect choices at time 𝑡, where 𝑞(𝑐𝑜𝑟) =1 − 𝑝(𝑐𝑜𝑟), 𝐼𝑇𝐼  is the interval interposed between trials, and 𝑡¤ is a fixed latency auxiliary to the 
decision process that is inevitably added to response times.  
 
We considered a predictive model – the one-step lookahead model (OLM) – that estimated the EV of 
the next sample, and committed to choice when the immediate opportunity cost became negative: 
 𝑂𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝐸𝑉Z¸RZ − 𝐸𝑉Z 
 
 
Unlike the SPRT model considered above, the OLM had full knowledge of the condition-wise structure 
of the task. Starting with a flat prior across conditions, on each sample the model used Bayes rule to 
estimate the probability of the sample being drawn from each of the 18 conditions (3 levels of mean 
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and 3 levels of variance = 9 conditions x 2 categories [CW/ACW]), marginalised to find p(CW), and 
updated the prior at each step. The model then used these estimates to calculate the expected value 
of the current sample. In order to calculate opportunity on sample k, an estimate of the evidence that 
will be provided by sample k+1 is required. To this end, the model used all values of 𝑋 from 1 to k to 
estimate the mean and variance of the distribution from which that trial’s stimuli were being drawn 
(unconstrained by the knowledge of the condition-wise structure). It then derived a specific estimate 
of the next sample by drawing a sample at random from this estimated distribution. As with sample 
k, the probability of making a correct response on sample k+1 was calculated using Bayes rule 
(incorporating the prior estimated from sample k). The OLM committed to a choice at the first point 
that the opportunity of further sampling became negative.  
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Figure 4.S. A. Probability correct as a function of time elapsed for a perfect integrator who chooses 
on the basis of the sign of the running decision variable. Solid/dotted lines reflect different levels of 
evidence strength (mean), colours reflect levels of evidence variance, illustrating the dissociable 
influence of these two factors. B. Model distributions of stopping times for correct (solid  black line) 
and error (dotted black) trials, for a one step lookahead model. C. Average (log) stopping times (in 
samples) for trials with low, medium and high mean, i.e. distance to the reference (x-axis) and low, 
medium and high variance, i.e. distance to the reference (dark, medium and pale green respectively) 
for the one step lookahead model. D and E. Human distributions of stopping times for correct (thicker 
black line) and error (thinner black) trials, and the corresponding fits of fixed- and collapsing-bound 
variants of the DDM, SPRT and adaptive weighting models (thick and thin coloured lines) for 
experiments 1 and 2 respectively. F. Subjective versus objective weighting of the decision evidence 
for the fixed bound models, separately for the three conditions of variance (low, medium and high in 
pale, medium and dark green respectively). The impact of more extreme angles, and angles from more 
variable streams, is lower in the human data. G. Coefficients for statistics predicting next-sample 
commitment based on sum(X), samples elapsed (N) and sum(X2) for the fixed bound models.  White 
bars are humans; each panel shows the fit of a model (blue, green and red dots reflect SPRT, DDM 
and AG models respectively). Rows 1-3 are experiments 1-3 respectively. H. The impact on p(choose 
clockwise) of sample information (X), the prediction error (|𝛿𝑋|), and the interaction of the latter two 
for the fixed bound models. I. Subjective versus objective weighting of the decision evidence, 
separately for the three conditions of variance (low, medium and high in pale, medium and dark green 
respectively) for the fixed bound models.  
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5. General Discussion 
5.1 Summary  
The processes underlying human evidence accumulation and decision termination are complex and 
multi-faceted. Here, we have built on previous work to continue the long journey towards 
understanding the behavioural and neural mechanisms underpinning perceptual decision making. 
Across a series of three studies, we have seen that human observers prioritise certain types of 
information when collecting evidence to inform a decision, and that they terminate choices when the 
sum of this selectively-integrated information reaches a threshold that collapses over time. This allows 
a limited-capacity observer to focus resources on diagnostic pieces of information, and to curtail this 
integration process either when the information is sufficiently supportive of one option over others, 
or (via the collapsing bound) when evidence is so weak that the benefit of continued deliberation is 
likely to be negative.  
 
The urn-and-balls task used in chapters two and three, in which participants were required on each 
trial to indicate from which of two urns a series of eight samples of evidence (variously-sized handfuls 
of coloured balls) were drawn, could be solved in at least three ways. The two urns that participants 
had to choose between comprised mainly category A information, or mainly category B information 
respectively. Thus firstly, participants could take into account the ratio of evidence, A:B, in each 
sample (handful of coloured balls), irrespective of the size of the sample from which the evidence was 
drawn. This would mean a sample that contained an information ratio of (for example) 2:5 in favour 
of category A:B would have an identical impact on choice irrespective of the size of the sample 
(number of balls drawn) that gave rise to this ratio. Secondly, participants could integrate information 
with respect to its reliability, taking into account the evidence in proportion to the information it 
conveys. A sample that is larger than another (i.e. a sample that contains more balls overall) conveys 
more information, even if the ratio of evidence is the same in both the larger and the smaller sample. 
The optimal (binomial) solution to the task accounts for the reliability of information, explicitly 
factoring the sample size n into its calculation of a decision update. Thirdly, rather than taking into 
account the evidence in proportion to the information it conveys, individuals could apply some 
weighting such that some information is integrated with higher gain. This is what we term selective 
prioritisation (or integration) here. 
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In chapter two, using a simple version of this task, in which each category (A or B) was characterised 
by just one ‘feature’ (colour, in this case), I described evidence counter to strategy one (ratio-based 
information integration) and in favour of strategy two (reliability-based information integration): 
human performance was best captured by a model that summed the evidence on each sample in 
proportion to the information it conveyed, via a simple mechanism that emulated the binomial 
solution. In other words, in this experiment, the objective weight of evidence was consistently linearly 
related to the subjective weight that participants gave the information, as we would expect from a 
reliability-based solution.  
 
In chapter three, I described a paradigm that made the urn-and-balls task slightly more complex by 
characterising each category with more than one feature, or ‘subcategory’ (again, each 
feature/’subcategory’ was a different colour). This time, performance was best captured by a model 
that followed the third strategy, selectively integrating information about the more prevalent feature 
(subcategory) within each of the categories. (In chapter 2 in contrast, the reliability-based solution 
was equivalent to adding up the number of dots over samples, with no selectivity). In chapter four, 
using a different type of categorisation task, I detailed a model that again weighted certain pieces of 
information more strongly than others based on their consistency with the running tally of evidence. 
Thus together, we never saw a ratio-based strategy, we saw reliability-based (consistent) weighting 
in one task, prioritising of more prevalent information in another, and prioritising of information 
consistent with the running mean in the third.  
 
5.2 Linking the results in a common framework 
 
The prioritising of certain pieces of information seen in the latter two experiments, unlike the 
reliability-based solution seen in the first, can lead to inconsistent decisions. Pieces of information are 
not treated in a manner that is simply proportional to the information they convey: an identical piece 
of evidence will be treated very differently depending on the information with which it is presented. 
The fact that we have seen evidence both for consistency and inconsistency during evidence 
integration leads to an obvious question: why do we see selective prioritisation of information in some 
circumstances, but not others? This is not the only query to arise from this pattern of results. The 
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nature of the gain allocation in the latter two experiments described was quite different: one 
suggested that humans prioritised the more extreme information (the more prevalent information on 
a given sample), whilst the other suggested humans prioritised “inlying” information that was 
consistent with the running mean of evidence. Thus a second question is: can we explain these 
differences in the nature of evidence prioritisation within just one framework?  
 
Despite these questions suggesting that the evidence across the experiments is potentially disparate, 
I will argue in what follows that the ‘inconsistencies’ are actually consistent, linked by a common aim: 
to allocate gain to the most informative evidence on a given task, subject to capacity constraints.   
 
Why do we see reliability-based behaviour only in some circumstances? 
Focusing first on the urn-and-balls tasks, and starting with the first question – why do we see reliability 
based behaviour in some circumstances, and asymmetric prioritisation in others? – one potential 
explanation pertains to the fact that the single-feature categorisation task seen in chapter two, and 
the multi-feature categorisation task used in chapter three differed in the level of cognitive load they 
produced, which presumably would increase as the number of features per category increased. Thus 
given that processing capacity may have been less limited by the simpler task used in chapter two, full 
(reliability-based) integration of the information was possible. However, when cognitive demand 
increased in the multi-feature task, selective prioritisation of more prevalent information occurred 
due to the limited capacity of the system under this higher requirement. Similarly, the task employed 
in chapter four – orientation categorisation of a series of samples drawn from distributions of angles 
with different levels of mean and variance – was cognitively demanding in the sense that sequentially 
occurring information from within the same trial could be highly disparate: when the underlying 
distribution had high variance, one sample could strongly favour category A, and the next strongly 
favour category B, and so on. Thus some trials featured conflicting information, the integration of 
which may lead to higher computational demand, and hence again selectivity of gain allocation to 
inlying evidence was required for the system to cope. Thus the presence of asymmetric weighting in 
some circumstances and absence in the others is consistent with the notion that selectivity is driven 
by limited processing resources. Under conditions of high late noise – noise that arises from sources 
internal to the observer, rather than in the stimulus itself, for example due to this high cognitive 
demand – capacity constraints mean that not all information can be fully integrated, and therefore 
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the best decisions can be made by allocating resources to the information that is most diagnostic of a 
choice.  
 
How can the different types of selectivity be explained? 
The second question is an interesting one: why should selectivity under late noise lead to prioritising 
of inliers in some circumstances (chapter 4, and the previous work described there) and the 
prioritising of extreme information in others (chapter 3, and the previous work described there)? The 
answer to this, it has been argued, pertains to the efficiency of resource allocation: resources are most 
usefully deployed when preferentially distributed to process information that is more likely to occur. 
This efficient resource allocation can be likened to the strategic placement of fielders during a game 
of rounders in an average school P.E. class: the most likely place the ball will go when bowled is 
straight past the batter, so it is most effective to have the person best at catching stationed as 
backstop, with several other fielders placed near base one ready to catch the ball and get the batter 
out. The likelihood of the ball going anywhere much beyond the bases, on the other hand, is slim, so 
only one person need be allocated as a ‘deep fielder’. In chapter four, the stimuli were drawn from 
Gaussian distributions; therefore participants’ prioritisation of inlying rather than outlying 
information can be explained via this efficiency: allocating resources to extreme stimuli (those far 
from the distribution mean, and that are therefore unlikely to occur) is wasteful, whereas focusing 
resources on the most likely stimuli (close to the distribution mean) makes best use of the available 
resources.  
 
Now consider the scenario in which the evidence is being drawn from a uniform distribution: all values 
within the given range are equally likely to occur. In this case there is no a priori reason to prioritise 
resources to any one feature value over another, and thus no way to allocate resources in the same 
way. To continue the playground game analogy, in a game of Bulldog, it is equally likely that the line 
of players will take any route within the boundaries past the bulldog to the other side. However, when 
the whistle goes the bulldog can still efficiently allocate their attention by focusing on the general area 
of space to which more of the players head first, neglecting to cover places where fewer people are 
running, as it is this that will make the bulldog more likely to catch someone. In chapter three, the 
number of balls drawn from the urn was uniform, and people prioritised information ‘on the fly’ – 
based on the most prevalent information on each sample – that allowed them to focus on the most 
informative evidence in this way. Thus again, the common aim outlined above– to allocate gain to the 
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most informative evidence on a given task, subject to capacity constraints – is satisfied within these 
different findings, as all results suggests that resources are being focused in the most efficient way (Li 
et al., 2017; Spitzer, Blankenburg, & Summerfield, 2016). 
 
However this leaves questions open for further research. Via what mechanism do people come to 
determine the nature of the underlying distribution of evidence and use it to allocate gain effectively? 
It is not implausible that they are able to make such deductions very quickly: research into summary 
statistics has shown that people are able to classify the average feature value (for example, size) of a 
group of shapes more quickly than it would be possible to process each shape individually, suggesting 
that humans may perform an initial summary ‘sweep’ of the scene that picks up on the statistics of 
the information present (Ariely, 2001; Chong & Treisman, 2003, 2005; Marchant & de Fockert, 2009; 
Solomon, Morgan, & Chubb, 2011). Furthermore when in doubt, the law of large numbers means that 
if a feature is sampled often enough, the feature values will form a Gaussian distribution, thus this is 
a heuristic people could use to infer the underlying structure of commonly occurring stimuli.  
 
Two different types of tasks were used in this thesis: the urn and balls task is what I term a comparison 
task, in which all information for both categories is present on screen at the same time in a given 
sample, whilst chapter four featured a categorisation task, in which only one piece of information is 
present on the screen at a time, and the information it conveys for category A is 1 minus the 
information it conveys for category B. The former task type always featured stimuli drawn from a 
uniform distribution, whilst the latter featured stimuli drawn from a normal distribution. In terms of 
the allocation of limited resources, it is unclear what would happen if a comparison task that featured 
stimuli from a normal distribution was used: we would arguably expect enhanced processing of 
information that is close to the mean of its respective category, but it is unclear whether the cognitive 
demand of such a process would be prohibitively high. Thus another potential explanation for the 
difference in resource allocation seen in the two task types is simply linked to processing capacity: 
selective integration occurs on categorisation tasks not because of the distribution of the stimuli, but 
because the cognitive load is too high for an alternative gain control mechanism. It could be that 
humans have a hierarchy of processes deployed according to cognitive load: reliability-based 
integration occurs when there is limited load, prioritisation of gain towards expected information 
occurs when the load is higher, and selective prioritisation of the most prevalent information occurs 
when the load is higher still. It happens to be the case that the comparison tasks only featured stimuli 
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drawn from uniform distributions, and the only categorisation task featured stimuli drawn from 
Gaussian distributions, making it impossible at present to tease apart the two explanations. Thus it 
remains to be clarified empirically which of the two explanations best accounts for the deployment 
of processing resources.  Of course, it could be the case that neither explanation is superior: other 
models not yet considered in my analysis may best capture the data.  
 
5.3 Interpreting new results 
Urgency 
The main focus thus far has been on the mechanisms underpinning evidence accumulation, given this 
was a theme common to all three experiments. In chapter four, the gain control mechanism that 
preferentially integrated evidence that was more consistent with the running mean formed part of a 
wider framework that linked the level of this accumulated quantity to choice times in a self-paced 
task. In this framework, decisions were triggered when the cumulate of this information reached a 
threshold level, which differed between individuals, and which decreased over time to allow decisions 
to be triggered even when evidence remained weak if enough time has passed. This type of signal is 
often referred to as an ‘urgency’ signal (Hawkins et al., 2015).  
 
Much previous work that has investigated what drives decisions to a close when the choice is self-
paced has focused on fitting model parameters to the distribution of reaction times for correct and 
error trials. Whilst this process formed part of our model-fitting procedure, we also used a design that 
enabled us to know precisely at each stage of an ongoing decision (trial) the underlying statistics (for 
example, the level of cumulative evidence at each timepoint). Our design also required participants 
to request each piece of information, rather than seeing it automatically, giving us a high degree of 
confidence that we had a precise measure of whether a person wished to continue sampling or 
commit to a choice, as both were active processes. This richness of information meant that we were 
able to interrogate the data in detail beyond model fits to reaction time distributions, by using a 
general linear model approach to predict the likelihood of decision commitment at any given time 
based on these quantities. This approach consistently demonstrated that time elapsed in itself was 
central in causing decisions to be terminated, a finding reflected in the fact that models with a 
collapsing bound captured data better on every measure used. We hope that the nature of the 
paradigm used here helps to bolster the case for the importance of an urgency signal in closing difficult 
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decisions, which we believe is central to understanding what drives commitment in such decisions, 
but which remains a controversial topic within the literature (Hawkins et al., 2015)  
 
Importantly, building on work using single unit recording (e.g. (Churchland et al., 2008)) we also 
identified a potential neural substrate of an urgency signal: the lateralised difference in beta band 
activity – a signal that has been linked to preparation of a motor response (Donner et al., 2009) – was 
significantly influenced by the amount of time elapsed in a decision. Interestingly, the cumulative 
decision information had no significant influence on this lateralised activity. This is puzzling given that, 
whilst the models suggest that time elapsed is important in driving choices, it is clearly not the only 
factor: these models assume that the level of decision information is what triggers the threshold, as 
time elapsed alone is not what terminates choices. One option for future research is to repeat this 
experiment but each participant, after completing the self-paced trials, is shown the exact same trials 
in a shuffled order under a non-self-paced paradigm. If the signal seen in the beta band is truly an 
urgency signal that is causally linked to the choice to terminate a decision, we should see it in the self-
paced but not the yoked experimenter-paced version of the task. This would help us to understand 
further the nature of this lateralised signal, and why it may or may not contain decision information.  
 
Subcategory selectivity 
An outstanding question from these results pertains to consistencies with the extant literature, rather 
than the questions above which focused on discrepancies within the experiments themselves: in 
previous work related to that seen in chapter three, in comparison tasks, information about the more 
prevalent category was preferentially integrated. Here, for the first time, a multi-feature 
categorisation task was used and the results suggested that in this paradigm, prevalent subcategory 
information was processed with enhanced gain. How this result stands with respect to the current 
literature warrants some discussion. The use of a multi-feature task to investigate selective 
integration was a new approach: previously, binary decisions between categories which themselves 
were comprised of only one feature (such as bar length) have been used. Here instead the decisions 
required people to choose between categories that were themselves comprised of more than one 
feature (colour): are the balls drawn from an urn that is mainly comprised of category A, itself 
comprised of orange and green balls, or mainly category B, itself comprised of pink and blue balls? 
Using this new paradigm, the results suggested that the more prevalent feature (or ‘subcategory’) 
within each category – e.g. orange or green – rather than information from the overall category (e.g. 
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category A, green and orange), was the element that was selectively integrated on the basis of its 
prevalence. Whilst we may have expected to see information prioritisation at the category level too, 
this was the first time that this new paradigm, which was designed to explore subcategory selectivity, 
was used, and was in many ways an exploratory investigation. Arguably the more surprising aspect of 
this pattern of integration was that, unlike selective integration at the category level, this process in 
itself did not protect decisions against the influence of late noise. This is particularly interesting given 
that the beneficial effects of selective integration in the face of late noise has been a key reason for 
understanding why individuals may behave in line with the process; it is more challenging to account 
for a mechanism that occurs with no apparent benefit relative to general down-weighting of all 
information in order to conserve neural resources. However, given that this is the first attempt to 
investigate selective integration in a multi-feature task, the robustness of this effect ought to be 
established with further empirical investigation before trying to draw strong conclusions about what 
this result may mean for the selective integration process in general.  
 
5.4 Future directions and wider questions 
An important focus for future work should arguably be to refine further the definition of ‘late noise’. 
Drugowitsch and colleagues made significant progress in formally identifying this source of noise that 
has a dissociable impact on choice from that of ‘early’ (sensory) noise. Furthermore, they were able 
to distinguish two different sources of late noise – integration noise and selection noise –  which they 
showed are increased by increasing the number of items to be integrated or the number of choice 
options respectively (Drugowitsch et al., 2016). However, increasing the number of options or samples 
is not the only way to increase the demands of these processes: integration could also be made more 
challenging by, for example, increasing the disparity in the pieces of evidence to integrate (as in the 
high variance trials in chapter four), and choices could be made more challenging by, for example, 
requiring different options to be selected with different modalities (say, a keyboard press for one 
option and a verbal report for another). However, whilst the notion that increased integration and 
choice demands will increase late noise at these stages is intuitive – the extent of ‘late noise’ will often 
naturally be linked to task difficulty in cognitive tasks –there is not one ‘common scale’ of late noise, 
as it can be increased or decreased in multiple ways. This presents a challenge to future research 
which seeks to link the level of late noise and the nature of selective integration processes seen. One 
way of approaching this problem consistently is to conduct a set of experiments in which cognitive 
 164 
load is systematically manipulated in a number of different ways, and to assess the level of late noise 
generated by these manipulations in an identical way across all tasks so that the level of late noise 
can be estimated in advance in future experiments.   
 
The finding that, under certain distributions of stimuli, people down-weight perceptually surprising 
information (such as outliers) is itself in some ways surprising: phenomena such as repetition 
suppression, expectation suppression (Todorovic & de Lange, 2012) and the oddball response (Picton, 
1992) may all suggest that we would do otherwise. All these phenomena are linked by a tendency to 
allocate more neural resources to ‘surprising’ stimuli: the oddball response is the enhanced neural 
response to rare (target) stimuli over frequent (non-target) stimuli. Repetition suppression is the 
dampened neural response to stimuli which have been seen recently, and expectation suppression is 
the attenuation of responses that are predicted (and therefore unsurprising). In chapter three, more 
prevalent – and therefore, statistically less ‘surprising’ – information is processed with enhanced gain, 
in contrast to these three phenomena.  Why do we see these conflicting patterns of results? The 
traditional distinction between “top-down” and “bottom-up” attention is crucial here: top-down 
attention is the internal process that guides attention based on prior knowledge and current goals, 
whereas bottom-up attention refers to external factors that grab attention, such as the salience of a 
stimulus relative to its context (Katsuki & Constantinidis, 2014). In the urn and balls paradigm in 
chapter three, no one piece of information would have stood out as inherently salient in comparison 
to the rest of the information, and as such should not have generated any bottom-up response. In 
contrast, the task goal was to determine which was the more underlying urn, and therefore top-down 
attention would arguably have been responsible for the larger neural response to more prevalent – 
i.e. unsurprising, but highly task relevant – information. Relatedly, in chapter four, the task involved a 
deliberate manipulation of the variance of the streams from which the stimuli were drawn, meaning 
that stimuli could be highly different from the running mean and as such may contain an element of 
bottom up as well as top down salience. This was reflected in the EEG response, consistent with the 
previous work that shows bottom-up salience leading to larger neural signals: we identified a unique 
portion of the EEG signal that was attributable to prediction error (i.e. how perceptually surprising the 
information was): the larger the discrepancy between the current stimulus and the running mean, the 
higher this neural response.  
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5.5 Optimal decisions?  
The notion of what constitutes a ‘good’ choice was discussed extensively in the introduction. A 
number of apparently ‘suboptimal’ behaviours outlined there can be accounted for within the 
frameworks provided by these tasks. Particularly, a recurring ‘suboptimal’ behaviour described in the 
literature is that of preference inconsistency: a truly rational observer should always show the same 
preference towards information of a certain value. In both chapters three and four, I showed that 
selective prioritisation of information goes some way to accounting for this inconsistency: the value 
or impact of a piece of information on a choice depends on the information with which it is presented. 
I defined a ‘good’ decision as one that leads to high accuracy in the face of late noise whilst accounting 
for the fact that we have limited processing resources. If we allow, based on the arguments presented 
throughout, that selective integration leads to ‘good’ choices in this way, then we can conclude that 
this apparent suboptimality seen in other experiments is simply a by-product of a generally beneficial, 
resource-efficient process.  
 
This definition of a ‘good’ decision comprises two subcomponents: resource efficiency, and 
robustness in the face of late noise. One potentially interesting question is whether the late noise 
protection arise as a by-product of a resource efficient process, or whether efficiency itself is a useful 
consequence of robust choices? Selective integration of information does not seem to be an 
automatic process, as it is not seen in the work presented in chapter two, which could suggest that it 
is driven by higher task demands (and thus supports the idea that limited resources drive the 
behaviour). On the other hand, irrespective of whether it saves processing resources, selectivity has 
been shown to lead to better choices than non-selectivity (though not at the subcategory level): 
indeed, the fact that selectivity was seen in chapter three despite not conferring any extra benefit to 
decisions could be taken as evidence that efficiency is the by-product of a semi-default process. 
Ultimately, this could perhaps be a ‘chicken-and-egg’ style question and either way, it is the 
combination of efficiency and robustness, rather than each in isolation, that underpins our definition 
of a ‘good’ choice.  
 
Whether or not we accept this way of defining ‘good’ decisions, our motivation ought not to be an 
attempt to ‘prove’ whether or not humans make optimal choices, but instead to understand, given 
that particular behaviours occur, why it happens (Rahnev & Denison, 2018). If decisions that appear 
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‘bad’ are made, what is the reason for this, and particularly, is it plausible that we have evolved for 
millions of years to make fundamental errors in quotidian choices? Of course, this is possible, but a 
key focus of my work is that ‘bad’ choices may be i) a by-product of what is generally a good procedure 
ii) due to our limited capacity system being physically incapable of making ‘optimal’ choices by some 
definitions or iii) some combination. All three of the experiments were linked by efficient policies that, 
generally, lead to accurate choices, despite not always being in line with an ‘optimal’ observer.  
 
The opening of this thesis states that “good things come to those who weight”. Are we now satisfied 
that this is true? We have seen across a series of three experiments that humans weight evidence 
according to a variety of features, and that this general policy leads to ‘good’ choices in terms of 
maximising accuracy of difficult decisions. This selectivity can be understood within a more general 
‘gain control’ framework, in which individuals prioritise the most informative evidence, based on the 
statistics of the environment.  In the other sense of the word, individuals must wait an appropriate 
amount of time before choosing – continuing to sample evidence for too long is costly, not sampling 
for long enough leads to bad choices. We saw that individuals make their decisions when weighted 
evidence reaches a threshold that collapses over time; the weighting means that choices are more 
likely to be accurate, the collapsing bound stops individuals from deliberating forever. Thus we can 
reasonably conclude that good things come to those who…  
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